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Riassunto
L’attivita` di ricerca dell’Ing. Juri Luca De Coi puo` essere suddivisa in tre parti. La
prima parte ha riguardato l’indagine dello stato dell’arte in policy language ed ha
prodotto i seguenti contributi:
∙ Identiﬁcazione dei requisiti di un moderno policy language;
∙ Deﬁnizione di un linguaggio che soddisfa tali requisiti (Protune);
∙ Implementazione di un framework per l’attuazione di Protune policy.
La seconda parte si e` focalizzata sulla sempliﬁcazione del processo di deﬁnizione di
policy ed ha prodotto i seguenti contributi:
∙ Identiﬁcazione di un sottoinsieme del linguaggio naturale controllato ACE1
adatto ad esprimere Protune policy ;
∙ Implementazione del mapping tra ACE policy e Protune policy ;
∙ Creazione di un editor in grado di guidare gli utenti passo-passo nella deﬁnizio-
ne di Protune policy.
La terza parte ha testato la fattibilita` dell’approccio scelto mediante l’applicazione
a scenari di concreta rilevanza, tra cui:
∙ Controllo d’accesso basato su policy per metadata store;
∙ Sviluppo di una sovrastruttura di sicurezza per RDF store.
L’attivita` di ricerca e` stata svolta in forte collaborazione con la Leibniz Universita¨t
Hannover e altri partner europei all’interno dei progetti REWERSE2, TENCompe-
tence3 ed OKKAM4.
1http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/site/
2http://rewerse.net/
3http://www.tencompetence.org/
4http://www.okkam.org/
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Zusammenfassung
Die im Laufe der Promotion von Herrn Juri Luca De Coi durchgefu¨hrten Forschungs-
arbeiten befassten sich mit dem Gebiet der policy languages und lassen sich in
drei Teile gliedern. Im ersten Teil wurde der Stand der Technik im Bereich policy
languages untersucht und erweitert, mit den folgenden Ergebnissen:
∙ Identiﬁzierung der Anforderungen, die von modernen Policy-Sprachen erfu¨llt
werden sollten;
∙ Deﬁnition der Policy-Sprache Protune, die diese Anforderungen erfu¨llt;
∙ Implementierung einer Infrastruktur, die Protune Policies interpretiert.
Der zweite Teil der Arbeit fokussierte die Vereinfachung des Deﬁnitionsverfahrens
von Protune Policies, mit den folgenden Ergebnissen:
∙ Identiﬁzierung einer zur Formulierung von Protune-Policies geeigneten Un-
termenge der kontrollierten natu¨rlichen Sprache ACE1;
∙ Implementierung einer automatischen U¨bersetzung von ACE-Policies in Pro-
tune-Policies;
∙ Erweiterung des ACE-Editors fu¨r die automatisierte Unterstu¨tzung von Be-
nutzern bei der Deﬁnition von ACE-Policies.
Im dritten Teil wurde die Anwendung der in den ersten beiden Teilen vorgestellten
Ansa¨tze auf realistische Szenarien untersucht. Dazu za¨hlt
∙ der leistungsfa¨hige und skalierbare Policy-basierte Zugriﬀ auf Metadaten und
∙ die Entwicklung einer Sicherheitebene fu¨r RDF-Datenbanken.
Die Forschungen wurden in enger Zusammenarbeit mit der Alma Mater Studiorum
– Universita` di Bologna als auch mit weiteren europa¨ischen Partnern innerhalb der
Projekte REWERSE2, TENCompetence3 und OKKAM4 durchgefu¨hrt.
1http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/site/
2http://rewerse.net/
3http://www.tencompetence.org/
4http://www.okkam.org/
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Abstract
The activity of the Ph.D. student Juri Luca De Coi involved the research ﬁeld of
policy languages and can be divided in three parts. The ﬁrst part of the Ph.D. work
investigated the state of the art in policy languages, ending up with
∙ identifying the requirements up-to-date policy languages have to fulﬁll
∙ deﬁning a policy language able to fulﬁll such requirements (namely, the Pro-
tune policy language)
∙ implementing an infrastructure able to enforce policies expressed in the Pro-
tune policy language
The second part of the Ph.D. work focused on simplifying the activity of deﬁning
policies and ended up with
∙ identifying a subset of the controlled natural language ACE1 to express Pro-
tune policies
∙ implementing a mapping between ACE policies and Protune policies
∙ adapting the ACE Editor to guide users step by step when deﬁning ACE
policies
The third part of the Ph.D. work tested the feasibility of the chosen approach by
applying it to meaningful real-world problems, among which
∙ eﬃcient policy-aware access to metadata stores
∙ development of a security layer on top of RDF stores
The research activity has been performed in tight collaboration with European part-
ners within the projects REWERSE2, TENCompetence3 and OKKAM4.
1http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/site/
2http://rewerse.net/
3http://www.tencompetence.org/
4http://www.okkam.org/
xii
List of publications
[1] Fabian Abel, Juri Luca De Coi, Nicola Henze, Arne Wolf Koesling, Daniel
Krause, and Daniel Olmedilla. Enabling advanced and context-dependent
access control in RDF stores. In ISWC/ASWC, pages 1–14, 2007.
[2] Fabian Abel, Juri Luca De Coi, Nicola Henze, Arne Wolf Koesling, Daniel
Krause, and Daniel Olmedilla. A user interface to deﬁne and adjust policies
for dynamic user models. In WEBIST, pages 184–191, 2009.
[3] Piero A. Bonatti, Juri Luca De Coi, Daniel Olmedilla, and Luigi Sauro. A
rule-based trust negotiation system. Accepted for TDKE.
[4] Piero A. Bonatti, Juri Luca De Coi, Daniel Olmedilla, and Luigi Sauro.
Policy-driven negotiations and explanations: Exploiting logic-programming for
trust management, privacy & security. In ICLP, pages 779–784, 2008.
[5] Piero A. Bonatti, Juri Luca De Coi, Daniel Olmedilla, and Luigi Sauro.
Rule-based policy representations and reasoning. In REWERSE, pages
201–232. 2009.
[6] Juri Luca De Coi, Peter Fankhauser, Tobias Kuhn, Wolfgang Nejdl, and
Daniel Olmedilla. Controlled natural language policies. In CCS, 2009.
[7] Juri Luca De Coi, Norbert E. Fuchs, Kaarel Kaljurand, and Tobias Kuhn.
Controlled English for reasoning on the Semantic Web. In REWERSE, pages
276–308. 2009.
[8] Juri Luca De Coi, Eelco Herder, Arne Ko¨sling, Christoph Loﬁ, Daniel
Olmedilla, Odysseas Papapetrou, and Wolf Siberski. A model for competence
gap analysis. In WEBIST, 2007.
[9] Juri Luca De Coi, Philipp Ka¨rger, Arne Wolf Koesling, and Daniel Olmedilla.
Exploiting policies in an open infrastructure for lifelong learning. In EC-TEL,
pages 26–40, 2007.
xiii
[10] Juri Luca De Coi, Philipp Ka¨rger, Arne Wolf Koesling, and Daniel Olmedilla.
Control your eLearning environment: Exploiting policies in an open
infrastructure for lifelong learning. TLT, 1(1):88–102, 2008.
[11] Juri Luca De Coi, Philipp Ka¨rger, Daniel Olmedilla, and Sergej Zerr.
Semantic Web policies for security, trust management and privacy in social
networks. In ICAIL, pages 112–119, 2009.
[12] Juri Luca De Coi, Philipp Ka¨rger, Daniel Olmedilla, and Sergej Zerr. Using
natural language policies for privacy control in social platforms. In SPOT,
pages 112–119, 2009.
[13] Juri Luca De Coi and Daniel Olmedilla. A ﬂexible policy-driven trust
negotiation model. In IAT, pages 450–453, 2007.
[14] Juri Luca De Coi and Daniel Olmedilla. A review of trust management,
security and privacy policy languages. In SECRYPT, pages 483–490, 2008.
[15] Juri Luca De Coi, Daniel Olmedilla, Piero A. Bonatti, and Luigi Sauro.
Protune: A framework for Semantic Web policies. In International Semantic
Web Conference (Posters & Demos), 2008.
[16] Juri Luca De Coi, Daniel Olmedilla, Sergej Zerr, Piero A. Bonatti, and Luigi
Sauro. A trust management package for policy-driven protection &
personalization of web content. In POLICY, pages 228–230, 2008.
[17] Ekaterini Ioannou, Juri Luca De Coi, Arne Wolf Koesling, Daniel Olmedilla,
and Wolfgang Nejdl. Access control for sharing Semantic Data across
desktops. In PEAS, 2007.
[18] Arne Wolf Koesling, Eelco Herder, Juri Luca De Coi, and Fabian Abel.
Making legacy LMS adaptable using policy and policy templates. In LWA,
pages 35–40, 2008.
[19] Piero A. Bonatti, Juri Luca De Coi, Wolfgang Nejdl, Daniel Olmedilla, Luigi
Sauro, and Sergej Zerr. Policy based protection and personalized generation
of web content. In LA-WEB, 2009.
xiv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Security management is a foremost issue in large-scale networks like the World
Wide Web. In such a scenario, traditional assumptions for establishing and enforc-
ing access-control regulations do not hold anymore. In particular, identity-based
access-control mechanisms have proved to be ineﬀective, since in decentralized and
multicentric environments the requester and the service provider are often unknown
to each other.
Policies are a well-known approach to protecting security and privacy of users
in the context of the Semantic Web: policies specify who is allowed to perform
which action on which resource depending on properties of the requester and of the
resource as well as parameters of the action and environmental factors (e.g., time).
In the last years many languages have been proposed which allow to express policies
in a formal way (policy languages). Some of them came together with software
components (policy engines) able to enforce policies written in the corresponding
policy language.
The potential policies have proved to own is not fully exploited yet, since
nowadays their usage is mainly restricted to speciﬁc application areas and the policy
languages proposed so far can be expected to be used only by security experts or
other computer scientists: common users cannot proﬁt from them, since almost no
policy framework oﬀers facilities or tools to meet the needs of users without a strong
background in computer science.
Being usability a major issue in moving toward a policy-aware Web, this work
tackles it by providing the following contributions.
1. The ﬁrst complete description of the semantics of the policy language Pro-
tune [19, 67] is provided
2. An extension of the Protune language toward the Semantic Web vision is
presented: a Protune program is not self-contained anymore but points to
1
2resources available on the Semantic Web which are automatically identiﬁed,
located, deployed and ﬁnally exploited at policy evaluation time
3. The natural language front-end for the Protune policy framework is de-
scribed
4. A description how the Protune engine can be used in order to create a
security level on top of metadata stores and RDF repositories is provided.
Such use cases have been addressed in order to test feasibility, eﬃcacy and
eﬃciency of the Protune engine w.r.t. real-world scenarios
This Ph.D. thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 presents an overall picture of the
research ﬁeld: in particular, Section 1.1 introduces the concept of policy, whereas
Section 1.2 outlines the historical evolution of policy languages. Chapter 2 presents
the state-of-the-art in policy languages. Chapter 3 describes syntax and semantics
of the last version of the Protune language and especially focuses on its diﬀerences
and improvements w.r.t. the previous version. Chapter 4 presents Protune’s ACE
front-end which allows to deﬁne Protune policies in natural language. Chapters 5
and 6 describe applications of the Protune engine to real-world scenarios, namely
how it can be used in order to create a security level on top of metadata stores and
RDF repositories respectively. Finally, Chapter 7 presents open issues and further
work, and concludes.
1.1 The concept of policy
According to [77]’s well-known deﬁnition, policies are “rules governing the
choices in the behavior of a system”, i.e., statements which describe which decision
the system must take or which actions it must perform according to speciﬁc circum-
stances. Policy languages are special-purpose programming languages which allow
to specify policies, whereas policy engines are software components able to enforce
policies expressed in some policy language.
Policies are encountered in many situations of our daily life: the following
example is an extract of a return policy of an on-line shop1.
1http://www.fancydressking.co.uk/returns-policy/info_5.html
3Any item for return must be received back in its original shipped con-
dition and original packing. The item must be without damage or use
and in a suitable condition for resale. All original packaging should ac-
company any returned item. We cannot accept returns for exchange or
refund if such items have been opened from a sealed package.
With the digital era, the speciﬁcation of policies has emerged in many Web-related
contexts and software systems. E-mail client ﬁlters like the following one are a
typical example of policy.
If the header of an incoming message contains a ﬁeld X-Spam-Flag whose
value is YES then move the message into the folder INBOX.Spam. More-
over, if this rule matches, do not check any other one.
Some of the main application areas where policies have been lately used are security
and privacy as well as speciﬁc business domains, where they take on the name of
“business rules” (but cf. [62, 63, 80] for other application areas).
A security policy deﬁnes security restrictions for a system, organization or
any other entity. It may deﬁne which resources a system should regard as security
relevant, in which way the resources should be protected and how the system should
proceed, if access to those resources is requested by a third party. A privacy policy
is a declaration made by an organization regarding its use of customers’ personal
information (e.g., whether third parties may have access to customer data and how
that data will be used). Finally, business rules describe the operations, deﬁnitions
and constraints that apply to an organization in achieving its goals. Tab. 1.1 presents
excerpts of a security policy2, a privacy policy3 and a business rule4 (in the business
domain of a tax collection agency).
The use of formal policies yields many advantages compared to other ap-
proaches: formal policies are usually dynamic, declarative, have a well-deﬁned se-
mantics and allow to be reasoned over. In the following, all above-mentioned prop-
erties will be thoroughly described.
2http://www.sans.org/resources/policies/DMZ_Lab_Security_Policy.doc
3http://www.siteprocentral.com/contracts/privacy_policy_sample.html
4http://law.onecle.com/texas/tax/11.145.00.html
41. Original ﬁrewall conﬁgurations and any changes thereto
must be reviewed and approved by InfoSec (including both
general conﬁgurations and rule sets). InfoSec may require
additional security measures as needed.
2. Our site users can choose to electronically forward a link,
page, or documents to someone else by clicking “e-mail
this to a friend”. The user must provide their email
address, as well as that of the recipient. This information
is used only in the case of transmission errors and, of
course, to let the recipient know who sent the email. The
information is not used for any other purpose.
3. A person is entitled to an exemption from taxation of the
tangible personal property the person owns that is held or
used for the production of income if that property has a
taxable value of less than $500.
Table 1.1: Example policies: (1) a security policy; (2) a privacy policy;
(3) a business rule
Dynamicity If the description of the behavior of an agent or other software com-
ponent is built in the component itself, whenever the need for a diﬀerent behavior
arises, new code for that behavior must be written, compiled and deployed. A more
reusable design choice provides the component with the ability of adapting itself ac-
cording to some dynamically conﬁgurable description of the desired behavior (i.e.,
a policy). This way, as soon as the need for a diﬀerent behavior arises, only the
policy and not the whole component must be replaced.
Declarativeness The traditional (imperative) programming paradigm requires
programmers to explicitly specify an algorithm to achieve a goal. On the other hand,
the declarative approach simply requires programmers to specify the goal, whereas
the implementation of the algorithm is left to the support engine. This diﬀerence
is commonly expressed by resorting to the sentence “declarative programs specify
what to do, whereas imperative programs specify how to do it”. For this reason,
declarative languages are commonly considered a step closer to the ﬁnal user than
imperative ones. Policy languages are typically declarative and policies are typically
declarative statements: as such, common users should be able to deﬁne them in an
easier way.
5Well-deﬁned semantics A language’s semantics is well-deﬁned if the meaning of
a program written in that language is independent of the particular implementation
of the language interpreter. Programs written in a language provided with well-
deﬁned semantics can be easily exchanged among diﬀerent parties since each party
understands them in the same way. Policy languages are usually based on some
mathematical formalism (like Logic Programming [64] or Description Logic [9]),
which ensures policies expressed in such languages to have a well-deﬁned semantics.
Formal policies have hence advantages over policies expressed by means of natural
language sentences, which tend to be ambiguous and lend themselves to diﬀerent
interpretations.
Reasoning The term “reasoning” refers to the possibility of combining known
information in order to infer new one, like in the following example.
If it is known that “all humans are mortal” and that “Socrates is human”
one can infer that “Socrates is mortal”.
On the one hand it is true that the sentence “Socrates is mortal” is diﬀerent than
the ones preceding it, but on the other one it is clear that, according to the common
sense, one can deduce (i.e., infer) the third sentence out of the ﬁrst two. The
inferred information is referred to as implicit knowledge, since it was not explicitly
available before. In the context of declarative programs (and in particular of policy
languages), statements a program consists of can be reasoned over in order to infer
new statements. For instance, reasoning applied to the third policy in Tab. 1.1
allows to infer that, if
∙ John is a person
∙ John owns a car
∙ the car is a tangible personal property
∙ John uses the car in his daily work (and therefore he uses it for the production
of income) and
∙ the car has a taxable value of less than $500
6then John is entitled to an exemption from taxation of the car.
1.2 From uid/psw-based authentication to trust negotiation
Traditional access-control mechanisms (like the ones exploited in usual oper-
ating systems) make authorization decisions based on the identity of the requester:
the user must provide a pair (푢푠푒푟푛푎푚푒, 푝푎푠푠푤표푟푑) and, if this pair matches any of
the entries in some static table kept by the system (e.g., the ﬁle /etc/pwd in Unix),
the user is granted with some privileges. However, in decentralized and multicentric
environments, peers are often unknown to each other and access control based on
identities may be ineﬀective.
In order to address this scenario, role-based access-control mechanisms have
been developed. In a role-based access-control system every user is assigned with
one or more roles which are in turn exploited in order to take authorization deci-
sions. Since the number of roles is typically much smaller than the number of users,
role-based access-control systems reduce the number of access-control decisions. A
thorough description of role-based access control can be found in [46].
In a role-based access-control system the authorization process is split in two
steps, namely assignment of one or more roles and check whether a member of the
assigned role(s) is allowed to perform the requested action. Role-based languages
usually provide support only to one of the two steps, moreover role-based authen-
tication mechanisms require that the requester provides some information in order
to map her to some role(s). In the easiest case this information can be once again
a (푢푖푑, 푝푤푑) pair, but systems which need a stronger authentication usually exploit
credentials, i.e., digital certiﬁcates representing statements certiﬁed by given entities
(certiﬁcation authorities) which can be used in order to establish properties of their
holder.
More modern approaches (cf. Chapter 2) directly exploit the properties of
the requester in order to make authorization decisions, i.e., they do not split the
authorization process in two steps like role-based languages. Nevertheless, they do
not use credentials in order to certiﬁcate the properties of the requester.
Credentials, as well as declarations (i.e., non-signed statements about proper-
7ties of the holder), are however building blocks of languages designed to support the
trust negotiation [60] vision: trust between peers is established by exchanging sets
of credentials between them in a negotiation which may consist of several steps.
CHAPTER 2
A Review of the State-of-the-art in Policy Languages
In the last years many policy languages have been proposed, targeting diﬀerent
application scenarios and provided with diﬀerent features and expressiveness: goal
of this chapter is to compare most of such languages in order to outline the features
an up-to-date policy language should provide. Such features have been used as a
guideline when deﬁning the Protune policy language we will describe in Section 3.
Comparisons among policy languages have been already provided in the lit-
erature. However existing comparisons either do not consider a relevant number
of available solutions or mainly focused on the application scenarios their authors
worked with (e.g., trust negotiation in [75] or ontology-based systems in [81]). More-
over, policy-based security management is a rapidly evolving ﬁeld and most of this
comparison work is now out-of-date.
Currently, a broad and up-to-date overview covering most of the relevant avail-
able policy languages is lacking. In this chapter we intend to ﬁll this gap by providing
an extensive comparison covering eleven policy languages. Such a comparison will
be carried out on the strength of ten criteria, partly already known in the literature
and partly introduced in our work for the ﬁrst time.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, related work is accounted
for. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 introduce the languages which will be compared and the
criteria according to which the comparison will be carried out respectively. The
actual comparison takes place in Section 2.4, whereas Section 2.5 presents overall
results and draws some conclusions.
2.1 Related work
The paper of Seamons et al. [75] is the basis of our work: some of the insights
they provided have proved to be still valuable right now and as such they are recalled
in our work as well. Nevertheless, in over seven years the research ﬁeld has consid-
erably changed and nowadays many aspects of [75] are out of date: new languages
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9have been developed and new design paradigms have been taken into account, what
makes the comparison performed in [75] obsolete and many criteria according to
which they were evaluated not suitable anymore.
The pioneer paper of Seamons et al. paved the way to further research on pol-
icy language comparisons like Tonti et al. [81], Anderson [7] and Duma et al. [38]. Al-
though [81] actually presents a comparison of two ontology-based languages (namely,
KAoS and Rei) with the Object-oriented language Ponder, the work is rather an
argument for ontology-based systems, since it clearly shows the advantages of on-
tologies.
Because of the impressive amount of details it provides, [7] restricts the com-
parison to only two (privacy) policy languages, namely EPAL and XACML, therefore
a comprehensive overview of the research ﬁeld is not provided, and features which
neither EPAL nor XACML support are not taken into account at all among the
comparison criteria.
Finally, [38] provides a comparison speciﬁcally targeted to giving insights
and suggestions to policy authors (designers). Therefore, the criteria according to
which the comparison is carried out are mainly practical ones and scenario-oriented,
whereas more abstract issues are considered out of scope and hence not addressed.
2.2 Considered policy languages
To date, a bunch of policy languages have been developed and are currently
available: we have chosen those which at present seem to be the most popular
ones, namely Cassandra [13], EPAL [8, 10], KAoS [82, 83], PeerTrust [42], Pon-
der [35], PSPL [21], Rei [48], 푅푇 [61], TPL [46], WSPL [6] and XACML [65, 43].
The information we will provide about the aforementioned languages is based on
the referenced documents. Whenever a feature is not addressed in the considered
literature nor is it known to the author in other way, that feature will be supposed
not to be provided by the language.
The number and variety of policy languages proposed so far is justiﬁed by the
diﬀerent requirements they had to accomplish and the diﬀerent use cases they were
designed to support. Ponder is meant to help local security policy speciﬁcation and
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security management activities, therefore typical addressed application scenarios in-
clude registration of users or logging and audit events, whereas ﬁrewalls, operating
systems and databases belong to the applications targeted by the language. WSPL’s
name itself (namely, Web Services Policy Language) suggests its goal: supporting
the description and control of various aspects and features of a Web Service. Web
Services are addressed by KAoS too, as well as general-purpose grid computing,
although it was originally oriented to software agent applications where dynamic
runtime policy changes need to be supported. Rei’s design was primarily concerned
with support to pervasive computing applications in which people and devices are
mobile and use wireless networking technologies to discover and access services and
devices. EPAL (Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language) was proposed by IBM
to support enterprise privacy policies. Some years before, IBM had already intro-
duced the pioneer role-based policy language TPL (Trust Policy Language), which
paved the way to other role-assignment policy languages like Cassandra and 푅푇
(Role-based Trust-management framework), both of which aim to address access-
control and authorization problems which arise in large-scale decentralized systems
when independent organizations enter into coalitions whose membership and very
existence change rapidly. The main goal of PSPL (Portfolio and Service Protection
Language) was to provide a uniform formal framework for regulating service access
and information disclosure in an open, distributed network system like the Web;
support to negotiations and private policies were among the basic reasons which
led to its deﬁnition. PeerTrust is a simple yet powerful language for trust ne-
gotiation on the Semantic Web based on a distributed request evaluation. Finally,
XACML (eXtensible Access-Control Markup Language) was meant to be a standard
general-purpose access-control policy language, ideally suitable to the needs of most
authorization systems.
2.3 Comparison criteria
We acknowledge the remark made by [38], according to which a comparison
among policy languages on the basis of the criteria presented in [75] is only par-
tially satisfactory for a designer, since general features do not help in understanding
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which kind of policies can be practically expressed with the constructs available in a
language. Therefore, in our comparison we selected a good deal of criteria having a
concrete relevance (e.g., whether actions can be deﬁned within a policy and executed
during its evaluation, how the result of a request looks like, whether the language
provides extensibility mechanisms and to which extent). On the other hand, since
we did not want to come short on theoretical issues, we selected four additional cri-
teria, basically taken from [75], and somehow reworked and updated them. We call
these more theoretical criteria core policy properties, whereas more practical issues
have been grouped under the label contextual properties.
2.3.1 Core policy properties
Well-deﬁned semantics As we already mentioned in Section 1.1, we consider a
policy language’s semantics to be well-deﬁned if the meaning of a policy written in
that language is independent of the particular implementation of the language. Logic
Programs and Description Logic knowledge bases have a mathematically deﬁned
semantics, therefore we assume policy languages based on either of the formalisms
to have well-deﬁned semantics.
Monotonicity In the sense of logic, a system is monotonic if the set of conclusions
which can be drawn from the current knowledge base does not decrease by adding
new information to the knowledge base. In the sense of [75], a policy language is
considered to be monotonic if an accomplished request would also be accomplished
if accompanied by additional disclosure of information by the actors involved in the
transaction: in other words, disclosure of additional evidences and policies should
result in granting additional privileges. Policy languages may be non-monotonic in
the sense of logic (as it happens with Logic Programming-based languages) but still
be monotonic in the sense of [75].
Condition expressiveness A policy language must allow to specify under which
conditions the request of the user (e.g., to perform an action or to disclose a creden-
tial) should be accomplished. Policy languages diﬀer in the expressiveness of such
conditions: some of them allow to set constraints on properties of the requester
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but not on parameters of the requested action. Moreover, constraints on environ-
mental factors (e.g., time) are not always supported. Cassandra’s expressiveness
can be even tuned by varying the constraint domain it is equipped with. This cri-
terion subsumes “credential combinations”, “constraints on attribute values” and
“inter-credential constraints” in [75].
Underlying formalism A good deal of policy languages base on some well-known
formalism: PSPL bases on Logic Programming, whereas Cassandra, Peer-Trust and
푅푇 on a subset of it (namely, Constrained Datalog) and KAoS on Description Logic.
Knowledge about the formalism a language bases upon can be useful in order to un-
derstand some features of the language itself: e.g., the fact that a language is based
on Logic Programming with negation (as failure) entails consequences regarding the
monotonicity of the language (in the sense of logic), whereas knowing that Descrip-
tion Logic knowledge bases may contain contradictory statements could induce to
infer that Description Logic-based languages needs to deal with such contradictions.
2.3.2 Contextual properties
Action execution During the evaluation of a policy, some actions may have to
be performed: one may want to retrieve the current system time (e.g., in case au-
thorization should be allowed only in a speciﬁc time frame), to send a query to a
database or to record some information in a log ﬁle. Cassandra, equipped with a
suitable constraint domain, allows to specify side-eﬀect free actions, whereas Ponder
and XACML support particular kinds of actions. It is worth noticing that this crite-
rion evaluates whether a language enables the policy author to specify actions within
a policy: during the evaluation of a policy the engine may carry out non-trivial ac-
tions on its own (e.g., both 푅푇 and TPL engines provide automatic resolution of
credential chains) but such actions are not considered in our investigation.
Delegation Delegation is often used in access-control systems to cater for tempo-
rary transfer of access rights to agents acting on behalf of other ones (e.g., passing
write rights to a printer spooler in order to print a ﬁle). The right of delegating is a
right as well and as such can be delegated, too. Some languages provide a means for
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cascaded delegations up to a certain length, whereas others allow unbounded del-
egation chains. In order to support delegation, many languages provide a speciﬁc
built-in construct, whereas others exploit ﬁner-grained features of the language in
order to simulate high-level constructs. The latter approach allows to support more
ﬂexible delegation policies and is hence better suited for expressing the subtle but
signiﬁcant semantic diﬀerences which appear in real-world applications.
Evidences During the evaluation of authentication policies, the requester might
have to provide credentials (cf. Section 1.2), i.e., digital certiﬁcates representing
statements certiﬁed by given entities (certiﬁcation authorities) which can be used
in order to establish properties of their holder. Credentials are not supported by
languages not targeting authentication policies (e.g., Ponder) nor by e.g., EPAL or
KAoS. PeerTrust and PSPL provide another kind of evidence, namely declara-
tions which are non-signed statements about properties of the holder (e.g., credit-
card numbers).
Negotiation support [6] adopts a broad notion of “negotiation”. A negotiation
is supposed to happen between two actors whenever: (i) both actors are enabled
to deﬁne a policy; and (ii) both policies are taken into account when processing a
request. According to this deﬁnition, WSPL supports negotiations as well. In this
work we adopt a narrower deﬁnition of negotiation by adding a third prerequisite
stating that: (iii) the evaluation of the request must be distributed, i.e., both actors
must evaluate the request locally and either decide to terminate the negotiation or
send a partial result to the other actor who will go on with the evaluation. Whether
the evaluation is local or distributed may be considered an implementation issue
as long as policies can be freely disclosed. Distributed evaluation is required under
a conceptual point of view as soon as the need for keeping policies private arises:
indeed, if policies were not private, simply merging the actors’ policies would reveal
possible compatibilities between them.
Policy engine decision The result of the evaluation of a policy must be notiﬁed
to the requester. The result sent back by the policy engine may carry information
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to diﬀerent extents: in the easiest case a boolean answer may be sent (allowed vs.
denied). Some languages (e.g., EPAL, WSPL and XACML) support error messages,
whereas Cassandra returns a set of constraints which is a subset of the one in the
requester’s query.
Extensibility Since experience shows that each system needs to be updated and
extended with new features, a good programming practice requires to keep things
as general as possible in order to support future extensions. Almost every language
provides some support to extensibility. 푅푇 may be regarded as an exception since,
as pointed out by [13], the need for more advanced features was handled by releasing
a new ﬂavor of the language (available 푅푇 ﬂavors can be obtained by combining
푅푇0 and 푅푇1 on the one hand with 푅푇
푇 and/or 푅푇퐷 on the other one). In the
following we provide a description of the mechanisms languages adopt in order to
support extensibility.
2.4 Comparison
In this section the considered policy languages will be compared according
to the criteria outlined in Section 2.3. The overall result of the comparison is
summarized in Tab. 2.4.
Well-deﬁned semantics As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, a policy language’s se-
mantics is well-deﬁned if the meaning of a policy written in that language is indepen-
dent of the particular implementation of the language. We assume policy languages
based on Logic Programming or Description Logic to have well-deﬁned semantics.
The formalisms underlying the considered policy languages will be accounted for in
the following. So far we restrict ourselves to listing the languages provided with a
well-deﬁned semantics, namely, Cassandra, EPAL, KAoS, PeerTrust, PSPL, Rei
and 푅푇 .
Monotonicity In the sense of [75], a policy language is considered to be monotonic
if disclosure of additional evidences and policies only results in granting additional
privileges. Therefore, the concept of “monotonicity” does not apply to languages
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which do not provide support for evidences, namely EPAL, Ponder, WSPL and
XACML. All other languages are monotonic, with the exception of TPL, which
explicitly supports negative certiﬁcates, stating that a user can be assigned a role
푅 if there exists no credential of some type claiming something about her. The
authors of TPL acknowledge that it is almost impossible proving that there does
not exist such a credential somewhere. Therefore, they interpret their statement in
a restrictive way, i.e., they assume that such a credential does not exist if it is not
present in the local repository. Despite this restrictive deﬁnition, the language is
still non-monotonic since, as soon as such a credential is released and stored in the
local repository, consequences which could be drawn previously cannot be drawn
anymore.
Condition expressiveness A role-based policy language maps requesters to roles.
The assigned role is afterwards exploited in order (not) to authorize the requester
to execute some action. The mapping to a role might in principle be performed ac-
cording to the identity or other properties of the requester (to be stated by some evi-
dence) and possibly environmental factors (e.g., current time). Cassandra, equipped
with a suitable constraint domain, supports both scenarios.
Environmental factors are not taken into account by TPL, where the map-
ping to a role is only performed according to the properties of the requester. Such
properties can be combined by using boolean operators, moreover a set of built-in
operators (e.g., >, =) is provided in order to set constraints on their values.
Environmental factors are not taken into account by 푅푇0 either, where role
membership is identity-based, meaning that a role must explicitly list its members.
Nevertheless, since: (i) roles are allowed to express sets of entities having a certain
property; and (ii) conjunctions and disjunctions can be applied to existing roles in
order to create new ones; then role membership is eventually based on properties of
the requester. 푅푇1 goes a step beyond and, by adding the notion of parametrized
role, allows to set constraints not only on properties of the requester but also on the
ones of the resource on which the requested action should be performed. This feature
makes the second step traditional role-based policy languages consist of unnecessary.
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For this reason, 푅푇1, as well as the other 푅푇 ﬂavors basing on it, may be considered
to lay on the border between role-based and non role-based policy languages.
A non role-based policy language does not split the authentication process
in two diﬀerent steps but directly provides an answer to the question whether the
requester should be allowed to execute some action. In this case, the authorization
decision can in principle be made not only according to properties of the requester
or the environment, but also according to the ones of the resource on which the
action would be performed as well as parameters of the action itself. EPAL intro-
duces the further notion of “purpose” for which a request was issued and allows
to set conditions on it. Some non role-based languages make a distinction between
conditions which must be fulﬁlled in order for the request to be at all taken into
consideration (which we call prerequisites, according to the terminology introduced
by [21]) and conditions which must be fulﬁlled in order for the request to be satisﬁed
(requisites, according to [21]): not always both kinds of conditions have the same
expressiveness.
Let start checking whether and to which extent the non role-based policy lan-
guages we consider support prerequisites: WSPL and XACML only support a simple
set of criteria to determine a policy’s applicability to a request, whereas Ponder pro-
vides a complete solution which allows to set prerequisites involving properties of
requester, resource, environment and parameters of the action. Prerequisites can
be set in EPAL and PSPL as well: the expressiveness of PSPL prerequisites is the
same as the one of its requisites, which we will discuss later.
With the exception of Ponder, which allows to set restrictions on environmental
properties only for delegation policies, each other language supports requisites (Rei
is even redundant in this respect): KAoS allows to set constraints on properties
of the requester and the environment, Rei also on action parameters and PSPL,
WSPL and XACML also on properties of the resource. EPAL supports conditions
on the purpose for which a request was issued but not on environmental properties.
Attributes must be typed in EPAL, WSPL, XACML and typing can be considered
a constraint on the values the attribute can assume, anyway the deﬁnition of the
semantics of such attributes is outside WSPL’s scope. Finally, in PeerTrust
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conditions can be expressed by setting guards on policies: each policy consists of a
guard and a body, the body is not evaluated until the guard is satisﬁed.
Underlying formalism The most part of languages provided with a well-deﬁned
semantics rely on some kind of Logic Programming or Description Logic. Logic
Programming is the semantic foundation of PSPL, whereas a subset of it, namely
Constraint Datalog, is the basis for Cassandra, PeerTrust and 푅푇 . KAoS relies
on Description Logic, whereas Rei combines features of Description Logic (ontolo-
gies are used in order to deﬁne domain classes and properties associated with the
classes), Logic Programming (Rei policies are actually particular Logic Programs)
and Deontic Logic (in order to express concepts like rights, prohibitions, obligations
and dispensations). EPAL exploits Predicate Logic without quantiﬁers. Finally,
no formalisms underly Ponder (which only bases on the Object-oriented paradigm),
TPL, WSPL and XACML.
Action execution Ponder allows to access system properties (e.g., time) from
within a policy. Moreover, it supports obligation policies, asserting which actions
should be executed if some event happens: examples of such actions are printing a
ﬁle, tracking some data in a log ﬁle and enabling/disabling user accounts. XACML
allows to specify actions within a policy: these actions are collected during the policy
evaluation and executed before sending a response back to the requester. A similar
mechanism is provided by EPAL and of course by WSPL, which is indeed a speciﬁc
proﬁle of XACML. The only actions the policy author can specify in PeerTrust
and PSPL are related to the sending of evidences. Cassandra (equipped with a
suitable constraint domain) allows to call side-eﬀect free functions (e.g., to access
the current time). It is worth noticing that languages which allow to specify actions
within policies can to some extent simulate obligation policies, as long as the trig-
gering event is the reception of a request, although in such languages the ﬂexibility
provided by Ponder is not met. Finally, KAoS, Rei, 푅푇 and TPL do not support
the execution of actions.
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Delegation Ponder deﬁnes a speciﬁc kind of policies in order to deal with delega-
tion: the ﬁeld valid allows positive delegation policies to specify constraints (e.g.,
time restrictions) to limit the validity of the delegated access rights. Rei allows to
deﬁne not only policies delegating rights but also policies delegating the right to del-
egate (some other right). Delegation is supported by 푅푇퐷 (“D” stands indeed for
“delegation”): being 푅푇 a role-based language, the right which can be delegated is
the one of activating a role, i.e., the possibility of acting as a member of such a role.
Ponder delegation chains have length 1, whereas 푅푇 delegation chains always have
unbounded length. Cassandra provides a more ﬂexible mechanism which allows to
explicitly set the desired length of a delegation chain (as well as other properties
of the delegation): in order to obtain such a ﬂexibility, Cassandra does not pro-
vide high-level constructs to deal with delegation but simulates them by exploiting
ﬁner-grained features of the language. Delegation (of authority) can be expressed
in PeerTrust by exploiting the operator @. Finally, EPAL, KAoS, PSPL, TPL,
WSPL and XACML do not support delegation.
Type of evaluation The most part of the considered languages require that all
policies to be evaluated are collected in some place before starting the evaluation,
which is hence performed locally: this is the way EPAL, KAoS, Ponder, 푅푇 and
TPL work. Cassandra, Rei, WSPL and XACML perform policy evaluation locally,
nevertheless they provide some facility in order to collect policies or policy fragments
which are spread across the network. For instance, in XACML combining algorithms
deﬁne how to collect results of the evaluation of multiple policies and derive a single
result, whereas Cassandra allows policies to refer to policies of other entities, so that
policy evaluation may trigger requests for remote policies (possibly the requester’s
one) over the network. Policies can be collected in a single place if they can be freely
disclosed, therefore the languages mentioned so far do not address the possibility
that policies may have to be kept private themselves. Protection of sensitive policies
can be granted only by providing support to distributed policy evaluation, like the
one carried out by PeerTrust or PSPL.
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Evidences The result of a policy’s evaluation may depend on the identities or
other properties of the actor who requested its evaluation: a means needs hence
to be provided in order for the actors involved in the transaction to communicate
such properties to each other. Such information is usually provided in the form
of digital certiﬁcates signed by trusted entities (certiﬁcation authorities) and called
credentials. Credentials are a key element in Cassandra, 푅푇 and TPL, whereas
they are unnecessary in Ponder, whose policies are concerned with limiting the
activity of users who have already been successfully authenticated. The authors of
PSPL were the ﬁrst ones advocating for the need of non-signed statements (e.g.,
credit card numbers), which they called declarations. Declarations are supported
by PeerTrust as well. Finally, EPAL, KAoS, Rei, WSPL and XACML do not
support evidences.
Negotiation support As stated in Section 2.3.2, we use a narrower deﬁnition
of negotiation than the one provided in [6], into which WSPL does not ﬁt. There-
fore, only pretty few languages support negotiation in the sense we speciﬁed above,
namely Cassandra, PeerTrust and PSPL.
Policy engine decision The evaluation of a policy should end up with a result
to be sent back to the requester. In the easiest case such result is a boolean stating
whether the request was (not) fulﬁlled: KAoS, PeerTrust, Ponder, PSPL, 푅푇 and
TPL conform to this pattern. Beside permit and deny, WSPL and XACML provide
two other result values to cater for particular situations: not applicable is returned
whenever no applicable policies or rules could be found, whereas indeterminate
accounts for some error which occurred during the processing. In the latter case,
optional information is made available to explain the error.
A boolean value, stating whether the request was (not) fulﬁlled, does not
make sense in the case of an obligation policy, which simply describes the actions
which must be executed as soon as an event (e.g., the reception of a request) hap-
pens. Therefore, beside the so-called rulings allow and deny, EPAL deﬁnes a third
value (don’t care) to be returned by obligation policies. One of the elements an
EPAL policy consists of is a global condition which is checked at the very begin-
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ning of the policy evaluation: not fulﬁlling such a condition is considered an error
and a corresponding error message (policy error) is returned. A further message
(scope error) is returned in case no applicable policies were found.
Cassandra’s request format contains (among other things) a set of constraints
푐 belonging to some constraint domain: the response consists of a subset 푐′ of 푐
which satisﬁes the policy. In case 푐′ = 푐 (resp. 푐′ = ∅) true (resp. false) is
returned. Rei obligation policies enable the requester to decide whether to complete
the obligation by comparing the eﬀects of meeting the obligation (MetEffects) and
the eﬀects of not meeting it (NotMetEffects).
Extensibility Extensibility is a fuzzy concept: almost all languages provide some
extension points to let the user adapt it to her speciﬁc needs. Nevertheless, the
extension mechanisms greatly vary from language to language: here we brieﬂy sum-
marize the means the various languages provide in order to address extensibility.
Extensibility is described as one of the criteria taken into account when de-
signing Ponder: in order to smoothly provide support to new types of policies which
may arise in the future, inheritance was considered a suitable solution and Ponder
was hence implemented as an Object-oriented language.
XACML’s support to extensibility is two-fold: (i) on the one hand, new
datatypes, as well as functions for dealing with them, may be deﬁned in addition to
the built-in ones. Datatypes and functions must be speciﬁed in XACML requests,
which indeed consist of typed attributes associated with the requester, the resource
acted upon, the action being performed and the environment; (ii) as we mentioned
above, XACML policies can consist of any number of distributed rules. XACML
already provides a number of combining algorithms which deﬁne how to collect re-
sults of the evaluation of multiple policies and derive a single result. Nevertheless,
a standard extension mechanism is available to deﬁne new algorithms.
Using non-standard user-deﬁned datatypes would lead to wasting one of the
strong points of WSPL, namely the standard algorithm for merging two policies into
a single one which subsumes both of them (assuming that such a policy exists), since
there can be no standard algorithm for merging policies which exploit user-deﬁned
21
attributes (except in case the only comparison operators supported are = and ∕=).
The use of non-standard algorithms would in turn mean that WSPL policies could
not be supported by a standard policy engine. Being standardization the main
goal of WSPL, no wonder that it comes short on the topic “extensibility”, which is
not necessarily a drawback, if the assertion of [6] holds: “most Web Services will
probably use fairly simple policies in their service deﬁnitions”.
Ontologies are the means to cater for extensibility in KAoS and Rei: the use of
ontologies facilitates a dynamic adaptation of the policy framework by specifying the
ontology of a given environment and linking it with the generic framework ontology.
Both KAoS and Rei deﬁne basic built-in ontologies, which are supposed to be further
extended for a given application.
Extensibility was the main issue taken into account in the design of Cassandra.
Its authors realized that standard policy idioms (e.g., role hierarchy or role delega-
tion) occur in real-world policies in many subtle variants. Instead of embedding such
variants in an ad hoc way, they decided to deﬁne a policy language able to express
this variety of features smoothly. In order to achieve this goal, the key element is
the notion of constraint domain, an independent module which is plugged into the
policy engine in order to adjust the expressiveness of the language. The advantage
of this approach is that the expressiveness (and hence the computational complex-
ity) of the language can be chosen depending on the requirements of the application
and can be easily changed without having to change the language semantics.
Finally, PeerTrust, PSPL, 푅푇 and TPL do not provide extension mecha-
nisms.
2.5 Discussion
By carrying out the task of comparing a considerable amount of policy lan-
guages, we came to believe that they can be classiﬁed in two main groups collecting,
so to say, standard-oriented and research-oriented languages respectively.
EPAL, WSPL and XACML can be considered standard-oriented languages
since they provide a well-supported but restricted set of features. Although it is
likely that this set will be extended as long as the standardization process proceeds,
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so far the burden of providing advanced features is charged on the user who needs
them. Standard-oriented languages are hence a good choice for users who do not
need advanced features but for whom compatibility with standards is a foremost
issue.
Ponder, 푅푇 and TPL lay somehow in between. On the one hand, Ponder pro-
vides a complete authorization solution, which however takes place after a previously
overcome authentication step. Therefore, Ponder cannot be applied to contexts (like
pervasive environments) where users cannot be accurately identiﬁed. On the other
hand, 푅푇 and TPL do not provide a complete authorization solution, since they
can only map requesters to roles and need to rely on some external component to
perform the actual authentication (although parametrized roles available in 푅푇1 and
the other 푅푇 ﬂavors basing on it make the previous statement no longer true).
Finally research-oriented languages strive toward generality and extensibility
and provide a number of more advanced features in comparison with standard-
oriented languages (e.g., conﬂict harmonization in KAoS and Rei, negotiations in
Cassandra, PeerTrust and PSPL). Therefore, they should be the preferred choice
for users who do not mind about standardization issues but require the advanced
functionalities which research-oriented languages provide.
CHAPTER 3
The Protune Policy Language
This chapter describes the syntax and semantics of the Protune policy language.
An engine able to enforce Protune policies has been implemented and can be freely
downloaded from http://skydev.l3s.uni-hannover.de/gf/project/protune/w
iki/?pagename=Evaluation. The Protune language speciﬁcations are partially
an original contribution of this work (cf. Section 3.6 for a description of the im-
provements w.r.t. the previous version) as is the reasoning-related part of the
Protune engine. Language speciﬁcations and engine are just two building blocks
of the Protune framework, which also comprises a policy-ﬁltering module [19],
an explanation-generation module [20], a natural language front-end [30], a wrap-
per for Web applications [17, 32] and an editor (available at http://policy.l3s.
uni-hannover.de:9080/policyFramework/protune/demo.html). None of these
further modules (but the natural language front-end described in Chapter 4) are
original contributions of and will be described in this work.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 introduces Protune’s con-
ceptual space. Protune’s syntax and semantics are informally introduced in Sec-
tions 3.2 and 3.3 respectively and formalized in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
Finally, Section 3.6 outlines original contributions and improvements of the version
of the Protune language described in this work w.r.t. the previous version.
3.1 Protune’s conceptual space
A typical access-control scenario involves two actors : the one which issues a
request to access some resource or service and the one which accepts or rejects such
request.
Note 1 With “actors” we mean “logical actors”, which do not need to be physically
separated entities: access requests can be issued by one component of a concentrated
system to another component of the same system. However, it is often the case
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that actors are independent entities residing on diﬀerent nodes of a network which
seldom come across each other for the purpose of accessing resources or services.
Note 2 The handling of access requests might involve more than two actors. In a
typical scenario (cf. Section 2.3.2), the actor to which the access request has been
issued cannot or does not want to take the access decision and therefore delegates
a third entity to take it. In another typical scenario, certiﬁcation authorities (cf.
Section 1.2) are consulted in order to check the authenticity of a certiﬁcate provided
by some actor. However, except in case the opposite is explicitly stated, we will
assume in the following that the handling of access requests involves exactly two
actors.
For this reason, Protune assumes that two actors are available whenever an access
request takes place. We will call client the one issuing the access request and server
the one taking the access decision.
Note 3 As we will see in the following, the communication between actors can
evolve to a negotiation (cf. Section 2.3.2) in which, when handling an access re-
quest, the server can issue counter-requests to the client and therefore, in some
sense, it becomes a client as well. For this reason, in Protune the meaning of the
terms “client” and “server” is relative to the most deeply nested counter-request. In
Protune counter-requests can nest to arbitrary depth.
In order to issue a request, the client must know
1. which request it wants to issue
2. whom it wants to issue the request to
In order to handle a request, the server must know
3. the policy in force
4. according to which strategy the policy should be evaluated
Items 1., 2., 3., and 4. will be discussed in Sections 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and 3.1.4
respectively.
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3.1.1 The user interface
As described in Section 2.4, many policy languages base on some mathemat-
ically deﬁned logical formalism in order to provide a well-deﬁned semantics. Pro-
tune is no exception, since it bases on (a subset of) Logic Programming [64] (LP
in the following). In particular, an access request is modeled as a (Protune) goal.
For this reason, Protune natively supports two kinds of requests
∙ yes/no requests (e.g., am I allowed to access resource res1? )
∙ multiple-answer requests (e.g., which resources am I allowed to access? )
Like usual LP-engines (e.g., SWI-Prolog1, tuProlog2, YAP-Prolog3), the Protune
engine implements the answer to a goal as an iterator [41]: the iterator is empty if
the requesting actor is not allowed to access the resource (for yes/no requests) or if
there is no resource it is allowed to access (for multiple-answer requests). Otherwise,
the diﬀerent elements of the iterator can be retrieved one by one.
Note 4 The Protune engine’s user interface also provides a commodity to retrieve
all accessable resources at once. Because of the possibly considerable increment of
computational resources required as well as of sensitive information disclosed, users
are strongly encouraged to rely on the iterator-based interface and to resort to the
above-mentioned commodity only if all accessable resources have to be retrieved.
3.1.2 The communication channel
A communication channel must be provided between the actors of an access-
control scenario which, as mentioned in Note 1, often reside on diﬀerent nodes of a
network. The Protune engine provides an abstraction layer over the communica-
tion medium, so that users willing to issue a request to an actor are only required to
provide the name or address of the host on which the actor resides. The Protune
engine will check automatically and in a transparent way through which medium
the communication with the actor can be established.
1http://www.swi-prolog.org/
2http://alice.unibo.it/xwiki/bin/view/Tuprolog/
3http://www.dcc.fc.up.pt/˜vsc/Yap/
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Note 5 In case of a negotiation (cf. Note 3), the medium through which counter-
requests are issued and answered does not have to be the one through which the
original request is issued and answered.
This design choice has both advantages and drawbacks. Up to now, sockets4 are
the only communication medium supported. As soon as other media (like, e.g.,
secure sockets5, RMI6 or Web Services7) are supported, the required changes to the
Protune engine will not aﬀect the network interface. However, as it is often the
case in computer science, as soon as the abstraction level is risen, a bigger user-
friendliness is obtained to the detriment of ﬂexibility. Our approach is user-friendly
in the sense that nothing but name or address of the actor’s host has to be provided
by the user. On the other hand, only one single Protune engine (and hence one
single policy) per host is possible. Since we did not ﬁnd any reasonable scenario
yet for which this restriction could be a limitation, we do not plan to change our
approach yet.
3.1.3 Protune policies
Trust is the top of the well-known Semantic Web stack [76] and Protune has
been proposed within the Semantic Web community in order to become a building
block of the Semantic Web vision. As such, Protune fosters interoperability among
resources spread across diﬀerent nodes of the Semantic Web. For this reason, a
Protune policy is a distributed program: the policy residing on the host of either
of the communicating actors is supposed to be only an entry point which refers to
other resources, namely, further policies and executable ﬁles (speciﬁcally, jar ﬁles).
The policies which are referred to can in turn refer to other ones, so that in general
the evaluation of a Protune policy requires to evaluate a graph of resources, all
of which are automatically identiﬁed, located, deployed and ﬁnally exploited by the
Protune engine.
4http://java.sun.com/docs/books/tutorial/networking/sockets/index.html
5http://java.sun.com/javase/6/docs/technotes/guides/security/jsse/JSSERefGuide
.html
6http://java.sun.com/javase/6/docs/technotes/guides/rmi/index.html
7http://java.sun.com/webservices/technologies/index.jsp
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A policy can refer to an external resource by exploiting a predicate (cf. follow-
ing sections) which is not deﬁned within the policy itself but in a diﬀerent package.
The concept of package has been inspired by Java packages, which indeed share some
similarities with Protune packages: the pair (푝푎푐푘푎푔푒, 푝푟푒푑푖푐푎푡푒푁푎푚푒) univocally
identiﬁes a Protune predicate, just like the pair (푝푎푐푘푎푔푒, 푐푙푎푠푠푁푎푚푒) univocally
identiﬁes a Java class. However, the two concepts do not overlap: in the following
we account for the main diﬀerences.
∙ Java packages are simply namespaces introduced in order to avoid conﬂicts
when deﬁning classes with the same name. Protune packages are URIs8
pointing to actual information (stored in a manifest ﬁle) about the type and
the location of the external resource
∙ The Java Virtual Machine is able to understand whether a required class is
missing, but it cannot automatically retrieve it. The Protune engine is able
to understand whether a required predicate is missing and to identify, locate,
deploy and exploit in an automatic way the external resource deﬁning it
Note 6 A Protune manifest ﬁle contains exactly two entries, namely, the type
and the location of the external resource. The type is either logical (for Protune
policies) or provisional (for executable ﬁles), whereas the location is a URI.
Note 7 Undiscriminated import of external policies can lead to security leakage.
Therefore, special care was taken when designing the importing process. Importing
an allow rule 푎푙푙표푤(⟨푎푡표푚⟩) ← ⟨푏표푑푦⟩. (cf. following sections) would add to the
importing policy a further condition enabling the requesting actors which fulﬁll ⟨푏표푑푦⟩
to know whether ⟨푎푡표푚⟩ holds, and it might be the case that this behavior does not
match the intention of the author of the importing policy. For this reason, the
Protune engine automatically ﬁlters allow rules out of the policies to be imported.
3.1.4 Evaluation strategies
It is often the case that there is more than one single way to fulﬁll a request.
For instance, in order to access some resource an identity card or a student id might
8http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986
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have to be disclosed. Moreover, it might be the case that some actor possesses both
an identity card and a student id but prefers to disclose one of them over the other.
Diﬀerent alternatives can be followed at the same time. This might be mean-
ingful in case of negotiations (cf. Note 3), where the disclosure of sensitive informa-
tion does not guarantee per se access to the requested resource, which also depends
on the successful evaluation of counter-requests. If time is an issue, following dif-
ferent alternatives with the hope that at least one of them leads to a successful
negotiation might be more meaningful than trying an alternative, waiting until it
fails and trying the next one, even if more sensitive information must be disclosed.
Identifying in an automatic way the best set of sensitive resources to be dis-
closed according to some optimality criterion as well as enabling the user to de-
ﬁne herself which resources should be disclosed by means of a preference language
(e.g., [34]) are research ﬁelds on their own (cf. [84, 85, 86, 87] for a general account)
and are orthogonal to the topic of this work. The Protune engine provides sup-
port to evaluation strategies by supplying the well-known eager and parsimonious
strategies [84] as well as a general interface which can be extended by third parties
in order to deﬁne customized evaluation strategies.
3.2 A gentle introduction to Protune’s syntax
Fig. 3.1 shows an excerpt of the Protune policy of the ﬁctitious on-line
bookstore “Happy Book”. We will make use of such excerpt in order to introduce
Protune’s syntax in an informal way: the formal speciﬁcation of Protune’s syn-
tax is provided in Section 3.4. Fig. 3.1 shows keywords and other tokens of the
Protune language in italics. The policy should be self-explanatory because of the
comments which exemplify Protune’s conventions for single-line (cf. lines 5, 8, 12,
14 and 36) and multiple-line (cf. lines 21-27) comments.
Protune is based on Datalog [2] and, as such, it is an LP-based policy lan-
guage (cf. Section 2.3.1). A Protune program is basically a set of normal Logic
Program rules [64] 퐴 ← 퐿1, . . . 퐿푛 where 푛 ≥ 0, 퐴 is an atom (called the head of
the rule) and 퐿1, . . . 퐿푛 (the body of the rule) are literals, i.e., ∀푖 : 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛 퐿푖
equals either 퐵푖 or ∼ 퐵푖 (where the symbol ∼ denotes the negation-as-failure [64]
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1: 푖푚푝표푟푡 <www.happy-book.com/policies/module.mf!/retrieve/2>
2: 푖푚푝표푟푡 <www.protune.com/modules/basics.mf!/date/1>
3: 푖푚푝표푟푡 <www.protune.com/modules/credentials.mf!/send/2>
4: 푖푚푝표푟푡 <www.visa.com/policies/creditCard.mf!/chargedOn/2>
5: % The client can retrieve a resource if it is public.
6: 푎푙푙표푤(retrieve(Id,Resource))←
7: public(Id).
8: // The client can retrieve a non-public resource if it buys it.
9: 푎푙푙표푤(retrieve(Id,Resource))←
10: 푛표푡 public(Id),
11: buy(Resource).
12: % Resource res1 is public.
13: public(res1).
. . .
14: // The following lines deﬁne the properties type, . . . date of resource res1.
15: res1[“type”] = book.
16: res1[“title”] = “De Agri Cultura”.
17: res1[“author”] = “M. Porcius Cato”.
18: res1[“author”] = “A. Mazzarino”.
19: res1[“isbn”] = 3598711328.
20: res1[“date”] = ‘July 1998’.
. . .
21: /∗
22: The client buys a resource if it
23: * sends a credit card and
24: * (assuming that CurrentDate denotes the current date)
25: * the credit card has not expired yet and
26: * the price of the resource has been charged on the credit card
27: ∗/
28: buy(Resource)←
29: [1] send(
30: “SELECT id FROM credentials WHERE type = ‘creditCard’”,
31: CreditCard
32: ),
33: date(CurrentDate),
34: CreditCard[“expirationDate”] ≥ CurrentDate,
35: chargedOn(Resource[“price”], CreditCard).
36: % The literal labeled [1] (lines 29-32) must be evaluated by the client.
37: [1]→ 푎푐푡표푟 : 푝푒푒푟.
Figure 3.1: Example Protune policy
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operator) for some atom 퐵푖. Lines 6-7, 9-11 and 28-35 show rules whose body is not
empty, whereas lines 13 and 15-20 show facts, i.e., rules whose body is empty.
The vocabulary of the atoms occurring in Protune rules is partitioned into
the following categories.
Allow Have the form allow(푎푡표푚), where 푎푡표푚 is a non-allow atom (cf. lines 6,
9). Allow atoms are the entry points of Protune policies, in the sense that a
goal atom can be successfully evaluated only if it matches the non-allow atom
in the head of some allow rule (cf. Note 8)
Classical Have the form 푝(푡1, . . . 푡푎), where 푎 ≥ 0 (cf. lines 7, 10-11, 13, 28-33,
35). 푝 and 푎 are called the name and the arity respectively of the predicate
exploited in the atom, whereas ∀푖 : 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푎 푡푖 is a term (cf. below). Classical
atoms are further partitioned into logical and provisional atoms, according to
whether they exploit logical or provisional predicates (cf. Note 6 and below)
Comparison Have the form 푡1 ∘ 푡2, where 푡1 and 푡2 are terms and ∘ is a comparison
operator (cf. line 34). Protune supports the following comparison operators:
=, ∕=, >, ≥, <, ≤
Value-assignment Have the form 푐푡 = 푡, where 푐푡 is a complex term (cf. below)
and 푡 is a term (cf. lines 15-20). Value-assignment atoms owe their name to
the fact that, when appearing in the head of a rule whose body is fulﬁlled,
they assign a value to a given attribute of an object (cf. below)
Note 8 All of allow, . . . value-assignment atoms (but provisional atoms) can appear
both in rule heads and bodies. Rules in whose head an allow, . . . value-assignment
atom appears are called allow, . . . value-assignment rules respectively.
By deﬁnition, provisional atoms cannot appear in rule heads since they are
not deﬁned in a policy but in an executable ﬁle (cf. Note 6). Value-assignment
atoms in rule bodies check whether an object possesses a given (푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pair.
Examples 2, 3 and 4 show meaningful applications of comparison rules. Finally,
allow atoms can be exploited in rule bodies whenever the conditions to be fulﬁlled in
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order to evaluate an atom 푎푡표푚2 are a superset of the conditions to be fulﬁlled in
order to evaluate an atom 푎푡표푚1, like in the following example.
allow(푎푡표푚1) ←
푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛1, . . . 푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푚.
allow(푎푡표푚2) ←
푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛1, . . . 푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푚, 푓푢푟푡ℎ푒푟퐶표푛푑푖푡푖표푛1, . . . 푓푢푟푡ℎ푒푟퐶표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푛.
The second rule can be replaced by the more compact one
allow(푎푡표푚2) ←
allow(푎푡표푚1), 푓푢푟푡ℎ푒푟퐶표푛푑푖푡푖표푛1, . . . 푓푢푟푡ℎ푒푟퐶표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푛.
Logical predicates are deﬁned in (i.e., appear in the head of some rule of) a (pos-
sibly imported) policy (cf. the predicates 푝푢푏푙푖푐/1 and 푏푢푦/1 at lines 7, 10-11, 13,
28). The evaluation of provisional predicates (like 푟푒푡푟푖푒푣푒/2, 푠푒푛푑/2, 푑푎푡푒/1 and
푐ℎ푎푟푔푒푑푂푛/2 at lines 6, 9, 29-33, 35) requires to perform an action. Provisional
packages (cf. Note 6) deﬁne the mapping between provisional predicates and ac-
tions, evaluate the formers and execute the latters. For this reason, the provisional
predicates appearing in Fig. 3.1 are not part of the Protune language and the fol-
lowing explanation of their interface does not add anything to its description but is
only meant to provide for a better understanding of the policy presented in Fig. 3.1.
retrieve/2 Predicate deﬁned by Happy Book (cf. line 1) which allows to retrieve
the resource corresponding to a given identiﬁer from a local database. The
identiﬁer is modeled as an object identiﬁer (cf. below), whereas the resource
is modeled as an object having at least the attribute price whose value is
modeled as a number (cf. below). The evaluation of (an atom exploiting) the
predicate can be successful only if its ﬁrst (resp. second) parameter is (resp.
is not) instantiated
send/2 Predicate deﬁned in the credentials package of theProtune framework (cf.
line 3) which allows to retrieve the credentials fulﬁlling given constraints from
a local credential database. The speciﬁcation of the constraints is modeled as
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a(n SQL) string (cf. below), whereas the credentials are modeled as objects.
The evaluation of the predicate can be successful only if its ﬁrst (resp. second)
parameter is (resp. is not) instantiated
date/1 Predicate deﬁned in the basics package of the Protune framework (cf.
line 2) which allows to retrieve the current date. The current date is modeled
as a date (cf. below). The evaluation of the predicate can be successful only
if its parameter is not instantiated
chargedOn/2 Predicate deﬁned by VISA (cf. line 4) which allows to charge a given
amount on a given credit card. The amount is modeled as a number, whereas
the credit card is modeled as an object. The evaluation of the predicate can
be successful only if both parameters are instantiated
Protune is a typed language and provides four scalar datatypes (namely, booleans,
numbers, strings and dates) and one vectorial datatype (namely, objects). Booleans
are represented by means of the keywords false and true, whereas the right-hand
side of the equality at line 19 (resp. 18, 20) shows that numbers (resp. strings and
dates) are represented as lists of digits (resp. double-quoted character strings and
single-quoted character strings whose content can be interpreted as a date—more
on this in Section 3.4). Objects are sets of (푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pairs linked to an
identiﬁer and people familiar with Java, JavaScript or PHP can think of them as
maps, objects or associative arrays respectively. However, whilst in such languages
each attribute has one single value, Protune attributes can be multi-valued (cf.
lines 17-18). Notice that objects whose attributes are integers can simulate arrays
and lists.
Protune terms can be variables, scalars, object identiﬁers (cf. line 13 and
the right-hand side of the equality at line 15) or complex terms (cf. the left-hand
sides of the equalities at lines 15-20, the left-hand side of the inequality at line 34
and the ﬁrst parameter at line 35). Complex terms have the form 푡1[푡2] where 푡1 is
a variable, an object identiﬁer or a complex term in turn, whereas 푡2 is a term.
The heads of rules contain atoms, whereas the heads of metarules contain
metaatoms. In this work we only focus on actor metaatoms/rules. Sensitivity and
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explanation metaatoms/rules, exploited by the policy-ﬁltering [19] and explanation-
generation module [20] respectively (cf. the beginning of this chapter), are beyond
the scope of this work.
The head of the actor metarule at line 37 contains the actor metaatom [1]→
actor:peer. Actor metarules owe their name to the actor metaatoms their heads
contain. Actor metaatoms owe their name to the token actor they contain. Actor
metaatoms are the mechanism used by Protune to support counter-requests (cf.
Note 3): literals whose labels are referred to by actor metaatoms are supposed to be
evaluated by the client. Finally, the bodies of metarules do not necessarily have to
be empty: metarule bodies do not substantially diﬀer from rule bodies, beside the
fact that they can contain (unlabeled) metaatoms, too.
We conclude this section by describing the format of the importing state-
ments at lines 1-4. Whenever a provisional predicate or a logical predicate not
deﬁned in the current policy is exploited, a corresponding importing statement
must be added to the current policy. Importing statements have the form import
<푢푟푖!/푛푎푚푒/푎푟푖푡푦>, where 푛푎푚푒 (resp. 푎푟푖푡푦) is the name (resp. arity) of the
imported predicate, whereas 푢푟푖 is the URI of the manifest of the package deﬁning
the predicate (cf. Section 3.1.3).
3.3 A gentle introduction to Protune’s semantics
Usual LP-engines (like the ones mentioned in Section 3.1.1) evaluate in a
similar way goals and the bodies of rules which have to be evaluated, namely, ac-
cording to the SLDNF-resolution mechanism [64]. The evaluation of a goal/body
퐿1, . . . 퐿푛 (where 푛 > 0) is successful iﬀ the evaluation of each of the literals 퐿푖
(where 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛) is successful.
The Protune engine evaluates Protune goals and bodies in a similar way.
However, unlike usual LP-engines, it evaluates diﬀerently goal and body literals
because of the following reasons.
∙ A goal literal is supposed to be evaluated by the server, whereas a body literal
might have to be evaluated by the client (cf. Note 3)
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∙ Before evaluating a goal literal, the server must check whether the policy in
force allows to evaluate it. Such a check is not needed for body literals
The evaluation of a goal literal of the form 푎푡표푚 is successful iﬀ both of the following
conditions are fulﬁlled.
∙ 푎푡표푚 can be evaluated according to the server’s policy, i.e., the server’s policy
contains some rule whose head matches allow(푎푡표푚) and the evaluation of
whose body is successful
∙ The evaluation of 푎푡표푚 is successful
The evaluation of a goal literal of the form ∼ 푎푡표푚 is successful iﬀ the evaluation
of the goal literal 푎푡표푚 is not (negation-as-failure [64] inference rule).
Note 9 The evaluation of a goal fails if either of the atoms it consists of cannot be
evaluated or if the evaluation of either of the literals it consists of is unsuccessful. In
both cases, the client will receive the same failure message, so that it has no means
to understand which case applies. Providing the client with information about which
kind of failure occurred would lead to unnecessarily disclosing (possibly sensitive)
information about the server’s policy. Being our goal to minimize unnecessary in-
formation disclosure, we designed the Protune engine’s interface so that it does
not distinguish between the two kinds of failure.
The evaluation of a body literal 퐿 is successful iﬀ either of the following conditions
is fulﬁlled.
∙ 퐿 has to be evaluated by the server and
– either 퐿 is of the form 푎푡표푚 and the server’s policy contains some rule
whose head matches 푎푡표푚 and the evaluation of whose body is successful
– or 퐿 is of the form ∼ 푎푡표푚 and the evaluation of the body literal 푎푡표푚
is unsuccessful (negation-as-failure [64] inference rule)
∙ 퐿 has to be evaluated by the client and the client evaluates it successfully
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A literal 퐿 has to be evaluated by the client iﬀ the server’s policy contains an actor
metarule (cf. Section 3.2) whose head matches [푖푑]→actor:peer (where [푖푑] is
the label identifying 퐿) and the evaluation of whose body is successful.
The evaluation of an atom varies according to the type of the atom. Sec-
tions 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 thoroughly describe how provisional, comparison and
value-assignment atoms respectively are evaluated. Logical atoms are not considered
since their evaluation takes place according to the well-known SLDNF-resolution
mechanism [64].
3.3.1 Provisional atoms
As mentioned in Section 3.1.3, the evaluation of (atoms exploiting) provisional
predicates requires to perform an action. The execution of such an action is del-
egated to an external resource (executor), which has to provide a given interface.
The input parameter of an executor is the atom to be evaluated, whereas the return
value is similar to the one of the whole Protune engine (cf. Section 3.1.1), namely
an iterator whose diﬀerent elements can be retrieved one by one.
Note 10 The return value of executors has been designed to be an iterator instead
of an atomic value because such interface models some scenarios in the most natural
way: against an SQL query, RDBMSs return sets of tuples, each of which can be
modeled most naturally as an element of an iterator.
Note 11 The interface executors must provide is a syntactic constraint, but not a
semantic one: in particular, the Protune speciﬁcations do not describe when a
(non-)empty iterator must be returned. It is reasonable that an empty iterator is
returned whenever no result is available. However, some executor developer might
want to return an empty iterator in order to signal that some error occurred (e.g.,
some variable was not instantiated). We do not encourage this practice whenever
it leads to ambiguities (i.e., whenever an empty iterator could be interpreted as
signaling both that no result is available and that some error occurred). However,
it can be considered a reasonable design choice for actions which, if successfully
executed, always return at least one result (e.g., retrieving the current date—cf.
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Fig. 3.1, line 33), if the executor developer has strong motivations for not providing
the executor user with any information about the occurred error.
Provisional atoms are recognized as such at policy-load time (cf. Section 3.1.3) and
track of the executors in charge of evaluating them is kept. Whenever a provisional
atom must be evaluated, the corresponding executor is invoked.
We conclude this section by describing how objects are handled throughout
the control ﬂow from the Protune engine to an executor and back. As described
in Section 3.2, objects are not atomic entities but sets of (푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pairs
linked to an identiﬁer. In order to be able to operate on an object, an executor
must be provided with all its (푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pairs. For this reason, whenever a
provisional atom must be evaluated, if some term of its is an object, the Protune
engine collects all such pairs before handing them over to the executor.
Note 12 Notice that such pairs might be spread throughout the policy as diﬀerent
facts or might even have to be inferred (as it happens if they appear in the head of
some value-assignment rule). Moreover, since the attributes and values pairs consist
of can be objects in turn, their (푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pairs must be collected as well.
Conversely, if it happens that some result returned by the executor contains an
object, the Protune engine keeps track of its (푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pairs in the current
scope.
Note 13 Beside containing Protune objects, represented as sets of (푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒,
푣푎푙푢푒) pairs linked to an identiﬁer, the current scope can contain their representation
as serializable9 Java objects linked to the same identiﬁer. The Java representation is
not used by the Protune engine during the reasoning process but executors might
ﬁnd it handier than the pair-based one. For this reason, whenever a provisional atom
must be evaluated, if some term of its is an object, the Protune engine hands its
Java representation over to the executor and, if it happens that some result returned
by the executor contains an object, it adds its Java representation to the current scope
as well. Finally, the Java representation is required to be a serializable object since
9http://java.sun.com/developer/technicalArticles/Programming/serialization/
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it might have to be transmitted across the network and the Protune engine makes
extensive use of the Java serialization mechanism for its network-related tasks.
Example 1 shows that the support to objects and actions reduces the declarativeness
of the Protune language.
Example 1 Assuming that
∙ the evaluation of the provisional atom 푎(푋) has as a result the binding of 푋
to an object having the (푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pair (“푎”,“푣”)
∙ no value-assignment atoms of the form 푌 [“푎”] =“푣” can be inferred from the
policy in force or the current scope before the evaluation of 푎(푋)
the evaluation of the atom 푌 [“푎”] =“푣” will be successful only if performed after the
evaluation of 푎(푋).
As shown in Example 1, in order to be able to write policies which are interpreted as
intended, a policy author must be aware of both: (i) the side-eﬀects of the evaluation
of a provisional atom; and (ii) the order according to which the Protune engine
evaluates the literals of a goal/body. Although this behavior of the Protune engine
might reduce the user-friendliness of the Protune language, it is the price to pay
in order to integrate objects and actions into a policy language and, all in all, it does
not diﬀer from the behavior of a usual Prolog engine: some knowledge of the way
a Prolog program is interpreted is required in order to write eﬀective and eﬃcient
Prolog programs as well.
3.3.2 Comparison atoms
The evaluation of a comparison atom is unsuccessful if either of the terms to
be compared is not instantiated or if they are not of the same type. In particular,
implicit casting is not supported (e.g., when comparing the string "1" and the
number 0, the former does not get automatically converted into the number 1, nor
is the number 0 automatically converted into the string "0" when comparing it with
the string "a"). If both terms are instantiated and of the same type, the outcome
of the evaluation depends on the type itself as well as on the comparison operator.
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= ∕= > ≥ < ≤
boolean × ×
number × × × × × ×
string × × × × × ×
date × × × × × ×
object × ×
Table 3.1: Comparisons supported by default
Tab. 3.1 summarizes the comparisons supported by default: the evaluation of
comparison atoms involving types and operators corresponding to cells not marked
with a cross is always unsuccessful (e.g., the evaluation of the comparison atom
true > false is unsuccessful). The outcome of the evaluation of comparison atoms
involving types and operators corresponding to cells marked with a cross depends on
the actual terms to be compared: the Protune ordering of numbers is the intuitive
one, strings are ordered alphabetically and dates temporally. The boolean false
is equal to itself and diﬀerent than the boolean true (the same holds if false and
true are swapped). Finally, two objects are equal if and only if they are the same
one (i.e., they have the same identiﬁer).
The default semantics of the operators has been deﬁned in order to ﬁt the needs
of most users. However, users can also modify (but not override) it by deﬁning
comparison rules (cf. Note 8). Such rules extend the semantics of an operator
by stating further conditions which, if fulﬁlled, allow a comparison atom to be
successfully evaluated. Examples 2, 3 and 4 show some cases in which comparison
rules can be useful.
Example 2 In some scenarios it might be convenient setting an ordering between
booleans so that, e.g., false precedes true. This behavior can be obtained by deﬁning
the following comparison facts.
false < true.
true > false.
false <= false.
false <= true.
true <= true.
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false >= false.
true >= false.
true >= true.
Example 3 As mentioned above, by default two objects are considered to be equal
if and only if they have the same identiﬁer. However, in some scenarios it might
be convenient considering equal two objects 표1 and 표2 if they have the same set of
(푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pairs (or, more formally, if 푠푢푏푠푒푡(표1, 표2) ∧ 푠푢푏푠푒푡(표2, 표1) holds,
where 푠푢푏푠푒푡(표1, 표2) holds iﬀ ∀(푎1, 푣1) ∈ 표1∃(푎2, 푣2) ∈ 표2 such that 푎1 equals 푎2 and
푣1 equals 푣2). This behavior can be obtained by deﬁning one or more comparison
rules.
Example 4 As mentioned above, by default the evaluation of a comparison atom
is unsuccessful if either of the terms to be compared is not instantiated. However,
in some scenarios it might be convenient having an equality operator which behaves
similarly as the =/2 Prolog predicate10, i.e., which uniﬁes the terms to be compared
whenever possible so that, e.g., the evaluation of the comparison atom X = 2 succeeds
(and, as a side-eﬀect, uniﬁes X and 2) instead of failing. This behavior can be
obtained by deﬁning one or more comparison rules.
Comparison rules conform to Protune’s namespace mechanism (cf. Section 3.1.3)
as well, i.e., the extension of the semantics of an operator by means of a rule within
a given policy does not aﬀect the semantics of the same operator within a diﬀerent
policy. On the other hand, such extension can be imported into a diﬀerent policy by
exploiting the namespace of the imported policy together with the operator within
the importing one, like in the following example (where www.protune.com/modules/
basics.mf is the namespace of the imported policy).
X <www.protune.com/modules/basics.mf> = Y
Note 14 Whenever the user extends the semantics of an operator, the burden of
ensuring the consistency of the extension lays on the user herself. For instance,
10http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=21413
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although users are allowed to deﬁne the fact true = false., they must be aware of
the consequences of such a deﬁnition (in particular, the boolean true would be both
equal to and diﬀerent than the boolean false – because of the user-deﬁned fact and
the default semantics respectively).
Similarly, users are allowed to deﬁne both facts true >= false. and true
<= false., although this would lead to losing the antisymmetric property equality
usually possesses.
Note 15 W.r.t. the ﬁrst example presented in Note 14, the deﬁnition of the fact
true = false. implies that the evaluation of the atom true = false is success-
ful, but it does not imply per se that the evaluation of the atom false = true is
successful as well. In order to obtain such a result, a further fact false = true.
must be deﬁned. For a similar reason, none of the facts listed in Example 2 may be
omitted, if an ordering with the usual properties is desired.
Finally, during the evaluation of a comparison atom user-deﬁned rules are evaluated
(according to the well-known SLDNF-resolution mechanism [64]) before resorting to
the default semantics.
3.3.3 Value-assignment atoms
As described in Section 3.3.1, the evaluation of a provisional atom might
end up with the addition of one or more objects (and hence one or more sets of
(푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pairs) to the current scope. On the other hand, as described in
Section 3.2, users can create objects within a policy by deﬁning value-assignment
rules. For this reason, during the evaluation of a value-assignment atom, both user-
deﬁned rules and objects available in the current scope must be inspected. The
evaluation of a value-assignment atom is successful iﬀ it is uniﬁable with
∙ the head of some (value-assignment) rule, the evaluation of whose body is
successful or
∙ some (푎푡푡푟푖푏푢푡푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pair of some object available in the current scope
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Two value-assignment atoms 푡11[푡
1
2] = 푡
1
3 and 푡
2
1[푡
2
2] = 푡
2
3 (where ∀1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 2, 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 3
푡푖푗 is not a complex term—cf. Section 3.2) are uniﬁable iﬀ the triples (푡
1
1, 푡
1
2, 푡
1
3) and
(푡21, 푡
2
2, 푡
2
3) are uniﬁable. Cf. Section 3.5 for the case in which some 푡
푖
푗 is a complex
term.
The value-assignment atom 푡1[푡2] = 푡3 (where ∀1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 3 푡푖 is not a complex
term) is uniﬁable with the pair (푎, 푣) of the object whose identiﬁer is 푖푑 iﬀ the triples
(푡1, 푡2, 푡3) and (푖푑, 푎, 푣) are uniﬁable. Cf. Section 3.5 for the case in which some 푡푖
is a complex term.
Finally, the evaluation of user-deﬁned rules (according to the well-known
SLDNF-resolution mechanism [64]) takes place before objects available in the cur-
rent scope are inspected.
3.4 Protune’s syntax
This section formally describes the syntax of the Protune policy language.
For the sake of completeness, we will also formalize sensitivity and explanation
metaatoms, although we did not describe them thoroughly in the previous sections
(cf. the beginning of this chapter).
3.4.1 Terms
Deﬁnition 1 (Term) A term is either a variable, a boolean, a number, a string, a
date, an object identiﬁer or a complex term (cf. Deﬁnition 2).
We will represent variables as Prolog variables, booleans (resp. strings) as Java
booleans (resp. strings), numbers as Java integers, longs, ﬂoats or doubles11, dates as
single-quoted strings whose content is considered a valid date by the parse(String)
method of the java.text.DateFormat Java class12 and object identiﬁers as Prolog
non-quoted identiﬁers. Cf. below for the representation of complex terms.
Example 5 All of the following are well-formed terms: the variables X and ,
the boolean false, the numbers 0, 0L, 1e1f and 1e-9d, the string "", the date
‘24.06.09 10:50’ and the object identiﬁer a.
11http://java.sun.com/docs/books/jls/third_edition/html/j3TOC.html
12http://java.sun.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/text/DateFormat.html
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Deﬁnition 2 (Complex term) A complex term is a pair (푖푑, 푡푒푟푚), where 푖푑 is
either a variable, an object identiﬁer or a complex term and 푡푒푟푚 is a term (cf.
Deﬁnition 1).
We will represent complex terms as 푖푑[푡푒푟푚], where 푖푑 is the string representa-
tion of the variable (resp. object identiﬁer, complex term) and 푡푒푟푚 is the string
representation of the term.
Example 6 All of the following are well-formed complex terms: a[true], X[a],
a[a[a]] and a[X][0].
Deﬁnition 3 (Comparison operator) A comparison operator is either of =, !=,
>, >=, < and <=.
3.4.2 Atoms
Deﬁnition 4 (Classical atom) A classical atom is a pair (푛푎푚푒, 푡푒푟푚푠), where
푛푎푚푒 is a predicate name and 푡푒푟푚푠 is a (possibly empty) list of terms (cf. Deﬁni-
tion 1).
We will represent predicate names as Prolog non-quoted identiﬁers and classical
atoms as
∙ 푛푎푚푒, where 푛푎푚푒 is the string representation of the predicate name, if 푡푒푟푚푠
is empty
∙ 푛푎푚푒(푡푒푟푚1, ... 푡푒푟푚푛), where 푛 = #푡푒푟푚푠 and 푡푒푟푚푖 is the string repre-
sentation of the 푖-th term in 푡푒푟푚푠 (1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛), if 푡푒푟푚푠 is not empty
Example 7 All of the following are well-formed classical atoms: a and a(X, false,
0, "", ‘24.06.09 10:50’, a, a[a]).
Deﬁnition 5 (Comparison atom) A comparison atom is a triple (표푝푒푟푎푡표푟, 푙푒푓푡,
푟푖푔ℎ푡), where 표푝푒푟푎푡표푟 is a comparison operator (cf. Deﬁnition 3), and 푙푒푓푡 and
푟푖푔ℎ푡 are terms (cf. Deﬁnition 1).
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We will represent comparison atoms as 푙푒푓푡 표푝푒푟푎푡표푟 푟푖푔ℎ푡, where 푙푒푓푡 (resp. 표푝푒푟-
푎푡표푟, 푟푖푔ℎ푡) is the string representation of the left term (resp. comparison operator,
right term).
Example 8 All of the following are well-formed comparison atoms: X = false, 0
< "" and ‘24.06.09 10:50’ >= a.
Deﬁnition 6 (Queriable atom) A queriable atom is either a classical atom (cf.
Deﬁnition 4) or a comparison atom (cf. Deﬁnition 5).
Deﬁnition 7 (Decision atom) A decision atom is a singleton {푎푡표푚}, where 푎푡표푚
is a queriable atom (cf. Deﬁnition 6).
We will represent decision atoms as allow(푎푡표푚), where 푎푡표푚 is the string repre-
sentation of the queriable atom.
Example 9 All of the following are well-formed decision atoms: allow(a) and
allow(X = false).
Deﬁnition 8 (Atom) An atom is either a queriable atom (cf. Deﬁnition 6) or a
decision atom (cf. Deﬁnition 7).
3.4.3 Goals and rules
Deﬁnition 9 (Queriable literal) A queriable literal is a pair (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚),
where 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is either false or true and 푎푡표푚 is a queriable atom (cf. Deﬁ-
nition 6).
We will represent queriable literals as
∙ 푎푡표푚, where 푎푡표푚 is the string representation of the queriable atom, if 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑
is false
∙ not 푎푡표푚, if 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is true
Example 10 All of the following are well-formed queriable literals: a, not X =
false.
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Deﬁnition 10 (Goal) A goal is a non-empty list of queriable literals (cf. Deﬁni-
tion 9).
We will represent goals as 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙1, ... 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푛., where 푛 is the number of queri-
able literals the goal consists of and 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푖 is the string representation of the 푖-th
queriable literal (1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛).
Example 11 All of the following are well-formed goals: a. and a, X = false..
Deﬁnition 11 (Literal) A literal is either a pair (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚) or a triple (푙푎푏푒푙,
푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푞퐴푡표푚), where 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is either false or true, 푎푡표푚 is an atom (cf.
Deﬁnition 8), 푞퐴푡표푚 is a queriable atom (cf. Deﬁnition 6) and 푙푎푏푒푙 is a label.
We will represent labels as Prolog non-quoted identiﬁers and literals as
∙ 푎푡표푚, where 푎푡표푚 is the string representation of the atom, if the literal is of
the form (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚) and 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is false
∙ not 푎푡표푚, if the literal is of the form (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚) and 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is true
∙ [푙푎푏푒푙] 푞퐴푡표푚, where 푙푎푏푒푙 is the string representation of the label and 푞퐴푡표푚
is the string representation of the queriable atom, if the literal is of the form
(푙푎푏푒푙, 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚) and 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is false
∙ [푙푎푏푒푙] not 푞퐴푡표푚, if the literal is of the form (푙푎푏푒푙, 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚) and
푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is true
Example 12 All of the following are well-formed literals: a, not X = false and
[a] allow(a).
Deﬁnition 12 (Rule) A rule is either a pair (ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦) or a triple (푙푎푏푒푙, ℎ푒푎푑,
푏표푑푦), where ℎ푒푎푑 is an atom (cf. Deﬁnition 8), 푏표푑푦 is a (possibly empty) list of
literals (cf. Deﬁnition 11) and 푙푎푏푒푙 is a label.
We will represent labels as Prolog non-quoted identiﬁers and rules as
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∙ ℎ푒푎푑., where ℎ푒푎푑 is the string representation of the atom, if the rule is of
the form (ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦) and 푏표푑푦 is empty
∙ ℎ푒푎푑 :- 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙1, ... 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푛., where 푛 = #푏표푑푦 and 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푖 is the string
representation of the 푖-th literal in 푏표푑푦 (1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛), if the rule is of the form
(ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦) and 푏표푑푦 is not empty
∙ [푙푎푏푒푙]: ℎ푒푎푑., where 푙푎푏푒푙 is the string representation of the label, if the
rule is of the form (푙푎푏푒푙, ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦) and 푏표푑푦 is empty
∙ [푙푎푏푒푙]: ℎ푒푎푑 :- 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙1, ... 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푛., if the rule is of the form (푙푎푏푒푙,
ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦) and 푏표푑푦 is not empty
Example 13 All of the following are well-formed rules: a., X = false :- a. and
[a]: allow(a) :- X = false..
3.4.4 Metaatoms
Deﬁnition 13 (Actor metaatom) An actor metaatom is a singleton {푙푎푏푒푙}, wh-
ere 푙푎푏푒푙 is a literal label (cf. Deﬁnition 11).
We will represent actor metaatoms as 푙푎푏푒푙->actor:peer, where 푙푎푏푒푙 is the string
representation of the literal label.
Deﬁnition 14 (Sensitivity metaatom) A sensitivity metaatom is a singleton {
푙푎푏푒푙}, where 푙푎푏푒푙 is a literal label (cf. Deﬁnition 11) or a rule label (cf. Deﬁni-
tion 12).
We will represent sensitivity metaatoms as 푙푎푏푒푙->sensitivity:private, where
푙푎푏푒푙 is the string representation of the literal/rule label.
Deﬁnition 15 (Explanation metaatom) An explanation metaatom is a pair (푙푎-
푏푒푙, 푡푒푟푚), where 푙푎푏푒푙 is a literal label (cf. Deﬁnition 11) or a rule label (cf. Deﬁ-
nition 12) and 푡푒푟푚 is a term (cf. Deﬁnition 1).
We will represent explanation metaatoms as 푙푎푏푒푙->explanation:푡푒푟푚, where 푙푎푏푒푙
(resp. 푡푒푟푚) is the string representation of the literal/rule label (resp. term).
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Deﬁnition 16 (Metaatom) A metaatom is either an actor metaatom (cf. Deﬁni-
tion 13) or a sensitivity metaatom (cf. Deﬁnition 14) or an explanation metaatom
(cf. Deﬁnition 15).
Example 14 All of the following are well-formed metaatoms: the actor metaatom
[a]->actor:peer, the sensitivity metaatom [a]->sensitivity:private and the
explanation metaatom [a]->explanation:"".
3.4.5 Metarules
Deﬁnition 17 (Metaliteral) A metaliteral is a pair (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑,푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚), where
푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is either false or true and 푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚 is a metaatom (cf. Deﬁnition 16).
We will represent metaliterals as
∙ 푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚, where 푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚 is the string representation of the metaatom, if
푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is false
∙ not 푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚, if 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑 is true
Example 15 All of the following are well-formed metaliterals: [a]->actor:peer
and not [a]->sensitivity:private.
Deﬁnition 18 (Generic literal) A generic literal is either a literal (cf. Deﬁni-
tion 11) or a metaliteral (cf. Deﬁnition 17).
Deﬁnition 19 (Metarule) A metarule is a pair (ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦), where ℎ푒푎푑 is a
metaatom (cf. Deﬁnition 16) and 푏표푑푦 is a (possibly empty) list of generic literals
(cf. Deﬁnition 18).
We will represent metarules as
∙ ℎ푒푎푑., where ℎ푒푎푑 is the string representation of the metaatom, if 푏표푑푦 is
empty
∙ ℎ푒푎푑 :- 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙1, ... 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푛., where 푛 = #푏표푑푦 and 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푖 is the string
representation of the 푖-th generic literal in 푏표푑푦 (1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛), if 푏표푑푦 is not
empty
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Example 16 All of the following are well-formed metarules: [a]->actor:peer.,
[a]->sensitivity:private :- X oinden false. and [a]->explanation:""
:- [a]->actor:peer..
3.4.6 Policy
Deﬁnition 20 (Generic rule) A generic rule is either a rule (cf. Deﬁnition 12)
or a metarule (cf. Deﬁnition 19).
Deﬁnition 21 (Policy) A policy is a (possibly empty) list of generic rules (cf.
Deﬁnition 20).
3.5 (Toward) Protune’s semantics
At least two (non mutually exclusive) ways are feasible to describe the seman-
tics of the Protune policy language: (i) describing how a generic Protune policy
can be mapped to a Logic Program [64]; and (ii) providing an executable semantics
(cf. Chapter 7). Whilst we regard both approaches as future work, each of them
would proﬁt from a semantic characterization of complex terms (cf. Section 3.2).
This section provides such a characterization by describing how a generic Pro-
tune policy can be brought to a canonical form (beside variable renaming) in which
complex terms only appear within value-assignment atoms (cf. Section 3.2) of the
form 푡1[푡2] = 푡3, where none of 푡1, 푡2 and 푡3 is a complex term. In particular, this
section describes the eﬀects of function ℱ on the syntactic constructs a Protune
policy consists of.
3.5.1 Basic deﬁnitions
In the following we will write (푎1, . . . 푎푛) to denote a list consisting of the
elements 푎1, . . . 푎푛 (푛 ≥ 0) and ∅ to denote the empty list. Moreover we will write
퐴 ∪퐵 to denote the concatenation of lists 퐴 and 퐵.
Example 17 ∅ ∪ (푎) ∪ (푏, 푐) = (푎, 푏, 푐).
Deﬁnition 22 (Function 푓) If 푥 is a term then
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∙ 푓 : 푥 7→ (푥, ∅) if 푥 is not a complex term
∙ 푓 : (푖푑, 푡푒푟푚) 7→ ((푖푑, 푡푒푟푚), ∅) if (푖푑, 푡푒푟푚) is a complex term, 푓 : 푖푑 7→ (푖푑, ∅)
and 푓 : 푡푒푟푚 7→ (푡푒푟푚, ∅)
∙ 푓 : (푖푑, 푡푒푟푚) 7→ ((푖푑, 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 ∪ ((푖푑1, 푡푒푟푚1, 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒))) if 푓 :
푖푑 7→ (푖푑, ∅) and 푓 : 푡푒푟푚 7→ ((푖푑1, 푡푒푟푚1), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠)
∙ 푓 : (푖푑, 푡푒푟푚) 7→ ((푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒, 푡푒푟푚), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 ∪ ((푖푑1, 푡푒푟푚1, 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒))) if
푓 : 푖푑 7→ ((푖푑1, 푡푒푟푚1), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠) and 푓 : 푡푒푟푚 7→ (푡푒푟푚, ∅)
∙ 푓 : (푖푑, 푡푒푟푚) 7→ ((푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒1, 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒2), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠1∪푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠2∪ ((푖푑1,
푡푒푟푚1, 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒1), (푖푑2, 푡푒푟푚2, 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒2))) if 푓 : 푖푑 7→ ((푖푑1, 푡푒푟푚1), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒-
푛푡푠1) and 푓 : 푡푒푟푚 7→ ((푖푑2, 푡푒푟푚2), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠2)
where 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒, 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒1 and 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒2 are fresh variables.
Example 18 푓 : a 7→ (a, ∅),푓 : a[b[c]] 7→ (a[X], (b[c] = X)),푓 : a[b][c] 7→
(X[c], (a[b] = X)),푓 : a[b][c[d]] 7→ (X[Y], (a[b] = X, c[d] = Y)).
3.5.2 Terms
Deﬁnition 23 (Term) If 푥 is a term diﬀerent than a complex term then ℱ : 푥 7→
(푥, ∅). Cf. Deﬁnition 24 for the output of ℱ in case 푥 is a complex term.
Example 19 ℱ : a 7→ (a, ∅).
Deﬁnition 24 (Complex term) If (푖푑, 푡푒푟푚) is a complex term then
ℱ : (푖푑, 푡푒푟푚) 7→ (푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 ∪ ((푖푑1, 푡푒푟푚1, 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒)))
where 푓 : (푖푑, 푡푒푟푚) 7→ ((푖푑1, 푡푒푟푚1), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠) and 푣푎푟푖푎푏푙푒 is a fresh variable.
Example 20 ℱ : a[b[c]] 7→ (Y, (b[c] = X, a[X] = Y)),ℱ : a[b][c] 7→ (Y, (a[b]
= X, X[c] = Y)),ℱ : a[b][c[d]] 7→ (Z, (a[b] = X, c[d] = Y, X[Y] = Z)).
Theorem 1 For no term 푡푒푟푚 it happens that ℱ : 푡푒푟푚 7→ (푡푒푟푚1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠),
where 푡푒푟푚1 is a complex term.
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3.5.3 Atoms
Deﬁnition 25 (Classical atom) If 푡푒푟푚푠 = (푡푒푟푚1, . . . 푡푒푟푚푛) (푛 ≥ 0) and
(푛푎푚푒, 푡푒푟푚푠) is a classical atom then ℱ : (푛푎푚푒, 푡푒푟푚푠) 7→ ((푛푎푚푒, 푡푒푟푚푠1), 푎푠푠푖푔-
푛푚푒푛푡푠), where 푡푒푟푚푠1 = (푡푒푟푚11, . . . 푡푒푟푚
1
푛),푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 =
∪
1≤푖≤푛 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠푖
and ∀1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛 ℱ : 푡푒푟푚푖 7→ (푡푒푟푚1푖 , 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠푖).
Example 21 ℱ : a 7→ (a, ∅),ℱ : a(b[c]) 7→ (a(X), (b[c] = X)).
Deﬁnition 26 (Comparison atom) If (표푝푒푟푎푡표푟, 푙푒푓푡, 푟푖푔ℎ푡) is a comparison ato-
m then
∙ if 표푝푒푟푎푡표푟 is = and 푙푒푓푡 is a complex term, ℱ : (표푝푒푟푎푡표푟, 푙푒푓푡, 푟푖푔ℎ푡) 7→
((표푝푒푟푎푡표푟, 푙푒푓푡1, 푟푖푔ℎ푡1), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠푙 ∪ 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠푟), where 푓 : 푙푒푓푡 7→
(푙푒푓푡1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠푙) and ℱ : 푟푖푔ℎ푡 7→ (푟푖푔ℎ푡1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠푟)
∙ otherwise, ℱ : (표푝푒푟푎푡표푟, 푙푒푓푡, 푟푖푔ℎ푡) 7→ ((표푝푒푟푎푡표푟, 푙푒푓푡1, 푟푖푔ℎ푡1), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛-
푡푠푙∪푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠푟), where ℱ : 푙푒푓푡 7→ (푙푒푓푡1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠푙) and ℱ : 푟푖푔ℎ푡 7→
(푟푖푔ℎ푡1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠푟)
Example 22 ℱ : a = b 7→ (a = b, ∅),ℱ : a > b 7→ (a > b, ∅),ℱ : a[b] = c[d]
7→ (a[b] = X, (c[d] = X)),ℱ : a[b] > c[d] 7→ (X > Y, (a[b] = X, c[d] = Y)).
Theorem 2 For no assignment atom 푎푡표푚 it happens that ℱ : 푎푡표푚 7→ ((표푝푒푟푎푡표푟,
푙푒푓푡, 푟푖푔ℎ푡), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠), where 푟푖푔ℎ푡 is a complex term. Moreover 푙푒푓푡 can be a
complex term only if 표푝푒푟푎푡표푟 is =.
Deﬁnition 27 (Decision atom) If {푎푡표푚} is a decision atom then ℱ : {푎푡표푚} 7→
({푎푡표푚1}, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠), where ℱ : 푎푡표푚 7→ (푎푡표푚1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠).
Example 23 ℱ : allow(a(b[c])) 7→ (allow(a(X)), (b[c] = X)) and ℱ : allow(
a[b] = c[d]) 7→ (allow(a[b] = X), (c[d] = X)).
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3.5.4 Goals and rules
Deﬁnition 28 (Queriable literal) If (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚) is a queriable literal then
ℱ : (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚) 7→ ∪1≤푖≤푛((true, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푖)) ∪ ((푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚1)), where
ℱ : 푎푡표푚 7→ (푎푡표푚1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠) and 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 = (푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡1, . . . 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚-
푒푛푡푛) (푛 ≥ 0).
Example 24 ℱ : a(b[c]) 7→ (b[c] = X, a(X)) and ℱ : not a[b] = c[d] 7→
(c[d] = X, not a[b] = X).
Deﬁnition 29 (Goal) If 푔표푎푙 = (푙푖푡푒푟푎푙1, . . . 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푛) (푛 ≥ 1) is a goal then
ℱ : 푔표푎푙 7→ ∪1≤푖≤푛 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푠푖, where ∀1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛 ℱ : 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푖 7→ 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푠푖
Example 25 ℱ : a(b[c])) = b[c] = X, a(X) and ℱ : a, not a[b] = c[d]) =
a, c[d] = X, not a[b] = X.
Deﬁnition 30 (Literal) If (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚) is a literal then ℱ : (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚) 7→∪
1≤푖≤푛((true, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푖))∪((푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푎푡표푚1)), where ℱ : 푎푡표푚 7→ (푎푡표푚1, 푎푠푠푖푔-
푛푚푒푛푡푠) and 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 = (푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡1, . . . 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푛) (푛 ≥ 0).
If (푙푎푏푒푙, 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푞퐴푡표푚) is a literal then ℱ : (푙푎푏푒푙, 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푞퐴푡표푚) 7→∪
1≤푖≤푛((true, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푖)) ∪ ((푙푎푏푒푙, 푛푒푔푎푡푒푑, 푞퐴푡표푚1)), where ℱ : 푞퐴푡표푚 7→
(푞퐴푡표푚1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠) and 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 = (푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡1, . . . 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푛) (푛 ≥
0).
Example 26 ℱ : a(b[c]) 7→ (b[c] = X, a(X)) and ℱ : [a] not b[c] = d[e]
7→ ( [a] not b[c] = X,d[e] = X).
Deﬁnition 31 (Rule) If 푏표푑푦 = (푙푖푡푒푟푎푙1, . . . 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푛) (푛 ≥ 0) and (ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦)
is a rule then ℱ : (ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦) 7→ (ℎ푒푎푑1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 ∪
∪
1≤푖≤푛ℱ(푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푖)), where
ℱ : ℎ푒푎푑 7→ (ℎ푒푎푑1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠).
If (푙푎푏푒푙, ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦) is a rule then ℱ : (푙푎푏푒푙, ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦) 7→ (푙푎푏푒푙, ℎ푒푎푑1, 푎푠푠푖-
푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 ∪∪1≤푖≤푛ℱ(푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푖)), where ℱ : ℎ푒푎푑 7→ (ℎ푒푎푑1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠).
Example 27 ℱ : b[c] = d[e] :- a. 7→b[c] = X :- d[e] = X, a. and ℱ :
[a]: allow(a(b[c])) :- not b[c] = d[e]. 7→[a]: allow(a(X)) :- b[c]
= X, d[e] = Y, not b[c] = Y..
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3.5.5 Metaatoms
Deﬁnition 32 (Actor metaatom) If 푎푡표푚 is an actor metaatom then ℱ : 푎푡표푚
7→ (푎푡표푚, ∅).
Deﬁnition 33 (Sensitivity metaatom) If 푎푡표푚 is a sensitivity metaatom then
ℱ : 푎푡표푚 7→ (푎푡표푚, ∅).
Deﬁnition 34 (Explanation metaatom) If (푙푎푏푒푙, 푡푒푟푚) is an explanation meta-
atom then ℱ : (푙푎푏푒푙, 푡푒푟푚) 7→ ((푙푎푏푒푙, 푡푒푟푚1), 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠), where ℱ : 푡푒푟푚 7→
(푡푒푟푚1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠).
Example 28 ℱ : [a]->explanation:b[c] 7→ ([a]->explana-tion:X, (b[c] =
X)).
3.5.6 Metarules
Deﬁnition 35 (Metaliteral) If (푛푒푔푎푡푒푑,푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚) is a metaliteral then ℱ :
(푛푒푔푎푡푒푑,푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚) 7→ ∪1≤푖≤푛((true, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푖))∪((푛푒푔푎푡푒푑,푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚1)), wh-
ere ℱ : 푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚 7→ (푚푒푡푎푎푡표푚1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠) and 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠 = (푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡1,
. . . 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푛) (푛 ≥ 0).
Example 29 ℱ : not [a]->explanation:b[c] 7→ (b[c] = X, not [a]->expla-
nation:X)
Deﬁnition 36 (Metarule) If 푏표푑푦 = (푙푖푡푒푟푎푙1, . . . 푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푛) (푛 ≥ 0) and (ℎ푒푎푑,
푏표푑푦) is a metarule then ℱ : (ℎ푒푎푑, 푏표푑푦) 7→ (ℎ푒푎푑1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠∪
∪
1≤푖≤푛ℱ(푙푖푡푒푟푎푙푖
)), where ℱ : ℎ푒푎푑 7→ (ℎ푒푎푑1, 푎푠푠푖푔푛푚푒푛푡푠).
Example 30 ℱ : [a]->explanation:b[c] :- not b[c] = d[e]. 7→[a]->exp-
lanation:X :- b[c] = X, d[e] = Y, not b[c] = Y..
3.5.7 Policy
Deﬁnition 37 (Policy) If 푝표푙푖푐푦 = (푟푢푙푒1, . . . 푟푢푙푒푛) (푛 ≥ 0) is a policy then
ℱ : 푝표푙푖푐푦 7→ ∪1≤푖≤푛ℱ(푟푢푙푒푖).
53
3.6 What’s new
This section describes the most important diﬀerences between the version of
the Protune language presented in this work (Protune2 for short) and the one
presented in [19] (Protune1 for short).
External resources Logical external resources (cf. Note 6) were not supported
in Protune1 nor were the automatic identiﬁcation, location, deployment and ex-
ploitation of external resources (cf. Section 3.1.3). As a ﬁrst consequence, the
enforcement of Protune1 policies could take place only if: (i) needed (provisional)
external resources were manually made available to the Protune1 engine; and
(ii) each external resource was manually linked to an identiﬁer within a conﬁgu-
ration ﬁle. Moreover, the binding between the external resource responsible for a
(provisional) predicate appearing in a policy and the predicate itself had to be made
explicit within the policy by means of ontology metarules like the following one,
which binds the (provisional) predicate retrieve/2 to the external resource identi-
ﬁed in the conﬁguration ﬁle by the URI www.happy-book.com/policies/module.
mf!/retrieve/2.
retrieve(Id, Resource)→ 표푛푡표푙표푔푦 :
<www.happy-book.com/policies/module.mf!/retrieve/2> .
Finally, for each predicate appearing in a policy, the Protune1 engine had to be
told about its type by means of type metarules like the following one, which states
that the predicate retrieve/2 is a provisional one.
retrieve(Id, Resource)→ 푡푦푝푒:provisional.
The following list shows that, beside unnecessarily requiring the policy author to
specify information which could be retrieved in an automatic way, type and ontology
metarules were sources of possible errors.
∙ Mixing up logical with provisional in a type metarule as well as misspelling
the identiﬁer of the external resource in an ontology metarule induced the
Protune1 engine to behave diﬀerently than expected
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∙ Since in Protune1 type and ontology metarules did not involve predicates
but atoms, the Protune1 engine had no means (but by resorting to defaults)
to retrieve the type of the predicate exploited in the atom 푟푒푡푟푖푒푣푒(푖푑2, 푟푒푠2),
if the only type metarule involving the predicate retrieve/2 and appearing
in the policy was the following one.
푟푒푡푟푖푒푣푒(푖푑1, 푟푒푠1)→ 푡푦푝푒 : 푝푟표푣푖푠푖표푛푎푙.
∙ If, beside the one above, the policy had contained the type metarule
푟푒푡푟푖푒푣푒(푖푑2, 푟푒푠2)→ 푡푦푝푒 : 푙표푔푖푐푎푙.
the type of the predicate retrieve/2 would have depended on the atom ex-
ploiting it. Similarly, the type of the predicate would have varied according
to the outcome of the evaluation of 퐿1, . . . 퐿푛 if the policy had contained a
metarule whose body was not empty, like the following one.
푟푒푡푟푖푒푣푒(퐼푑,푅푒푠표푢푟푐푒)→ 푡푦푝푒 : 푙표푔푖푐푎푙← 퐿1, . . . 퐿푛.
Like type and ontology metarules, in Protune1 also actor metarules (cf. Sec-
tion 3.2) involved atoms. Beside the issues listed above, this made impossible for
a policy author writing a policy containing two literals which exploited the same
predicate and such that the ﬁrst (resp. second) one had to be evaluated by the
server (resp. client).
Provisional atoms Protune1 supported two possible representations of provi-
sional atoms: either as classical atoms (cf. Section 3.2) or as special atoms. The ﬁrst
representation was meant to be used for atoms whose evaluation had side-eﬀects,
whereas the second one for atoms whose evaluation was side-eﬀect free. A special
atom looked like the following
in([표푝1, ... 표푝푚], 푟:푝(푖푝1, ... 푖푝푛)) (1)
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where 푟 is the (identiﬁer of the) external resource, 푝 the predicate name, 푖푝1, . . . 푖푝푛
and 표푝1, . . . 표푝푚 its input and output parameters respectively. Output parameters
could only be variables, whereas input parameters only variables or strings, possibly
concatenated with each other by means of the operator & (X & " is a string.").
The following list shows some drawbacks of Protune1’s provisional atoms.
∙ As described above, the two representations of Protune1’s provisional atoms
were meant to be used in diﬀerent cases. However, since it was the developer
of the external resource who ultimately determined the actual representation,
there was no guarantee that she complied with Protune1’s guidelines and,
in practice, the evaluation of special atoms could have side-eﬀects and the
one of provisional atoms represented as classical atoms could be side-eﬀect
free. Moreover, one could argue that the policy author mostly does not care
whether an atom’s evaluation has side-eﬀects. Therefore, forcing her to use
a diﬀerent syntax in order to distinguish the two cases reduced Protune1’s
transparency and abstraction level
∙ As we will see in the next paragraph, Protune1 strings could be represented
in a number of ways, e.g., as double-quoted character strings. However, neither
was it possible representing them as double-quoted character strings outside
a special atom nor was it possible representing them but as double-quoted
character strings within a special atom. The constraint of representing the
same entity in diﬀerent ways according to the part of the policy it appeared in
was clearly misleading, error-prone and user-unfriendly, as was the possibility
of using the operator & only within special atoms
Protune2 normalizes the representation of provisional atoms by getting rid of
special atoms without losing any expressiveness: the Protune1 special atom (1)
can be represented as the Protune2 (classical) atom
푝(푖푝1, . . . 푖푝푛, 표푝1, . . . 표푝푚)
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if 푚 does not depend on the values of the input parameters, or as the atom
푝(푖푝1, . . . 푖푝푛, 표푝)
if it does, where 표푝 is supposed to be an object (cf. Section 3.2) having as many
properties as output parameters of 푝. In both cases, the directive import <푟!/푝/푎>
must appear at the beginning of the policy, where 푎 is the arity of 푝 (i.e., 푛+푚 or
푛+ 1 respectively).
Built-in datatypes Protune1 provided fewer built-in datatypes than Pro-
tune2, namely, integers and strings. Although with a slightly diﬀerent syntax,
complex terms (cf. Section 3.2) were supported in Protune1 as well – however,
objects were not: the grammar of the Protune1 language allowed to deﬁne com-
plex terms but, being their semantics not formally speciﬁed, the Protune1 engine
was not able to handle them.
A Protune1 string could be represented in a number of ways: as single-
or double-quoted character string (‘A string’ or "A string"), as <>-delimited
or non-delimited character string, if it fulﬁlled some restrictions (<Astring> or
aString), or as the concatenation of a string deﬁned in a PREFIX directive and
further characters (e.g., {p:string} was yet another representation of the string
Astring, if the directive PREFIX p : <A> appeared at the beginning of the pol-
icy). Such a proliferation of representations was likely to puzzle the user, especially
considering that some representations were only allowed within certain linguistic
constructs (cf. previous paragraph). For this reason, only the double-quoted repre-
sentation is allowed in Protune2.
Miscellany We conclude by mentioning further restrictions of Protune1 which
have been removed in Protune2: (i) only provisional atoms could appear in a
Protune1 goal (and they had to be wrapped by the allow token); (ii) Protune1
did not allow to extend the semantics of built-in operators (cf. Section 3.3.2); and
(iii) Protune1 provided up to one single response to a request. Last but not least,
the two versions of Protune base on diﬀerent formalisms: Protune1 was based
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on full Logic Programming [64], whereas Protune2 on Datalog [2].
CHAPTER 4
Using Policies in a Natural Way
Recent experiences with Facebook’s beacon service1 and Virgin’s use of Flickr pic-
tures2 have shown that the widespread adoption of applications (like Web 2.0 ap-
plications and social softwares) which allow users to share data did not come along
with an equally widespread use of technologies (such as policy languages) which al-
low users to ﬁne-grainedly specify which data can be shared with whom. One reason
for this is that current policy languages are too complex to be easily exploited by
common users in a proﬁtable way, since they typically require a policy author to
be a computer expert3 (see for instance excerpts of policies in diﬀerent languages in
Fig. 4.1 and [12]).
Complex syntax (e.g., unusual tokens not exploited in every-day communica-
tion such as :-, -> and &), logical formalisms (cf. Section 2.3.1) and the diﬃculty in
general of grasping the meaning of the policy without previous knowledge or being
a computer expert are some of the reasons which make formal languages particu-
larly unfriendly to common users. Moreover, real-world policies tend to be complex,
making the speciﬁcation process even harder.
As we mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3, Protune includes mech-
anisms to generate natural language descriptions out of already speciﬁed policies
(e.g., the explanation metarules shown in lines 10–25 of Fig. 4.1 can be used to ex-
plain the policy to the end users in a user-friendly manner). However, this approach
only helps to understand policies but not to create or modify them.
This chapter describes Protune’s natural language front-end which allows
users to deﬁne policies in the ACE controlled natural language [39]. Such policies
are then automatically translated to the Protune policy language. With this
1http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/29/AR20071129025
03.html?hpid=topnews
2http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/virgin-sued-for-using-teens-photo/2007/
09/21/1189881735928.html
3“Too often, only the Ph.D. student that designed a policy language or framework can use it
eﬀectively”, Kent E. Seamons. Semantic Web and Policy Workshop, 2005.
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(1) allow(download(User, Resource)) :-
(2) authenticated(User),
(3) hasSubscription(User, Subscription),
(4) availableFor(Subscription, Resource).
(5) authenticated(User) :-
(6) send(User, Credential),
(7) not forged(Credential),
(8) Credential["name"] = Name,
(9) User["name"] = Name.
(10) download(User, Resource)->explanation:
(11) "user \"" & User & "\" downloads resource \"" & Resource
(12) & "\"".
(13) authenticated(User)->explanation:
(14) "user \"" & User & "\" is authenticated".
(15) hasSubscription(User, Subscription)->explanation:
(16) "user \"" & User & "\" has subscription \"" & Subscription
(17) & "\"".
(18) availableFor(Subscription, Resource)->explanation:
(19) "subscription \"" & Subscription &
(20) "\" is available for resource \"" & Resource & "\"".
(21) send(User, Credential)->explanation:
(22) "user \"" & User & "\" sends credential \"" & Credential
(23) & "\"".
(24) forged(Credential)->explanation:
(25) "credential \"" & Credential & "\" is forged".
Figure 4.1: Example Protune policy
approach, the policy shown in Fig. 4.1 can be expressed as follows.
1. If a user is authenticated and has a subscription that is available for a resource
then she can download the resource.
2. Every user who sends a credential that is not provably forged and whose name
is the user’s name is authenticated.
Notice that the use of controlled natural languages to express policies makes the
explanation metarules mentioned above not needed anymore, since such policies
can be understood by common users as they are.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 presents the concept of “con-
trolled natural language”, introduces the controlled natural language ACE and es-
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pecially focuses on the internal format (DRS) the ACE parsing engine translates
ACE sentences into. Section 4.2 describes the mapping we deﬁned between DRSs
and Protune policies. Section 4.3 presents a predictive editor which guides the
user step by step toward deﬁning Protune policies by means of ACE sentences and
reports on the results of a preliminary user study evaluating its usability. Finally,
Section 4.4 compares our approach with related work.
4.1 Controlled natural languages
Controlled natural languages (CNLs) are subsets of natural languages that
are restricted (“controlled”) in a way that reduces or removes the ambiguity of the
language [72]. The main motivation is to improve the human-computer interaction4.
The users should be able to express statements in a language that is familiar to them.
On the other hand, the restrictions of the language enable the automatic processing
by computers.
The controlled natural languages we consider here are completely formal lan-
guages that can be mapped automatically and unambiguously to formal representa-
tions. Such languages are described by a formal grammar and are usually explained
to the users on the basis of construction rules (“which subset of the natural lan-
guage is covered?”) and interpretation rules (“how are the sentences interpreted
that would be ambiguous in the natural language?”). In order to clarify the inter-
pretation issue, let us have a look at the following sentence.
Bob buys the book with a card.
In full natural language this sentence has at least two diﬀerent meanings according
to the context it appears in, namely
∙ Bob buys a book which has a card.
∙ Bob buys a book by means of a (credit) card.
4There exist also some CNLs whose goal is just to improve the understanding for non-native
speakers without aiming to be computer-processable. We do not consider such languages here.
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In order to disambiguate sentences like the one above, CNLs have to make a number
of design choices in order to deterministically select one out of 푛 possible readings.
The controlled natural language ACE, for instance, assumes that all prepositional
phrases refer to the closest verb (unless the preposition is of, in which case the
prepositional phrase always refers to the preceding noun phrase). In the example
above, ACE would assume that the phrases the book and with a card refer to the
action of buying, boiling down to the second one of the readings listed above.
Ambiguity resolution takes place on a purely syntactic basis, so that CNLs
typically do not diﬀerentiate between the purchase of the man and the purchase of
the book, although in everyday’s speech one probably means that it is the man to
buy whereas it is the book to be bought.
In the following sections we introduce the controlled natural language ACE
that we used for Protune’s natural language front-end. Furthermore, we describe
the internal format the ACE parsing engine translates ACE sentences into.
4.1.1 Attempto Controlled English
Attempto Controlled English (ACE)5 [39] is a mature controlled natural lan-
guage (concretely, a controlled subset of English) that has been developed and con-
stantly extended during the last ﬁfteen years. Initially designed as a speciﬁcation
language, the focus has shifted toward knowledge representation and especially ap-
plications for the Semantic Web.
ACE supports a wide range of English constructs: nouns, proper names, verbs,
adjectives, singular and plural noun phrases, active and passive voice, pronouns,
relative phrases, conjunction and disjunction (and, or), existential and universal
quantiﬁers (e.g., a, every), negation, modal verbs (e.g., can, must), cardinality re-
strictions (e.g., at most 3 objects), anaphoric references (e.g., the resource, she),
questions, commands and much more.
ACE comes along with a number of tools, the most important of which is the
Attempto Parsing Engine (APE)6. APE translates ACE sentences into DRSs [16, 51],
whose expressiveness is equivalent to the one of ﬁrst-order logic. Various utility
5http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/site/
6http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/ape/
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Standard NLP tool APE
segmentation
tokenization
sentence splitting
classiﬁcation
parsing
association
normalization/deduplication
Table 4.1: A standard NLP tool’s processing steps vs. APE’s ones
tools use such representation and translate DRSs into other languages like e.g., the
ontology languages OWL and SWRL [49]. Furthermore, the ACE paraphraser can
translate DRSs back to ACE sentences, thereby providing a reformulation of the
original ACE text that can help understanding its APE interpretation.
Furthermore, many tools exist that apply ACE to a certain problem area:
RACE7 is a reasoner that can reason on ACE texts, ACE View [50] is a plugin for
the popular Prote´ge´ ontology editor and AceWiki [58] is a semantic wiki engine that
uses ACE for the representation of formal knowledge within a wiki.
Finally, ACE supports user-deﬁned lexica that deﬁne proper names, nouns,
verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions. Thus, it is easy to customize ACE by
integrating a particular domain-speciﬁc vocabulary.
4.1.2 ACE as a natural language
ACE sentences are interpreted by APE. While interpreting an ACE sentence,
APE carries out the usual tasks accomplished by NLP tools. Tab. 4.1 lists such tasks
and shows the main diﬀerences w.r.t. the processing steps carried out by APE.
Segmentation is concerned with ﬁnding the boundaries of grammatical ele-
ments (be they single words or whole sentences) which will then undergo further
processing. W.r.t. the ﬁrst ACE policy presented at the beginning of the chapter,
during the segmentation step If, a, user, . . . are recognized as words which form the
single sentence the whole policy consists of. APE breaks down the segmentation
step into two sub-tasks, namely tokenization and sentence splitting, concerned with
identifying the individual words and sentences of the input text respectively.
7http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/race/
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During the classiﬁcation step, each token is assigned a lexical category, whereas
the association step establishes relationships between lexical elements, thereby group-
ing them into higher-level clusters. W.r.t. the ﬁrst ACE policy presented at the
beginning of the chapter, during the classiﬁcation step the word a (resp. user)
is recognized as an article (resp. a common noun). During the association step,
the words a and user (resp. is and authenticated) are recognized as forming a
noun (resp. verb) phrase. APE performs classiﬁcation and association in one single
parsing step.
Finally, both in usual NLP tools and in APE, the normalization/deduplication
step identiﬁes and resolves yet higher-level relationships between linguistic elements.
W.r.t. the ﬁrst ACE policy presented at the beginning of the chapter, during this
step the pronoun she is recognized as referring to the common noun user.
Beside the diﬀerences we just outlined, the overall approach distinguishes APE
from NLP tools. Whilst NLP tools aim at processing and making sense out of
(in principle) whichever input sentence, APE insists on well-formedness: an input
sentence not complying with ACE’s grammar is simply rejected. Moreover, whilst
an NLP tool is expected to interpret an input sentence the way a native speaker
would do, the burden of expressing a content the way APE interprets it relies on
the author of the input sentence.
4.1.3 Discourse Representation Structure
As a formal language, ACE has a deterministic and well-deﬁned meaning.
Therefore, a developer may in principle use ACE sentences directly as the input
format of her application. This choice may turn out to be quite challenging since,
being ACE designed to be human-friendly, the translation of ACE sentences into a
logical representation is not trivial.
For this reason, the output of APE is a semantically equivalent representation
of the input ACE sentence which can be processed more easily in an automatic way.
This representation is called Discourse Representation Structure (DRS) and can be
thought of as a sort of abstract syntax tree of the input sentence. A DRS encodes
the whole information of the original ACE sentence and can be used “as it is” by
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drs([A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H], [
object(A, user, countable, na, eq, 1)-1,
property(B, authenticated, pos)-1,
predicate(C, be, A, B)-1,
object(D, subscription, countable, na, eq, 1)-1,
object(E, resource, countable, na, eq, 1)-1,
property(F, available, pos)-1,
predicate(G, be, D, F)-1,
modifier_pp(G, for, E)-1,
predicate(H, have, A, D)-1
])
Table 4.2: An example DRS
Prolog programs.
Tab. 4.2, shows the DRS corresponding to the if -part of the ﬁrst ACE policy
presented at the beginning of the chapter. In the following we will explain this
example, focusing on the elements relevant for the remainder of the chapter. A
thorough description of the DRS language is provided in [40].
For every noun (user, subscription and resource in the example), the DRS
introduces an object predicate, which is identiﬁed by a variable (A, D and E re-
spectively). All of user, subscription and resource are countable common nouns,
therefore the third argument of their object predicate is countable. Proper names
are also represented by object predicates, but their third argument is named.
For every adjective (authenticated and available), the DRS introduces a prope-
rty predicate, which is also identiﬁed by a variable (B and F respectively).
For every verb (namely is (authenticated), is (available) and has), the DRS
introduces a predicate predicate, which is identiﬁed by a variable (C, G and H
respectively). The third argument represents the subject, the fourth argument rep-
resents the object for transitive verbs and the predicate for the verb be, if it is used
in a copular way (i.e., to state a property of the subject). For example, the subject
of is (authenticated) is user, therefore the third argument of its predicate predicate
is the variable identifying user—namely A. On the other hand, its fourth argument
is the variable identifying the predicate authenticated—namely B.
Beside transitive verbs (like have), ACE also supports intransitive and di-
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transitive verbs (like register and give respectively): intransitive verbs only have a
subject (e.g., someone registers), whereas ditransitive verbs, beside having a subject
and a (direct) object, also have an indirect object (e.g., someone gives something
to someone). Intransitive (resp. ditransitive) verbs are represented in the DRS as
predicate predicates with three (resp. ﬁve) arguments.
The predicate is (available) is modiﬁed by a prepositional phrase (for a re-
source). For this reason, the DRS contains a modifier pp predicate. Its ﬁrst argu-
ment is the variable identifying is (available) (namely G), its second argument is the
preposition contained in the prepositional phrase (namely for) and its third argu-
ment is the variable identifying the noun (resource) contained in the prepositional
phrase (namely E).
Tab. 4.3 shows a pretty-printed version of the DRS that corresponds to the
the ﬁrst ACE policy presented at the beginning of the chapter. It shows further
features of the DRS language which we will now explain.
Each box in Tab. 4.3 corresponds to a drs predicate. Nested boxes reﬂect
the possibility that drs predicates are nested within other drs predicates. This
happens whenever the ACE sentence contains linguistic constructs like implication
or possibility.
Our example sentence is a conditional sentence with the protasis a user is
authenticated and has a subscription that is available for a resource and the apodosis
she can download the resource. The surrounding box in the DRS connects the boxes
representing protasis and apodosis by the implication symbol (⇒).
The apodosis itself contains a possibility construct (can download the re-
source). The DRS represents it by a nested box, where the inner box for download
the resource is preceded by the deontic operator denoting possibility (◇).
Each box in Tab. 4.3 consists of two parts. The bottom part contains pred-
icates (in particular, nested drs predicates) within the scope of the drs predicate
represented by the box, whereas the upper part lists the variables directly introduced
by predicates within the scope of the drs, i.e., not introduced by nested drs’s.
We conclude our introduction to the DRS language by mentioning that ACE
allows to express formulae involving (among others) integers, reals, strings, variables
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A B C D E F G H
object(A, user, countable, na, eq, 1)
property(B, authenticated, pos)
predicate(C, be, A, B)
object(D, subscription, countable, na, eq, 1)
object(E, resource, countable, na, eq, 1)
property(F, available, pos)
predicate(G, be, D, F)
modifier pp(G, for, E)
predicate(H, have, A, D)
⇒ ◇ I
predicate(I, download, A, E)
Table 4.3: A pretty-printed DRS
and the usual (in)equality operators. Such formulae are translated into DRSs by
means of the formula predicate. For instance, the ACE fragment 푋 > 1.0 is
translated into the DRS predicates
object(A, something, dom, na, na, na)
formula(A, >, real(1.0))
Notice that the variable occurring in the ACE fragment (namely 푋) has been re-
placed by another one (namely 퐴) and that the datatype of 1.0 is explicitly men-
tioned. Finally, the fact that the ACE fragment contains a variable 푋 is interpreted
by APE as asserting that some entity identiﬁed by 푋 exists. The existence of such
an entity is explicitly stated in the DRS by the object predicate.
4.2 Mapping DRS to Protune
Deﬁning a mapping between DRSs and Protune policies involves two main
tasks: (i) characterizing the subset of the DRS language that expresses Protune
policies; and (ii) mapping this subset to Protune. In both steps, it makes sense
trying to translate linguistic constructs of the DRS language into Protune linguis-
tic constructs which have a comparable semantics.
67
In this section we present the DRS Parsing Engine (DPE), which maps a subset
of all possible DRSs into Protune policies. We ﬁrst outline the requirements for
the mapping. The actual mapping is presented in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Mapping requirements
Two main requirements guided the ACE→DRS mapping, namely
Unambiguity The mapping is unambiguous, in the sense that for each ACE sen-
tence there is only one DRS it is translated into (i.e., the input ACE sentence
univocally determines the DRS it is translated into)
Syntax-based As described in Section 4.1, only syntactic information is exploited
by APE when translating ACE sentences into DRSs. Contextual information,
which can help humans to disambiguate ambiguous sentences, is not exploited
by APE which resorts to a set of built-in disambiguation rules
Since DPE was meant to be an extension of APE, we designed our DRS→Protune
mapping to be unambiguous (i.e., the input DRS must univocally determine the
Protune policy it is translated into) and syntax-based. As a third requirement,
the mapping should cover Protune as much as possible, i.e., one must be able
to deﬁne as many Protune policies as possible through DRSs. As we will see in
Section 4.2.2, all Protune policies not containing metarules (cf. Section 3.2) can be
expressed by means of suitable DRSs. On the other hand, not all possible DRSs can
be translated into Protune policies. The reason is that many linguistic constructs
of the DRS language (e.g., classical negation, necessity and sentence subordination)
do not have an immediate correspondence in Protune.
4.2.2 Mapping
This section introduces the mapping DPE implements. Only a subset of the
issues considered when deﬁning the DRS→Protune mapping will be discussed. A
more thorough overview is provided by [36].
We ﬁrst outline the features of the Protune language we chose to express
through DRSs and provide a rational for our choices. We then describe the overall
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structure a DRS must have in order to represent a Protune policy. Finally, we
describe how to represent Protune atoms by means of DRSs.
Which policies? First of all, our mapping does not cover metarules (cf. Sec-
tion 3.2). Although the Protune language in principle allows to create metarules
as complex as rules can be, in almost all cases real-world metarules conform to one
out of a set of few predeﬁned patterns. For this reason, providing users with the
expressiveness of (an extensive subset of) ACE in order to deﬁne metarules would
be confusing and hence error-prone.
Mapping drs predicates As described in Section 4.1.3, nested DRSs can repre-
sent (among else): (i) implication; (ii) negation-as-failure (NAF); and (iii) possibil-
ity. These linguistic constructs can be directly translated into Protune: (i) rules;
(ii) negated literals; and (iii) decision atoms (cf. Tab. 4.4).
As described in Section 3.2, a generic Protune rule has the form 퐴 ← 퐿1,
. . . 퐿푛 where 푛 ≥ 0, 퐴 is an atom and 퐿1, . . . 퐿푛 are literals. The meaning of the
rule is
퐴 holds if each and all of 퐿1, . . . 퐿푛 hold.
∀푖 : 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛 퐿푖 equals either 퐵푖 or ∼ 퐵푖 for some atom 퐵푖. The meaning of ∼ 퐵푖
is
퐵푖 does not provably hold.
The semantics of atoms 퐴 and 퐵푖 varies according to their type. In particular, the
meaning of a decision atom 푎푙푙표푤(퐶) (for some atom 퐶) is
퐶 can be evaluated upon request of some external entity.
Tab. 4.4 shows the two formats a DRS must possess in order to represent a Protune
rule. Box (a.1) represents a rule’s body as a set of literals, whereas box (a.2)
represents a rule’s head. Box (b) represents the special case of a Protune rule
without body. More formally, this leads to the following deﬁnition.
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(a)
(1)
...
⇒ (2)
...
(b)
...
(c) ∼
...
(d) ◇
...
Table 4.4: Generic forms of DRSs representing Protune rules (a-b),
negated literals (c) and decision atoms (d)
Deﬁnition 38 (DRS rule) A DRS rule has either of the formats (a) or (b) in
Tab. 4.4, where
∙ the content of box (a.1) is a set of DRS literals and (a.2) is a DRS head
∙ (b) is a DRS atom
DRSs can express NAF, which we can exploit in order to represent Protune
negated literals.
Deﬁnition 39 (DRS negated literal) A DRS negated literal has the format (c)
in Tab. 4.4, where the content of the box is a DRS atom.
In order to represent Protune decision atoms, we use the possibility construct of
the DRS language, which is supposed to represent the possibility operator of deontic
logic but can be nicely reused for Protune decision atoms.
Deﬁnition 40 (DRS decision atom) A DRS decision atom has the format (d)
in Tab. 4.4, where the content of the box is a DRS atom.
Mapping atomic DRS predicates In order to ﬁnalize the DRS→Protune
mapping, we still have to deﬁne how to express comparison, atoms and value-
assignment atoms (cf. Section 3.2) by means of constructs of the DRS language.
This is accomplished by syntactically characterizing patterns of atomic DRS predi-
cates.
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We already saw in Section 4.1.3 that DRSs can express formulae by means of
the predicate formula, therefore we can exploit this possibility in order to represent
Protune comparison atoms.
Deﬁnition 41 (DRS comparison atom) A DRS comparison atom is a set of
DRS predicates containing one single formula predicate and zero or more object
predicates.
As the ﬁrst example in Tab. 4.5 shows, only the DRS formula predicate is actually
used for the translation.
Diﬀerent patterns of DRS linguistic constructs can be mapped to Protune
classical atoms. We distinguish the following cases.
DRS predicate predicates are translated into Protune classical atoms using
the original verb lemma as the name of the atom. DRS object predicates are
dereferenced and directly included into the atom as constants (for proper names) or
variables (for common nouns). Example 2 in Tab. 4.5 shows how the DRS for Bob
sends a credential is translated. send becomes the name of a Protune classical
atom with a constant argument for the proper name Bob and variable argument for
the common noun credential.
DRS modifier pp predicates are translated by extending the name of the
corresponding Protune classical atom with the preposition of the prepositional
phrase and again including the dereferenced DRS object predicate as an argument
(cf. Example 3 in Tab. 4.5).
The translation pattern of the DRS predicate predicate diﬀers if: (i) it rep-
resents the verb be; and (ii) the verb be is used in a copular way (cf. Section 4.1.3).
Example 4 in Tab. 4.5 illustrates the simple case, where the DRS predicate for the
complement (user) is translated into the name of a Protune classical atom with
one argument for the subject Bob. Example 5 illustrates the more complex case,
where be is further modiﬁed by the prepositional phrase for Bob. Finally, Example
6 shows that be, when not used in a copular way, is translated like other verbs (cf.
Example 3).
In summary, Protune classical atoms are generated from the following pat-
terns of DRS predicates.
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Deﬁnition 42 (DRS classical atom) A DRS classical atom is a set of DRS pred-
icates containing one single predicate predicate and zero or more modifier pp,
object and property predicates.
Protune value-assignment atoms express properties possessed by objects. The
DRS language represents possession relationships between two objects 푋1 and 푋2
by means of the predicate relation(푋1,of,푋2). For this reason, we exploit the
DRS relation predicate in order to represent Protune value-assignment atoms.
Examples 7 and 8 in Tab. 4.5 illustrate how DRS relation predicates are translated
into Protune value-assignment atoms.
Deﬁnition 43 (DRS value-assignment atom) A DRS value-assignment atom
is a set of DRS predicates containing one single relation predicate and zero or
more object predicates.
Together, Deﬁnitions 39-43 deﬁne all necessary DRS patterns to generate Protune
atoms.
Deﬁnition 44 (DRS atom/literal) A DRS atom is either a DRS decision atom
or a DRS comparison atom or a DRS classical atom or a DRS value-assignment
atom. A DRS literal is either a DRS atom or a DRS negated literal.
4.3 Usability issues
APE’s functionalities are available through a number of interfaces. In partic-
ular, a stand-alone distribution is available8 which can be downloaded and installed
on one’s own computer.
Whenever a non well-formed sentence is input to APE’s stand-alone distribu-
tion, an error message containing debug information as well as suggestions to ﬁx the
problem occurred is shown (e.g., Every ACE text must end with . or ? or !.).
DPE provides a similar interface, with the diﬀerence that error messages (and
suggestions for ﬁxes) are provided not only if the input is not an ACE sentence, but
8http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/site/downloads/files/ape-6.5-100128.zip
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also if it is an ACE sentence which does not translate into a DRS rule (as deﬁned
in Section 4.2.2), and hence cannot be translated into a Protune policy.
Although meaningful error messages can help by driving users toward well-
formed input sentences, the approach provided by APE’s stand-alone distribution
and DPE suﬀers from a big drawback in terms of usability: even if the user ﬁxes
the problems occurred in her sentence according to the suggestions contained in the
error message, there is no guarantee that the corrected sentence will be well-formed,
since it might still contain (diﬀerent) errors. For this reason, the process of inputing
a sentence can result in a (possibly long) sequence of steps, in each of which new
errors appear which need to be ﬁxed in the following attempt.
Furthermore, the detection of the cause of a syntax error is not trivial at all.
For instance, in the case of the incorrect sentence a customer provides a card pays,
the user probably forgot a word somewhere in the sentence. But at least three
diﬀerent correct sentences can be constructed by the introduction of one word: a
customer provides a card that pays, a customer that provides a card pays and a cus-
tomer provides a card and pays. Thus, without further information it is impossible
to ﬁnd out what the actual mistake was.
W.r.t. usability, a much better approach is to constrain users to only create
well-formed input sentences. Section 4.3.1 describes a possible way to enforce this
constraint.
4.3.1 A predictive authoring tool
Even though CNLs are much easier to use than other computer languages, they
still require a minimum learning process of their restrictions and interpretation rules.
In order to ease and speed up this learning process, we suggest to use predictive
editors [59], i.e., editors that are aware of the grammar of the used CNL and can
guide the user step by step through the creation of a sentence. Such an editor
forces the user to continue the sentence in a way that corresponds to the respective
grammar and the currently loaded lexicon. Therefore, a complete sentence is always
syntactically correct and no error messages are needed.
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Several such editors have been introduced, for example ECOLE9 or GINO [15].
AceWiki and the ACE Editor make use of the same predictive editor that has been
developed to support subsets of ACE. This predictive editor is very ﬂexible, which
enabled us to adapt it to Protune’s requirements and to use it for the evaluation
described in Section 4.3.3.
Fig. 4.2 is a screenshot of the predictive editor that we used for the evaluation.
The numbered components are explained below.
(1) is a read-only text area that shows the beginning of a sentence. This
fragment has been entered by a user and it has been accepted by the editor as a
correct sentence beginning. Thus, there is at least one possible completion that
leads to a correct sentence. The button Delete can be used to delete the last token
inserted, whereas pressing the Clear button resets the content of the text area.
The text ﬁeld (2) can be used to enter the next words of the sentence. If they
are a correct continuation of the sentence then they are moved to the text ﬁeld (1)
as soon as the RETURN key is hit.
Clicking on the entries of the menu boxes (3) is an alternative way to construct
a sentence. There is a menu box for each word class that is allowed at the current
position. In this case, only function words, intransitive adjectives and singular
countable nouns representing persons or objects are allowed. The menu box for
verbs, for example, is not shown because verbs are not allowed at this position.
4.3.2 Editor’s features
The predictive editor described in Section 4.3.1 is implemented as a Web ap-
plication and can be easily deployed on a servlet container and accessed remotely.
The default editor can be personalized by providing a set of application-speciﬁc
components, the most important of which is the grammar of the language the editor
is meant to support.
As described in Section 4.2.1, not all features of ACE are used to express
Protune policies. For this reason, ACE policies (i.e., the set of all ACE sentences
expressing Protune policies) is a proper subset of the set of all ACE sentences.
9http://www.ics.mq.edu.au/˜rolfs/peng/writing-peng.html
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Our editor (shown in Fig. 4.2) currently supports a proper subset of ACE policies,
which we called ProACE. This set is sound and possesses a remarkable property
which we call half-coverage.
Soundness Each sentence belonging to ProACE can be translated to a Protune
rule. This property ensures that it is never the case that APE translates
a ProACE sentence into a DRS which is not a DRS rule as deﬁned in Sec-
tion 4.2.2
Half-coverage For each ACE sentence which: (i) does not belong to ProACE; and
(ii) could be in principle translated to a Protune policy 푃 ; there is a(n ACE)
sentence belonging to ProACE which can be translated to 푃 . This property
ensures that, if there is at all a way to express a Protune policy in ACE,
then there is a way to express the same policy in ProACE. In other words, this
property guarantees that, although ProACE is a proper subset of ACE, it does
not lower ACE’s expressiveness w.r.t. the capability of expressing Protune
policies
4.3.3 Evaluation
We conducted a preliminary user study in order to evaluate eﬃcacy and eﬃ-
ciency of our framework. The user study makes use of the editor described in Sec-
tion 4.3.1 and is available at http://policy.l3s.uni-hannover.de:9080/proace.
Its ﬁne-grained results are reported at http://policy.l3s.uni-hannover.de:9080
/proace/report.xml (Internet Explorer is required).
We asked the participants to reformulate the (full) natural language sentences
listed in Tab. 4.6 so that the editor accepted them. We did not provide any further
information to the participants beside the one available on the user study’s Web
pages. In particular, we did not provide any information about ProACE’s syntax
and interpretation rules. We only supplied few example ProACE sentences which
the users were supposed to mimic when reformulating the sentences in Tab. 4.6.
In order to evaluate our framework, we tracked the user’s interaction with it,
namely: (i) the time elapsed before the user undertook an action (e.g., pressing a
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Figure 4.2: A predictive authoring tool
N∘ Sentence Average Average Success
attempt time (s) rate (%)
number
1 Colleagues can access ﬁles related 2 194 (5.86) 11.11 (22.22)
to work.
2 Directory “work” contains ﬁles 1.79 162 (6.18) 18.18
related to work.
3 Friends can see everything which 1.64 151 (4.86) 20
is not related to work.
4 Friends of friends can see public ﬁles. 1.5 125 (4.82) 9.09 (81.81)
5 “Un chien andalou.mpg” is public. 1.38 51 (5.39) 100
6 “Guernica.jpg” is in directory “work”. 1.08 42 (7.08) 100
7 John is a friend. 1 17 (3.66) 92.31
Table 4.6: Sentences exploited in the user study
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button or hitting the RETURN key); (ii) how many times the user reworked the same
sentence and the overall time spent with it; and (iii) the ﬁnal version of a sentence.
The ﬁrst set of statistics can be used to evaluate the eﬃciency of our frame-
work: if much time elapses between two following actions it might mean that the
user is unsure about what she should do and possibly does not ﬁnd the interface
user-friendly. The third set of statistics can be used to check whether the sentence
reformulated by the user, as it is interpreted by APE and DPE, is semantically
equivalent to the original (full natural language) sentence, thereby evaluating the
eﬃcacy of our framework. Finally, the second set of statistics can be used to esti-
mate the diﬃculty degree of a sentence: if the user spent much time with a sentence
and reworked it many times, most likely she found that sentence more diﬃcult
than another one she did not spend so much time with and she did not rework so
many times. The estimate of the diﬃculty degree of a sentence can then be used to
normalize the other sets of statistics.
The entries in Tab. 4.6 are ordered according to a descending diﬃculty level.
Tab. 4.6 also shows how many times a sentence has been reworked (in average) as
well as the overall time spent in average with it and to start an action (between
parenthesis). The time required to reformulate a sentence varies from 17s to a bit
more than 3min: taking into account that the users had no previous knowledge
about ProACE’s syntactical constraints, we consider these values to be satisfactory.
Finally, the time required to undertake an action varies from less than 4s to a bit
more than 7s, being in average 5.48s: taking into account the time needed to search
all menu boxes (cf. Fig. 4.2) and to estimate whether a token can express the
intended meaning, we also consider these values to be satisfactory.
In order to evaluate the eﬃcacy of our framework, we classiﬁed the sentences
reformulated by the users as: (i) ProACE-correct; (ii) NL-correct; (iii) wrong; and
(iv) oﬀ-topic.
ProACE-correct sentences are semantically equivalent to the original ones both
in natural language and in ProACE. NL-correct sentences are semantically equiv-
alent to the original ones in natural language but not in ProACE. For instance,
sentence
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Every colleague accesses everything in “work”.
can be considered a correct reformulation in natural language of the ﬁrst sentence
in Tab. 4.6. However, intended as a ProACE reformulation of the same sentence, it
presents three errors.
1. A periphrastic form must be used to point out that only colleagues are allowed
to access everything in “work”: every colleague must be replaced by everyone
who is a colleague
2. The verb can must be used to express the permission: accesses must be re-
placed by can access
3. A new subordinate sentence must be used to point out the location of the
resources: in “work” must be replaced by which is in “work”
Wrong sentences are semantically equivalent to the original ones neither in natural
language nor in ProACE. Finally, oﬀ-topic sentences were not meant to reformulate
the original ones: sometimes users did not reformulate some of the sentences but
combined them with other ones in order to infer new sentences which they then
reformulated. For instance, many users reformulated the ﬁrst sentence in Tab. 4.6
as follows.
Everybody who is a colleague can access everything which is in “work”.
Sentence 2 in Tab. 4.6 indeed asserts that directory “work” contains ﬁles related to
work. Since no other directories are mentioned which contain ﬁles related to work,
the users probably considered sentence 2 equivalent to the following one by applying
a sort of “closed-world assumption” inference rule.
All ﬁles related to work are contained in directory “work”.
Combining this sentence with the ﬁrst one in Tab. 4.6 leads to the reformulation
above. Oﬀ-topic sentences are not considered in the last column of Tab. 4.6
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The last column of Tab. 4.6 shows the percentage of reformulated sentences
which are ProACE-correct. Between parenthesis it is also shown how such percent-
age would increase if the users had been aware of DPE’s interpretation rules which
led to the errors described above. The results show that users ﬁnd ProACE quite in-
tuitive as long as they have to deﬁne simple policies (like sentences 5-7 in Tab. 4.6),
that a basic knowledge of APE and DPE’s interpretation rules already allows to
specify more complex policies (like sentence 4) and that a deeper knowledge of such
rules is a prerequisite to deﬁne yet more complex policies (like sentences 1-3).
4.4 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work to exploit controlled
natural languages in order to ease the task of deﬁning formal policies. Still, the need
of a user-friendly interface to policy speciﬁcation is perceived in the community
and diﬀerent approaches have been proposed, some of which also exploit natural
language.
[78] suggests to use UML10 sequence diagrams as a notation for policy speciﬁ-
cation. The authors evaluate to which extent UML is suitable for the speciﬁcation
of policies and especially focus on expressiveness, utility and human readability. Al-
though sequence diagrams are expressive enough to specify policies, the authors rec-
ognize that policy speciﬁcation by means of sequence diagrams has major readability
and understandability problems which, if acceptable for engineers, are unlikely to
be overcome by non-technicians without strict guidance.
Among other new features, [83] describes the facilities the KAoS policy man-
agement framework (cf. Chapter 2) provides for policy authoring. In particular, the
Generic Policy Editor provides a policy author with a generic policy statement in
the form of a natural language sentence. More speciﬁc policies can be asserted by
replacing parts of such statement with terms retrieved from available and relevant
ontologies adapted to the current context
Although the Generic Policy Editor does exploit natural language, it simply
plays the role of a fancier interface: the freedom of the user is actually constrained
10http://www.uml.org/
80
to selecting the values of some ﬁelds out of a list, i.e., the approach does not diﬀer
from a classical user interface provided with a set of combo boxes.
[23] and [52] describe the policy workbench SPARCLE which enables users
to enter policies in natural language. The approach pursued by the authors lays
somehow in the middle between a “template-based” and a “full natural language”
one. On the one hand, policies must comply with one out of two high-level templates,
e.g.,
[User category] can [Action] [Data Category] for the purpose
of [Purpose] if [Condition] with [Obligation]
On the other hand, users are allowed to deﬁne the elements the templates consist
of (user categories, actions . . . ) the way they like. For this reason, there is no
guarantee that SPARCLE will correctly interpret the input policy (i.e., that the
semantics of the policy, as intended by SPARCLE, corresponds to the one the user
wanted to express). In our approach, a misinterpretation of the user’s input can
only happen if she did not stick to the interpretation rules of ACE and DPE (as
described in Section 4.2.1).
Somehow related is also [57], which describes a system able to process privacy
policies in full natural language. However, the focus of the paper is not on supporting
the users with an easy interface to policy speciﬁcation but on analyzing user policies
(describing under which circumstances users are willing to disclose personal data)
and enterprise policies (describing how enterprises handle customers’ personal data)
in order to ﬁnd compatibilities between them. NLP techniques are exploited in
order to convert policies to sets of (푛푎푚푒, 푣푎푙푢푒) pairs (where both 푛푎푚푒 and 푣푎푙푢푒
belong to a predeﬁned vocabulary), which are then matched.
CHAPTER 5
Access Control for Sharing Semantic Data across Desktops
As we noticed in Section 1.2, the expressiveness of the policy languages proposed
by the scientiﬁc community increased over time. At the beginning of Chapter 4,
we already pointed out a consequence of such increment of expressiveness, namely,
the reduction of the user-friendliness of policy languages. This chapter is concerned
with another consequence, namely, the increment of the computational overhead
required to enforce policies of languages with bigger and bigger expressiveness. This
problem is especially serious in all application scenarios which require a big amount
of requests to be evaluated against complex policies in a short time (as it happens
to, e.g., Web Servers).
A possible way to overcome this problem consists in pre-evaluating the poli-
cies available in a system against all possible requests and storing the results in a
suitable way (e.g., in a database). This way, as soon as a request comes in, the
computationally expensive process of evaluating the system’s policies against the
request does not need to be performed anymore since the request can be accepted
or rejected by looking up the pre-computed result.
This chapter thoroughly describes the issues related to the pre-evaluation of
policies in the case of a generic policy language and afterwards focuses on the spe-
ciﬁc issues of Protune, which we used to test the eﬃcacy and eﬃciency of our
approach. The results of our experiments w.r.t. the Semantic Desktop scenario are
also reported.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents a general-purpose
strategy to lower the policy enforcement time by exploiting pre-evaluation. The
general-purpose strategy does not provide good performance against policy modiﬁ-
cations. In order to overcome this problem, some knowledge of the employed policy
language is required. For this reason, Section 5.2 presents a special-purpose strategy
applicable to policies deﬁned in the Protune policy language. Section 5.3 intro-
duces the concept of “Semantic Desktop” and presents the experimental results of
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the application of the general-purpose strategy to the Semantic Desktop scenario.
Finally, we discuss related work in Section 5.4.
5.1 The general-purpose strategy
This section describes our general-purpose strategy to lower the policy enforce-
ment time. We ﬁrst introduce the conceptual framework our strategy applies to and
afterwards we describe the strategy itself.
5.1.1 The conceptual framework
This section: (i) elaborates on some general properties of policy languages
described in Chapter 2; and (ii) introduces some general properties of policy engines.
Such properties are organized according to the following independent dimensions
∙ expressiveness
∙ capability of specifying both positive and negative information explicitly
∙ interaction with the user at evaluation-time
As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1, a policy states conditions under which
an action can be executed. Such conditions can involve: (i) properties of the entity
(human or software agent) requesting its execution (requester); (ii) properties of
the entity on which the action has to be executed (resource); (iii) properties of the
action itself; or (iv) environmental properties.
As we mentioned in Section 2.3.1, in order to provide the language with a
well-deﬁned semantics, policy languages are usually based on some mathematical
formalism, typically Description Logic or Logic Programming or some suitable sub-
set of either of them. One of the main diﬀerences between Description Logic-based
(DL-based) and Logic Programming-based (LP-based) policy languages is the way
they deal with negation: Description Logic allows to deﬁne negative information ex-
plicitly, whereas LP-based systems can only deduce negative information by means
of the so-called negation-as-failure inference rule (cf. Section 3.3).
Since DL-based languages allow to specify both positive and negative infor-
mation, consistency problems arise whenever both a statement and its negation are
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asserted. This problem is typically addressed by allowing the user to deﬁne priorities
among statements (this is the strategy adopted, e.g., by the designers of KAoS—cf.
Chapter 2).
LP-based languages do not have to deal with consistency issues, since they only
allow the user to specify positive information. The other side of the coin is that, as
soon as new information is added to Logic Programs, consequences which could be
drawn previously cannot be inferred anymore (this is commonly expressed by the
sentence “negation-as-failure is a non-monotonic inference rule”—cf. Section 2.3.1).
Since DL-based languages allow to specify both positive and negative informa-
tion, they can enable the user to deﬁne both policies stating under which conditions
a request must be accepted (allow policies) and policies stating under which condi-
tions a request may not be accepted (deny policies). Since LP-based languages allow
to specify only positive information, they can only enable the user to deﬁne either
allow or deny policies. The ﬁrst approach automatically rejects incoming requests
which do not fulﬁll the given conditions and is usually preferred, since wrongly ac-
cepting a request which should have been rejected is typically a more serious issue
than rejecting a request which should have been accepted.
Nevertheless, LP-based languages can be exploited as building blocks of higher-
level languages which do allow to explicitly specify both positive and negative in-
formation by enforcing a negation semantics on top of them. This can be easily
obtained as follows: let 퐿 be an LP-based language and 퐿′ its extension with nega-
tion. A policy of 퐿′ is a pair (푃, 푓푙푎푔), where: (i) 푃 is a policy of 퐿; (ii) 푓푙푎푔 ∈
{푎푙푙표푤, 푑푒푛푦}; and (iii) 푃 is interpreted as an allow policy if 푓푙푎푔 = 푎푙푙표푤 and as
a deny policy if 푓푙푎푔 = 푑푒푛푦. This approach has been exploited in the deﬁnition of
the LP-based policy language Rei (cf. Chapter 2) and has been also applied to the
LP-based policy language Protune in [1].
Many application scenarios do not require the policy owner to take part in
the policy evaluation process. This is e.g., the case of a Web Server which delivers
(resp. does not deliver) sensitive information according to the clients’ properties as
speciﬁed in the server policy. In this case, it is reasonable assuming that the policy
owner (e.g., the human being who deployed the Web application) is never requested
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to provide further information to be used during the evaluation of the policy. Other
application scenarios do require that the policy evaluation process involves the policy
owner directly. This is often the case of ﬁrewalls on desktop computers. As soon
as a known application tries to access the computer, the request is (not) accepted
automatically according to the available policies. As soon as an unknown application
tries to access the computer, the policy owner (i.e., the user) is asked whether the
request should (not) be accepted.
In the next section we present a strategy to lower the policy enforcement time
which applies to policy languages and engines that
∙ allow to deﬁne policies based on properties of requester, action and resource
∙ enable to deﬁne allow and deny policies
∙ may require the policy owner to take part in the policy evaluation process
Cela va sans dire, our solution also applies to policy languages and engines which
support only a subset of the features listed above.
On the other hand, our solution does not apply to policies which set conditions
on environmental properties: it is clear that it does not make sense pre-evaluating
a policy which e.g., grants access to a resource from 8am to 5pm since, if only one
out of pre-evaluation time and query time belongs to this interval, access will be
wrongly granted/denied.
5.1.2 A na¨ıve general-purpose strategy
The UML1 diagram presented in Fig. 5.1 shows the entities a generic autho-
rization framework is concerned with, namely requesters, resources, actions and
policies: all of requesters, resources and actions are identiﬁed by some sort of identi-
ﬁer, whereas a policy, beside the text of the policy itself, possesses a ﬂag indicating
whether it applies only to the resources (resp. requesters, actions) available at policy
creation-time or also to resources possibly added later on.
Policies are distinct in allow and deny policies and dominance relationships
can be deﬁned among them: an allow (resp. deny) policy can dominate and be
1http://www.uml.org/
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Figure 5.1: A basic UML class diagram of a generic authorization frame-
work
dominated by an arbitrary number of deny (resp. allow) policies, meaning that in
case of conﬂict the dominating policy will be enforced. In the following we will call
such relationships among policies priority relationships.
The set of priority relationships induces a graph structure over the set of
policies. Special care must be taken in order to avoid that the graph contains loops,
since otherwise all policies belonging to a loop would be dominated and none of
them could be enforced. We will describe in the following how our strategy avoids
that loops are built in the priority relationship graph.
The basic functionality provided by an authorization framework is the ca-
pability of (not) authorizing requesters to perform actions on resources. However,
real-world authorization frameworks have to provide surrounding facilities for adding
and removing requesters, actions, resources and policies. In the following we brieﬂy
sketch the internals of such functionalities.
Request evaluation The evaluation of a request for accessing a resource takes
place according to the following algorithm. If there is a non-dominated ap-
plicable policy 푃 , the request is accepted or rejected, according to whether
푃 is an allow or a deny policy. Otherwise, the user is asked whether the
request should be accepted or rejected. In the latter case, the user’s answer
is interpreted as the deﬁnition of a new policy which dominates every pos-
sibly conﬂicting one. Notice that the addition of such priority relationships
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Figure 5.2: The UML class diagram of our authorization framework
can never make the priority relationship graph cyclic, since in such graph the
newly added policy does not have incoming arcs
Resource removal The addition of a new resource does not require to perform any
further operation, whereas, in order to keep the policy repository as tidy as
possible, it makes sense removing all policies aﬀecting one single resource upon
removal of that resource. Notice that with our approach it is not infrequent
that policies apply to one single resource: as we described above, this is the case
whenever the user is asked whether a request should be accepted or rejected.
Requester and action addition and removal are handled in a similar way as
resource addition and removal
Policy addition Whenever a new policy is added, it is checked whether it conﬂicts
with already deﬁned policies. If this is the case, the user is asked to deﬁne pri-
ority relationships between the new policy and the conﬂicting ones. The user
is not allowed to deﬁne priority relationships which would make the priority
relationship graph cyclic
Policy removal Whenever a policy is removed, all relationships it was involved in
are removed as well
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5.1.3 The general-purpose strategy revisited
When performing the operations listed in Section 5.1.2, some activities must
be carried out which are computationally expensive, namely
1. selection of non-dominated policies which apply to a given request (cf. list
item 1)
2. identiﬁcation of policies applicable to one single resource/requester (cf. list
item 2)
3. identiﬁcation of conﬂicting policies (cf. list item 3)
4. constraining the user to deﬁne only priority relationships which keep the pri-
ority relationship graph acyclic (cf. list item 3)
The UML diagram presented in Fig. 5.2 is a variant of the one shown in Fig. 5.1
and adds further information which is meant to reduce the computational cost of
the activities listed above. A new attribute dominatingPolicyNr has been added to
policies, indicating how many other policies dominate a given one, and a relationship
between policies and resources (resp. requesters, actions) has been added. A policy
can aﬀect an arbitrary number of resources (resp. requesters, actions). On the other
hand, each resource (resp. requester, action) can be aﬀected by an arbitrary number
of policies. These relationships have a unique attribute tracking whether the policy
aﬀects only that resource (resp. requester, action). In the following we will call
relationships between policies and resources (resp. requesters, actions) inﬂuence
relationships.
The addition of redundant information requires some overhead in order to
keep such information consistent with the global state of the system. W.r.t. the list
presented in Section 5.1.2, the following modiﬁcations are needed.
Resource addition Whenever a new resource is added, corresponding relation-
ships with the policies it is aﬀected by are deﬁned. Notice that also rela-
tionships with dominated policies are deﬁned, so that they do not need to
be computed each time a dominating policy is deleted. Relationships are of
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course deﬁned only with policies which apply also to resources added after
policy creation-time
Resource removal Whenever a resource is removed, all relationships it was in-
volved in are removed as well
Policy addition Whenever a new policy is added, inﬂuence relationships are de-
ﬁned between the new policy and the resources, requesters and actions it
aﬀects: if the new policy aﬀects only one single resource (resp. requester,
action) the unique attribute of the inﬂuence relationship is set. Finally, the
dominatingPolicyNr attribute of the new policy is initialized according to
the priority relationships deﬁned and the one of the policies dominated by the
new policy is incremented
Policy removal Whenever a policy is removed, all inﬂuence relationships it was
involved in are removed as well. The dominatingPolicyNr attribute of all
policies which were dominated by the deleted one is decremented
Against the increase in space needed to store explicitly all information about re-
questers, actions, resources, policies and the relationships between them, the revis-
ited general-purpose strategy has the potential of dramatically decreasing the time
needed by an authorization framework to carry out its activities. For instance, with
our strategy the evaluation of a request, which is typically a time-consuming task,
simply requires to look up whether a policy exists which applies to the current re-
quester, action and resource and, if this is the case, whether such policy is an allow
or a deny one. Assuming that the information shown in Fig. 5.2 is represented in a
reasonable way as a relational database, this task may amount to issuing one single
SELECT query to the corresponding RDBMS.
However, there is still a task for which our strategy does not provide good
performance, namely reacting to policy modiﬁcations: against the modiﬁcation of
a policy, all inﬂuence relationships involving it have to be recomputed, even if the
changes actually involve only few of them. A better approach would be to identify
the inﬂuence relationships aﬀected by the changes and to update only them. How-
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ever, this task essentially depends on the employed policy language, therefore no
general solution can be provided.
In the following we describe an eﬃcient strategy to identify the inﬂuence re-
lationships aﬀected by Protune policies.
5.2 The special-purpose strategy
This section describes an eﬃcient strategy to identify the inﬂuence relation-
ships (cf. Section 5.1.3) aﬀected by Protune policies. This strategy has the poten-
tial of dramatically decreasing the time needed to identify the inﬂuence relationships
aﬀected by modiﬁcations of a Protune policy. As described in Section 3.6, Pro-
tune is based on Datalog. For this reason, we ﬁrst introduce our strategy for
Datalog programs in Section 5.2.1 and we then extend it to Protune policies in
Section 5.2.2. Finally, we only focus on policy modiﬁcations consisting in addition
and removal of rules.
5.2.1 The Datalog case
Identifying the inﬂuence relationships aﬀected by changes to Protune policies
is a particular case of identifying the modiﬁcations in the extension of a predicate
against changes in a Logic Program. This section addresses this more general prob-
lem and presents an eﬃcient algorithm which allows to identify a superset of such
modiﬁcations.
Whenever a Protune policy is modiﬁed, all inﬂuence relationships it was
involved in have to be recomputed. Especially for big sets of requesters, actions
and resources, this process can be extremely expensive and time-consuming. A
better approach would be to ﬁrst identify the inﬂuence relationships which have to
be recomputed (which, at least for small modiﬁcations to the Protune policy, are
likely to be much fewer than all possible combinations of requesters, actions and
resources) and to recompute only those.
However, the identiﬁcation of each and all inﬂuence relationships which have
to be recomputed can be an expensive and time-consuming task as well. For this
reason, we could relax this requirement and identify a superset of the inﬂuence
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relationships which have to be recomputed. Being the overall time of relationship
identiﬁcation and recomputation to be minimized, an algorithm 퐴1 identifying more
relationships than a slower algorithm 퐴2 could still be preferable if the time required
to recompute the additional relationships is less than the diﬀerence of the execution
times of 퐴2 and 퐴1.
This section introduces an algorithm identifying a superset of the inﬂuence
relationships to be recomputed and explains the rational behind it. We start by
recalling that
1. an atom 푝(푥⃗) holds according to a Datalog program 푃 iﬀ it matches the head
of some rule of 푃 whose body holds. More formally,
푃 ∣= 푝(푥⃗)⇔ ∃푅 ∈ 푃, 휃∣휃퐻푅 = 푝(푥⃗) ∧ 푃 ∣= 휃퐵푅
where 휃 is a substitution [64] and 퐻푅 (resp. 퐵푅) denotes the head (resp. body)
of a rule 푅 of 푃
2. the body 퐵 of a rule of a Datalog program 푃 holds iﬀ each of the literals in
퐵 holds. More formally,
푃 ∣= 퐵 ⇔ ∃휃∣∀푙 ∈ 퐵 푃 ∣= 휃푙
where 휃 is a substitution
3. a ground negated literal holds iﬀ the atom it exploits does not hold. More
formally,
푃 ∣=∼ 푝(푥⃗)⇔ ¬푃 ∣= 푝(푥⃗)
where ¬ (resp. ∼) denotes classical negation (resp. negation-as-failure) and
no variables appear in 푥⃗
Deﬁnition 45 will allow to ease the notation in the following.
Deﬁnition 45 (Consequence) Given a Datalog program 푃 and an atom 푝(푥⃗), we
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say that 푝(푥⃗) is a consequence of 푃 by means of a rule 푅 ∈ 푃 iﬀ
∃휃∣휃퐻푅 = 푝(푥⃗) ∧ 푃 ∣= 휃퐵푅
where 휃 is a substitution and 퐻푅 (resp. 퐵푅) denotes the head (resp. body) of 푅.
We will write 푃 ∣=푅 푝(푥⃗) to denote the fact that the atom 푝(푥⃗) is a consequence of
a Datalog program 푃 by means of a rule 푅. We will also write 푃 ∣=ℛ 푝(푥⃗), where
ℛ ⊆ 푃 , as a shortcut for ∨푅∈ℛ푃 ∣=푅 푝(푥⃗). Finally, notice that 푃 ∣=푃 푝(푥⃗) and
푃 ∣= 푝(푥⃗) are equivalent.
We now present the deﬁnitions of extension and change functions. Such def-
initions, as well as the following ones, rely on the notion of universe 풰 , a generic
set which we will assume to be ﬁnite and to contain all constants appearing in the
given Datalog program(s).
Deﬁnition 46 (Extension function) Given a universe 풰 and a Datalog program
푃 , the extension function ℰ풰 ,푃 associates each predicate 푝 appearing in 푃 with the
set
{푥⃗ ∈ 풰푛∣푃 ∣= 푝(푥⃗)}
(extension of 푝), where 푛 denotes the arity of 푝.
Intuitively, ℰ풰 ,푃 associates each predicate 푝 appearing in 푃 with the set of its ground
instances 푝(푥⃗) which hold in 푃 .
Deﬁnition 47 (Change function) Given a universe 풰 and two Datalog programs
푃1 and 푃2, the change function 풞풰 ,푃1,푃2 associates each predicate 푝 appearing in 푃1
or 푃2 with the set
{푥⃗ ∈ 풰푛∣푃1 ∣= 푝(푥⃗)∨˙푃2 ∣= 푝(푥⃗)}
(change set of 푝), where 푛 (resp. ∨˙) denotes the arity of 푝 (resp. the XOR boolean
operator).
Intuitively, 풞풰 ,푃1,푃2 associates each predicate 푝 appearing in 푃1 or 푃2 with the set of
its ground instances 푝(푥⃗) which hold either in 푃1 or in 푃2 but not in both of them.
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The following theorem directly derives from the deﬁnitions of extension and
change functions.
Theorem 3 Given a universe 풰 and two Datalog programs 푃1 and 푃2, for each
predicate 푝 appearing in 푃1 or 푃2
풞풰 ,푃1,푃2(푝) = ℰ풰 ,푃1(푝)△ℰ풰 ,푃2(푝)
where △ denotes the symmetric diﬀerence operator.
Unfortunately, Theorem 3 cannot be exploited to compute in an eﬃcient way the
change set of predicates after modiﬁcations to a Datalog program, since it would re-
quire to compute the extension of such predicates before and after the modiﬁcations
took place and to compare the results with each other.
The remaining of this section is devoted to the description of the modiﬁed
change function 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 . Its deﬁnition (cf. below) is pretty similar to the one of
change function, the main diﬀerence being the condition the 푛-uples 푥⃗ have to fulﬁll
in order to belong to the image of a predicate. Since such condition has been relaxed,
for each predicate 푝 it holds that 풞풰 ,푃1,푃2(푝) ⊆ 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2(푝). On the other hand, the
relaxation has been carried out in a way such that the computation of 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 is
typically less expensive and time-consuming than the one of 풞풰 ,푃1,푃2 .
Tab. 5.1 shows the logical steps we performed to modify the change function
into the modiﬁed change function. In order to improve readability, we assume
throughout the table that conjunctions bind stronger than disjunctions.
Cell 1 is a paraphrase of the condition in Deﬁnition 47 which takes into account
the logical equivalence 퐴∨˙퐵 ≡ (퐴∧¬퐵)∨ (¬퐴∧퐵) and the equivalence presented
in Item 1 of the previous list. Only the ﬁrst part of the paraphrase is shown, since
the second part can be obtained from the ﬁrst one by swapping all occurrences of 1
and 2.
Cell 2 does not diﬀer from the previous one but for a further condition (namely,
푅11 ∈ 푃2 ∨ 푅11 /∈ 푃2) which has been added to the ﬁrst element of the conjunction.
Being this further condition always true, the addition does not modify the semantics
of the whole expression.
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Cell 3 further expands Cell 2 by applying the distributivity of conjunction over
disjunction and by recalling that 푥 ∈ 퐴∧푥 ∈ 퐵 ⇒ 푥 ∈ 퐴∩퐵 and 푥 ∈ 퐴∧푥 /∈ 퐵 ⇒
푥 ∈ 퐴∖퐵, where 퐴 and 퐵 are generic sets and ∖ denotes the set diﬀerence operator.
Finally, notice that the second part of the formula can be obtained from the ﬁrst
one by swapping all occurrences of 1 and 2, and of 3 and 4.
Cell 4 presents the ﬁrst relaxation we introduced: it involves the ﬁrst line, has
been deduced from the ﬁrst line of Cell 3 and can be explained intuitively as follows.
If there are no rules nor substitutions which allow to infer 푝(푥⃗) from 푃2, then not
even the rule and substitution which allow to infer 푝(푥⃗) from 푃1 will allow to infer
it from 푃2. The condition in the ﬁrst line of Cell 4 is less strong than the one in the
ﬁrst line of Cell 3, since the latter requires that no rule of 푃2 allows to infer 푝(푥⃗),
whereas the former simply requires that a particular rule of 푃2 does not allow to
infer it. As a consequence, all 푛-uples 푥⃗ satisfying the latter condition will satisfy
the former as well, i.e., the set of 푛-uples satisfying the latter condition is a subset
of the set of 푛-uples satisfying the former one.
Cell 5 is a rewriting of Cell 4: the ﬁrst line of Cell 5 summarizes lines 1 and 3
of Cell 4 by exploiting the logical equivalence ∃푥∣퐴(푥)∨ ∃푦∣퐵(푦) ≡ ∃푥∣퐴(푥)∨퐵(푥)
as well as the one involving the ∨˙ operator and the distributivity of conjunction over
disjunction we recalled above. Line 2 (resp. 3) of Cell 5 summarizes line 2 (resp. 4)
of Cell 4 by exploiting the formalism introduced in Deﬁnition 45.
Tab. 5.2 shows the logical steps we performed to relax the condition 푃1 ∣=
휃퐵푅∨˙푃2 ∣= 휃퐵푅 which appears in the ﬁrst line of the ﬁfth cell of Tab. 5.1. Cell 1 is
a paraphrase of such condition which takes into account the well-known deﬁnition of
the ∨˙ operator and the equivalence introduced in Item 2 of the previous list. Only
the ﬁrst part of the paraphrase is shown, since the second part can be obtained from
the ﬁrst one by swapping all occurrences of 1 and 2.
Cell 2 presents the second relaxation we introduced, which does not conceptu-
ally diﬀer from the one we presented in Cell 4 of Tab. 5.1: if there are no substitutions
which allow to infer every literal of 퐵푅 from 푃2, then not even the substitution which
allows to infer every literal of 퐵푅 from 푃1 will allow to infer them from 푃2.
Cell 3 does not diﬀer from the previous one but for the fact that the logical
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1
(∃휃11∣∀푙11 ∈ 퐵푅 푃1 ∣= 휃11휃푙11) ∧ ¬(∃휃12∣∀푙12 ∈ 퐵푅 푃2 ∣= 휃12휃푙12)∨
. . .
2
(∃휃11∣∀푙11 ∈ 퐵푅 푃1 ∣= 휃11휃푙11 ∧ ¬∀푙12 ∈ 퐵푅 푃2 ∣= 휃11휃푙12)∨
. . .
3
(∃휃11, 푙12 ∈ 퐵푅∣∀푙11 ∈ 퐵푅 푃1 ∣= 휃11휃푙11 ∧ ¬푃2 ∣= 휃11휃푙12)∨
. . .
4
(∃휃1, 푙1 ∈ 퐵푅∣푃1 ∣= 휃1휃푙1 ∧ ¬푃2 ∣= 휃1휃푙1)∨
(∃휃2, 푙2 ∈ 퐵푅∣푃2 ∣= 휃2휃푙2 ∧ ¬푃1 ∣= 휃2휃푙2)
5a
∃휃1, 푝(푥⃗) ∈ 퐵푅∣푃1 ∣= 휃1휃푝(푥⃗) ∧ ¬푃2 ∣= 휃1휃푝(푥⃗)∨
푃2 ∣= 휃1휃푝(푥⃗) ∧ ¬푃1 ∣= 휃1휃푝(푥⃗)
5b
∃휃1,∼ 푝(푥⃗) ∈ 퐵푅∣푃1 ∣=∼ 휃1휃푝(푥⃗) ∧ ¬푃2 ∣=∼ 휃1휃푝(푥⃗)
푃2 ∣=∼ 휃1휃푝(푥⃗) ∧ ¬푃1 ∣=∼ 휃1휃푝(푥⃗)
6 ∃휃1, 푝(푥⃗) ∈ 퐵푅∣푃1 ∣= 휃1휃푝(푥⃗)∨˙푃2 ∣= 휃1휃푝(푥⃗)
7 ∃푝(푥⃗) ∈ 퐵푅, 휃1∣휃1휃푥⃗ ∈ 풞풰 ,푃1,푃2(푝)
Table 5.2: Relaxation of condition 푃1 ∣= 휃퐵푅∨˙푃2 ∣= 휃퐵푅
equivalence ¬∀푥 퐴(푥) ≡ ∃푥∣¬퐴(푥) has been applied and the resulting existential
quantiﬁcation has been moved to the beginning.
Cell 4 presents the third relaxation we introduced, which can be explained
intuitively as follows. If there is a substitution which allows to infer every literal of
퐵푅 from 푃1, then such substitution allows to infer from 푃1 the literal which cannot
be inferred from 푃2. The condition in the ﬁrst line of Cell 4 is less strong than the
one in the ﬁrst line of Cell 3, since the latter requires that every literal of 퐵푅 can
be inferred from 푃1, whereas the former simply requires that a particular literal can
be inferred.
Cells 5a and 5b are rewritings of Cell 4: they summarize the two lines of Cell 4
by exploiting the logical equivalence involving existential quantiﬁcation we recalled
above. Line 5a (resp. 5b) assumes that the existentially quantiﬁed literal has the
form 푝(푥⃗) (resp. ∼ 푝(푥⃗)). Notice that, by applying the equivalence presented in
Item 3 of the previous list as well as the involutive property of classical negation,
the condition presented in line 5b does not diﬀer from the one presented in line 5a,
which we can hence assume to represent the general case as long as we interpret the
fragment 푝(푥⃗) ∈ 퐵푅 as denoting an atom (and not a literal anymore) appearing in
the body of a rule 푅, possibly within a negated literal.
Finally, Cell 6 is a rewriting of Cell 5a by applying the well-known deﬁnition of
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the ∨˙ operator and Cell 7 is a rewriting of Cell 6 by applying backwards Deﬁnition 47.
We are now ready to introduce the formal deﬁnition of modiﬁed change func-
tion.
Deﬁnition 48 (Modiﬁed change function) Given a universe 풰 and two Data-
log programs 푃1 and 푃2, the modiﬁed change function 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 associates each pred-
icate 푝 appearing in 푃1 or 푃2 with the set of 푥⃗ ∈ 풰푛 (modiﬁed change set) which
satisfy either of the following conditions
∙ ∃푅 ∈ 푃1 ∩ 푃2, 푝1(푥⃗1) ∈ 퐵푅, 휃, 휃1∣휃퐻푅 = 푝(푥⃗) ∧ 휃1휃푥⃗1 ∈ 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2(푝1)
∙ 푃1 ∣=푃1∖푃2 푝(푥⃗) ∧ ¬푃2 ∣= 푝(푥⃗)
∙ 푃2 ∣=푃2∖푃1 푝(푥⃗) ∧ ¬푃1 ∣= 푝(푥⃗)
where 푛 denotes the arity of 푝.
The ﬁrst condition in Deﬁnition 48 has been obtained by plugging the Cell 7 of
Tab. 5.2 into the ﬁrst line of Cell 5 of Tab. 5.1 and by moving the existential
quantiﬁcations to the beginning. The resulting expression has been further relaxed
by replacing the set 풞풰 ,푃1,푃2(푝) with a superset of it, namey 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2(푝) itself. Such
replacement makes Deﬁnition 48 recursive and this property will be exploited by
the algorithm presented in Fig. 5.3.
Intuitively, 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 associates each predicate 푝 appearing in 푃1 or 푃2 with the
set of its ground instances 푝(푥⃗) which
∙ either are a consequence of 푃1 by means of a rule not belonging to 푃2, but not
of 푃2
∙ or are a consequence of 푃2 by means of a rule not belonging to 푃1, but not of
푃1
∙ or match the head of some rule: (i) belonging to both 푃1 and 푃2; and (ii) such
that some (ground) instance of some predicate 푝1 in its body belongs to the
set 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 associates 푝 with
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Input:
a universe 풰
two Datalog programs 푃1 and 푃2
Output:
a map linking predicates with sets of their ground instances
푚푐푓(풰 , 푃1, 푃2) :
푝, 푝1 ≡ predicates
푥⃗ ≡ an 푛-upla of terms
푚1, 푚2 ≡ maps linking predicates with sets of their ground instances
푅 ≡ a rule
휃, 휃1 ≡ substitutions
(1) ∀푝 appearing in 푃1 or 푃2
(2) ∀푥⃗ ∈ 풰푎푟푖푡푦(푝)
(3) if(
(4) 푃1 ∣=푃1∖푃2 푝(푥⃗) ∧ ¬푃2 ∣= 푝(푥⃗)∨
(5) 푃2 ∣=푃2∖푃1 푝(푥⃗) ∧ ¬푃1 ∣= 푝(푥⃗)
(6) ) 푎푑푑(푚2, 푝, 푥⃗)
(7) do{
(8) 푚1 ::= 푚2
(9) ∀푝 appearing in 푃1 or 푃2
(10) ∀푅 ∈ 푃1 ∩ 푃2 such that 푝(푥⃗) appears in 퐻푅
(11) ∀휃 such that 휃푝(푥⃗) is ground
(12) if(퐵푅 is empty)
(13) 푎푑푑(푚2, 푝1, 휃푥⃗)
(14) else ∀푝1 such that 푝1(푥⃗1) appears in 퐵푅
(15) if(∃휃1∣푖푠퐼푛(푚1, 푝1, 휃1휃푥⃗1))
(16) 푎푑푑(푚2, 푝1, 휃푥⃗)
(17)} while(푚1 ∕= 푚2)
(18)return 푚2
Figure 5.3: Algorithm to compute the modiﬁed change function
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Deﬁnition 48 can be directly converted into an algorithm which computes the set
풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 associates a generic predicate 푝 with. Such algorithm (shown in Fig. 5.3)
relies on three auxiliary functions.
arity Returns the arity of the input predicate
add Adds the input 푛-upla to the set the input map links the input predicate with
isIn Returns true if the input 푛-upla belongs to the set the input map links the
input predicate with, false otherwise
Lines (1-6) of the algorithm initialize map 푚2 by computing for each predicate
appearing in 푃1 or 푃2 the subset of its extension which fulﬁlls either of the last two
conditions listed in Deﬁnition 48 and shown in lines (4-5).
The loop shown in lines (7-17) updates 푚2 (after keeping a backup copy in
푚1) by computing for each predicate appearing in 푃1 or 푃2 its ground instances
which fulﬁll the ﬁrst condition listed in Deﬁnition 48. The loop ends as soon as 푚2
does not diﬀer from 푚1, i.e., if 푚2 has not been modiﬁed during the last iteration:
in this case 푚2 is returned.
We notice that a loop is needed because the deﬁnition of modiﬁed change
function is recursive: the computation of the output of 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 for a given predicate
푝 requires that its output has been already computed for all predicates appearing
in the body of rules in whose head 푝 appears. On the other hand, as long as the
computation is not over yet, in general only a subset of the output of 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 for a
given predicate is available. For this reason, our algorithm computes the output of
풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 for a given predicate 푝 assuming that the output of the predicates 푝 depends
on has been completely computed, but then it checks this assumption by computing
the output of 풞ˆ풰 ,푃1,푃2 more and more times and only stops if a ﬁxed point is reached.
We notice that a ﬁxed point is always reached since, for each predicate 푝, the
set 푚2 links 푝 with cannot decrease and, in the worst case, it will be equal to 풰푛
(where 푛 denotes the arity of 푝), which is a ﬁnite set, since we assumed 풰 to be
ﬁnite.
We conclude this section by providing some qualitative remarks about the
eﬃciency of the algorithm shown in Fig. 5.3. The performance of such algorithm
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greatly varies according to the characteristics of the input programs. Beside the
trivial observation that the algorithm performs better: (i) the fewer predicates are
exploited in the input programs (line 9); (ii) the fewer rules are shared by them (line
10); and (iii) the smaller the universe is (line 11); it might be worth mentioning that
rules whose body is not empty have a bigger impact on the performance than facts,
since they require two further inner loops (lines 14-15) to be evaluated.
Lines 1-6 constitute the main diﬀerence between our algorithm and the na¨ıve
one which can be derived from Theorem 3: our algorithm does not require to com-
pute the extension of predicates w.r.t. the whole input programs but only w.r.t.
the rules which are not shared by them. For this reason, the improvement of our
algorithm over the na¨ıve one is especially visible whenever the input programs share
most rules, like in our application scenario, where the input programs represent the
policy in force before and after some modiﬁcations took place (with the reasonable
assumption that the modiﬁcations only involved a small part of the program).
Finally, if either of the input programs uses recursion, the loop shown in lines
(7-17) must be performed more than twice. The following example shows that
such loop might have to be performed up to #풰 + 1 times (where #퐴 denotes the
cardinality of a set 퐴). However, we do not believe that such cases often occurs in
practice.
(1) a(X) ← b(X, Y), a(Y).
(2) b(1, 0).
. . .
(푛) b(푛− 1, 푛− 2).
(푛+ 1) a(0).
Let assume that 풰 is the set of the ﬁrst 푛 natural numbers (where 푛 ≥ 1), 푃1 is the
Datalog program consisting of the ﬁrst 푛 rules shown above, whereas 푃2 consists
of all 푛 + 1 rules. Up to line (6) of the algorithm, 푚2 links the predicate 푎 with
the set {0}. At the end of the 푖-th iteration of the loop (where 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛), the
natural number 푖 has to be added to the set 푚2 links 푎 with. Since such set has been
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modiﬁed, a new iteration is needed. After the natural number 푛 has been added to
the set, the (푛+ 1)-th iteration does not add anything to such set and the loop can
be exited.
5.2.2 The Protune case
The algorithm presented in Fig. 5.3 can be easily adapted to Protune policies
in order to retrieve the atoms of the form allow(execute(requester, action,
resource)) which have to be re-evaluated against modiﬁcations to the policy.
The biggest diﬀerences between Datalog and Protune which are relevant in
this respect are: (i) Protune is a policy language and not a language for data
retrieval; (ii) the evaluation of a Protune literal might require to perform actions;
and (iii) Protune supports value-assignment atoms (cf. Section 3.2). In the re-
maining of this section we discuss whether and how each of these diﬀerences requires
changes to the algorithm presented in Fig. 5.3.
As described in Section 3.3, the process of evaluating a Protune query in-
volves up to two steps: checking whether the query can be evaluated and, if this is
the case, actually evaluating it. This chapter describes how to pre-evaluate triples
(푟푞, 푎, 푟푠), where 푟푞 is a requester allowed to perform the action 푎 on the resource
푟푠. For this reason, we are only concerned with the ﬁrst one of the two steps we
just mentioned, for which the single-step algorithm presented in Fig. 5.3 can still be
exploited.
As we just argued, the algorithm presented in Fig. 5.3 can be used to identify
the modiﬁed change set of Protune logical predicates appearing in a policy (cf.
Section 3.2). However, there is no standard way to identify the modiﬁed change set
of Protune provisional predicates, since its computation strongly depends on the
actions associated to the provisional predicates. At a general level, (at least) two
approaches are feasible.
∙ Assuming that the extension of provisional predicates has changed and recom-
puting it. This approach would require to modify the algorithm presented in
Fig. 5.3 by OR-ing a further condition to the ones listed in lines (4-5) stating
that 푝 is a provisional predicate. The drawback of this approach is that, in
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case the assumption does not hold (i.e., if the extension of some provisional
predicate did not change), the modiﬁed change set of the other predicates can
excessively overestimate their change set
∙ Requiring that the policy only exploits provisional predicates whose extension
does not change. This approach would require to modify the algorithm pre-
sented in Fig. 5.3 by adding to line (9) the further constraint that 푝 must be
a logical predicate. The drawback of this approach is that it is applicable to
a lower number of scenarios
Notice that, since in Protune environmental properties are retrieved by means of
provisional predicates, the second approach further constrains the restriction intro-
duced in Section 5.1.1, namely the exclusion from our scenario of policies which set
conditions on environmental properties.
Finally, the notation Protune uses to represent value-assignment atoms is
nothing but syntactic sugar: each atom of the form 푖푑[푎푡푡푟] = 푣푎푙 occurring in a
Protune policy could be systematically replaced by the Datalog-compatible atom
푝(푖푑, 푎푡푡푟, 푣푎푙) (where 푝 is the name of a predicate not occurring in the policy)
without modifying Protune’s semantics nor reducing its overall functionalities and
expressive power.
5.3 Experimental results
This section introduces the concept of “Semantic Desktop” and presents the
experimental results of the application of our general-purpose strategy (cf. Sec-
tion 5.1) to the Semantic Desktop scenario.
Personal Information Management (PIM) systems support users in organizing
and managing their e-mails, address books, calendars and other information on their
desktop. Systems like Google Desktop2, Beagle3, Haystack4 and Gnowsis [71] deﬁne
semantic data as any content available on the user’s personal information space.
Their primary goals are to provide convenient access to such semantic data and
2http://desktop.google.com/
3http://beagle-project.org/
4http://haystack.lcs.mit.edu/
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Figure 5.4: Architecture of the Semantic Desktop Beagle++ system and
semantic data sharing across desktops
to enable sharing of both desktop resources and metadata describing them across
PIMs.
Fig. 5.4 illustrates a Semantic Desktop as well as semantic data sharing across
desktops. Each user of the system possesses a Semantic Desktop corresponding to
her personal information space. Each desktop contains a set of resources the user
creates, modiﬁes or deletes as well as a set of applications along with their internal
resources. A set of ﬁlters and generators process these resources and generate
metadata to describe their content. For example, metadata for publications include
title and authors, metadata for e-mails include sender, receiver(s), subject and date.
Generated metadata are automatically stored in a database and used to maintain
an inverted index which maps keywords to actual resources in order to allow for
full-text query search.
In order to evaluate our general-purpose strategy against the Semantic Desktop
scenario, we simulated the evolution of a user’s desktop. At the beginning of the
simulation, the user has no resources (and therefore no policies). As resources are
added, requests for accessing them are issued. As described in Section 5.1, whenever
no policies have been deﬁned for a requested resource, the user is asked to accept or
reject the request. The user’s feedback is simulated by a random generator of binary
values. Resources keep being added until 1.000 policies have been deﬁned, i.e., a
number which we consider to be much bigger than the one of current real-world
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CREATE TABLE POLICY(
ID INT,
TYPE BOOLEAN,
NOW OR ALWAYS BOOLEAN,
DOMINATING POLICY NR INT
)
CREATE TABLE DOMINATES(
DOMINATING INT,
DOMINATED INT
)
CREATE TABLE AFFECT RESOURCE(
POLICY INT,
RESOURCE INT,
UNIQUE BOOLEAN
)
Figure 5.5: Schema of the database used in our evaluation
scenarios. At that time, we go the way back, i.e., we remove policies and resources
until neither the formers nor the latters are available in the system anymore.
Fig. 5.5 shows the schema of the relational database used in our evaluation
as an implementation of (a subset of) the UML diagram shown in Fig. 5.2. Table
POLICY contains information about the policies deﬁned by the user, namely, their
identiﬁer (ﬁeld ID) and type (allow or deny—ﬁeld TYPE), whether they apply only
to the resources available at policy creation-time or also to resources possibly added
later on (ﬁeld NOW OR ALWAYS) and the number of other policies dominating them
(ﬁeld DOMINATING POLICY NR). Notice that in our implementation the text of the
policies is not contained itself in the database but in a ﬁle the ID ﬁeld points to.
Table DOMINATES stores the priority relationships (cf. Section 5.1.2) between
policies, i.e., it is a set of pairs of policy identiﬁers whose ﬁrst element (ﬁeld
DOMINATING) dominates the second one (ﬁeld DOMINATED). Finally, table AFFECT RE-
SOURCE stores the inﬂuence relationships (cf. Section 5.1.3) between policies and
resources, i.e., it is a set of triples containing the identiﬁers of a resource (ﬁeld
RESOURCE) and of a policy aﬀecting it (ﬁeld POLICY) as well as a ﬂag (ﬁeld UNIQUE)
tracking whether the policy aﬀects only that resource.
Notice that no tables storing inﬂuence relationships between policies and re-
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Figure 5.6: Overhead of adding/removing resources
questers/actions are available. Because of symmetry reasons, in our evaluation we
restricted ourselves to only considering inﬂuence relationships between policies and
resources.
Fig. 5.6 shows the overhead of exploiting pre-evaluation when adding/removing
resources. As described in Section 5.1, the overhead of adding a resource amounts to
deﬁning inﬂuence relationships with the policies it is aﬀected by (i.e., in our imple-
mentation, to inserting rows into table AFFECT RESOURCES), whereas the overhead
of removing a resource amounts to
∙ removing all policies aﬀecting only that resource (i.e., in our implementation,
deleting rows from table POLICY)
∙ deleting all (inﬂuence) relationships it was involved in (i.e., in our implemen-
tation, deleting rows from table AFFECT RESOURCES)
The higher number of operations needed when removing an existing resource w.r.t.
adding a new one explains why in Fig. 5.6 the gradient of the Remove resource-curve
is higher than the one of the Add resource-curve.
Fig. 5.7 shows the overhead of exploiting pre-evaluation when adding/removing
policies. As described in Section 5.1, the overhead of adding a policy amounts to
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Figure 5.7: Overhead of adding/removing policies
∙ checking whether it conﬂicts with already deﬁned policies
∙ incrementing the dominatingPolicyNr attribute of the policies dominated by
the new one (i.e., in our implementation, updating rows of table POLICY)
∙ deﬁning inﬂuence relationships between the new policy and the resources it af-
fects (i.e., in our implementation, inserting rows into table AFFECT RESOURCES)
whereas the overhead of removing a policy amounts to
∙ decrementing the dominatingPolicyNr attribute of all policies which were
dominated by the deleted one (i.e., in our implementation, updating rows of
table POLICY)
∙ deleting all inﬂuence and priority relationships it was involved in (i.e., in our
implementation, deleting rows from tables AFFECT RESOURCES and DOMINATES)
Again, the higher number of operations needed when adding a new policy w.r.t.
removing an existing one explains why in Fig. 5.7 the Add policy-curve presents
higher values than the ones of the Remove policy-curve.
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Figure 5.8: Optimized vs. non-optimized policy evaluation
Finally, Fig. 5.8 shows the improvement of exploiting pre-evaluation when eval-
uating requests. The evaluation of a request by exploiting pre-evaluation amounts
to issuing a query to the database whose schema is shown in Fig. 5.5 in order to
retrieve the type of the policy aﬀecting the requested resource. If such a policy does
not exist then no policies aﬀecting such resource have been deﬁned yet and the user
is asked whether the request should be accepted or rejected.
The evaluation of a request without exploiting pre-evaluation is more complex.
Since no information is explicitly available about which policy aﬀects which resource,
one has to try out all policies deﬁned in the system until: either (i) a non-dominated
policy is found which applies to the requested resource; or (ii) it turns out that such
a policy does not exist. Notice that the second case, which applies to requests for
resources for which no policies have been deﬁned yet, requires to inspect each and
all of the policies deﬁned in the system and is hence more and more computationally
expensive as the number of policies increases (as it is reﬂected in Fig. 5.8).
When going through all policies deﬁned in the system, it could be a good
idea starting with the non-dominated ones, going down the dominance relationship
graph and stopping as soon as the condition above is satisﬁed. This way, as soon as
an applicable policy is found, it is guaranteed that such policy is not dominated by
107
Input:
a resource 푟
Output:
either of 퐴퐶퐶퐸푃푇 , 푅퐸퐽퐸퐶푇 or 푈푁퐷퐸퐹퐼푁퐸퐷
푒푣푎푙푢푎푡푒(푟) :
푃 ≡ a set of policies
푃 = 푔푒푡푁표푛퐷표푚푖푛푎푡푒푑푃표푙푖푐푖푒푠()
while(푃 ∕= ∅)
∀푝 ∈ 푃
if(푎푝푝푙푖푒푠푇표(푝, 푟))
if(푖푠퐴푙푙표푤푃표푙푖푐푦(푝))
return 퐴퐶퐶퐸푃푇
else return 푅퐸퐽퐸퐶푇
푃 = 푔푒푡퐷표푚푖푛푎푡푒푑푃표푙푖푐푖푒푠(푃 )
return 푈푁퐷퐸퐹퐼푁퐸퐷
Figure 5.9: Algorithm to ﬁnd the policy applicable to a given resource
any other one w.r.t. the requested resource. This algorithm, which we exploited in
our experiments, is formalized by the function 푒푣푎푙푢푎푡푒 in Fig. 5.9. Such function
evaluates the request to access a resource 푟 w.r.t. the policies deﬁned in the system
and relies on four auxiliary functions.
getNonDominatedPolicies Returns the set of non-dominated policies deﬁned in
the system
appliesTo Returns true if the input policy 푝 applies to the input resource 푟, false
otherwise
isAllowPolicy Returns true if the input policy 푝 is an allow policy, false otherwise
getDominatedPolicies Returns the set of policies deﬁned in the system which are
dominated by some policy in the input policy set 푃
Function 푒푣푎푙푢푎푡푒 iterates over the set of policies deﬁned in the system going down
the dominance relationship graph. As soon as an applicable policy is found, the
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request is accepted or rejected according to whether the policy is an allow or a deny
one. If no applicable policy is found, 푈푁퐷퐸퐹퐼푁퐸퐷 is returned.
To conclude, we notice that the more complex the policies deﬁned in the
system are, the more computationally expensive their non-optimized evaluation is
and hence the bigger the improvement of exploiting pre-evaluation is. In order not
to introduce biases in our experiments, we only exploited the easiest policies one
can deﬁne with the Protune policy language. Such policies simply state that a
resource can(not) be accessed and do not require any condition to be fulﬁlled. Here
is an example how such a(n allow) policy looks like
푎푙푙표푤(푎푐푐푒푠푠(푟푒푠표푢푟푐푒퐼푑)).
where 푟푒푠표푢푟푐푒퐼푑 is the identiﬁer of the resource to be accessed.
Because of this design choice, the improvement of the optimized request evalua-
tion over the non-optimized one shown in Fig. 5.8 is underestimated w.r.t. real-world
scenarios. Still, our experiments show that our approach is beneﬁcial whenever the
ratio between the number of evaluations and the number of other operations is at
least 4.5 (for up to 100 policies deﬁned in the system) or 1 (for more than 300
policies). We consider these numbers to be reasonable in most real-world scenarios.
5.4 Related work
In the last years, systems for collaborative work and ﬁle sharing gained increas-
ing popularity. The need for eﬀective search in this context despite the increasing
amount of information pushed forward further developments of search infrastruc-
tures for enterprise data management systems [45]. However, the sometimes private
nature of such shared information makes diﬃcult applying traditional document in-
dexing schemes directly: user access levels and access control have to be reﬂected in
the index structures and retrieval algorithms as well as when ranking the search re-
sults. The shortcomings of traditional ranking algorithms for search through access-
controlled collections is outlined in [26].
In the literature, several solutions have been proposed addressing the problem
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of preserving the privacy of data stored on public remote servers, which typically
provide a basis for community platforms. For example, cryptographic techniques
enable users to store encrypted text ﬁles on a remote server and retrieve them by
means of keyword search [28, 44, 79].
However, these solutions are not suitable for collaborative multi-user environ-
ments. Alternatively, the data shared within a community can be stored locally
by the user within an access-controlled collection. In this case, eﬃcient retrieval
algorithms to search through access-controlled collections must be provided in order
to enable information sharing within the community.
The authors of [11] address the problem of providing privacy-preserving search
over distributed access-controlled content. Although this technique enables random
provider selection, it does not allow to rank search results obtained from diﬀerent
document collections. On the other hand, our semantically enriched community
platform provides a uniﬁed view on the whole information set available to the user.
CHAPTER 6
Enabling Advanced and Context-Dependent Access Control
in RDF Stores
The Semantic Web vision [76] requires that existing data are provided with machine-
understandable annotations. These annotations (commonly referred to as metadata)
are meant to ease tasks such as data sharing and integration. These metadata
are typically represented in RDF/XML [14, 22] or other machine-understandable
formats, such as microformats [55] or RDFa [3], which can be conveniently translated
into RDF, e.g., by custom GRDDL [66] transformations.
However, it is often the case that unconditional sharing of metadata is undesir-
able: many Semantic Web applications require to control when, what and to whom
metadata are disclosed. Nevertheless, existing RDF stores and standard protocols
to access them, such as the SPARQL protocol [29], do not support access control or
their support is minimal (e.g., protection only applies to the repository as a whole
but not to the data it contains).
A possible solution to this problem would be to embed access control within the
RDF store. However, in this case the access-control mechanism would be repository-
dependent and not portable across diﬀerent platforms. Moreover, “hard-wired” pro-
tection mechanisms have proved to work well in the context of relational database
management systems (RDBMS), where the granularity of access control nicely scales
down to the table level. However, such mechanisms do not apply to RDF reposito-
ries, since there is no schema underlying the data they store.
A more general solution is to add a new component responsible for access
control-related issues on top of the RDF store. However, the problems such compo-
nent would have to face are not trivial since, e.g., it cannot limit itself to ﬁltering
triples which must be kept private out of the results of a query. This depends on
the fact that those triples might not be known in advance, as it happens when the
outcome of the query consists of triples not previously available in the RDF store
but created on-the-ﬂy, e.g., by means of a SPARQL [69] CONSTRUCT statement.
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In this chapter we describe how policy languages can be exploited to integrate
advanced access-control mechanisms based on policies with arbitrary RDF data
stores. Since the na¨ıve approach of evaluating the available policies for each triple
returned against a query would not scale as soon as the result set exceeds a certain
size, our solution requires to rewrite input RDF queries in order to embed into them
the constraints set by applicable policies. The modiﬁed queries are then sent to the
RDF store which executes them like usual RDF queries. Notice that our framework
enables access control at triple level, i.e., all triples returned as a response to the
query are allowed to be disclosed to the requester according to the policies in force.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 accounts for
alternative approaches and related work. In Section 6.2 we describe how a policy
engine can be integrated on top of a generic RDF store in order to enforce access
control at triple level. Finally, Section 6.3 presents our current implementation: a set
of experiments which estimate the impact of our approach in terms of performance
is included as well.
6.1 Related work
In order to ﬁne-grainedly control access to speciﬁc RDF statements, two main
approaches have been proposed: (i) ﬁltering the set of RDF statements returned by
a query as described, e.g., in [33]; and (ii) deﬁning a priori a set of RDF statements
that are allowed to be accessed by the requester as proposed, e.g., in [37].
As for restricting access to RDF data, ﬁltering query results in a separate
post-processing step after query execution as proposed in [33] is not an adequate
solution: current RDF query languages allow to arbitrarily structure the results, as
shown in the following example1.
CONSTRUCT {CC} newNS:isOwnedBy {User}
FROM {User} ex:hasCreditCard {CC};
foaf:name {Name}
WHERE Name = ‘Alice’
1Our examples use SeRQL [24] syntax (for the sake of simplicity we do not include namespace
deﬁnitions). However, the ideas behind our solution are language-independent and can be applied
to other RDF query languages, such as SPARQL.
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Here, ﬁltering the query results is not straightforward, since the result structure is
not known in advance. In fact, not the results produced by the query but rather
the data accessed in the FROM clause should be restricted. Moreover, the approach
suggested in [33] is not feasible for large result sets (e.g., suppose an unauthorized
requester submits a query asking for all available triples in the store), since it requires
to ﬁrst retrieve all triples and only at that point to ﬁlter out the ones which cannot
be disclosed.
A diﬀerent way to address this problem is to deﬁne a priori which subsets of an
RDF database can be accessed by some requester. This approach is pursued in [27]
which shows how Named Graphs can be used to evaluate SPARQL queries. Dietzold
et Auer [37] propose a framework which ﬁrst applies all access-control policies to
the whole RDF database and afterwards executes the query only on the subset of it
containing RDF triples which can be disclosed.
A priori solutions are only applicable to scenarios where access restrictions
depend on the data to be accessed. However, in Semantic Web scenarios, where
diﬀerent services might want to access RDF statements, access to data could have
to be additionally restricted according to externally checked, contextual conditions.
Therefore, pre-computing Named Graphs for each possible combination of environ-
mental factors cannot help, since in the worst case it would lead to a number of
graphs to be generated which is exponential in the number of environmental fac-
tors. Runtime creation of Named Graphs is infeasible too, since the creation process
would excessively slow down the response time.
Reddivari et al. [70] suggest to exploit simple rule-based policies over RDF
stores: such policies deﬁne graph patterns identifying subgraphs of the database
on which actions like read and update can be executed. The drawback of this
approach is performance against query evaluation, since the process of answering a
query requires to instantiate the graph patterns, i.e., to generate one graph for each
policy and to execute the given query on each graph.
Our approach ensures that access policies are satisﬁed by rewriting the queries
that are sent to an RDF store. Thus, there is no need to instantiate graphs before
query execution. Furthermore, our approach enables to exploit RDF Schema entail-
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ments similarly as done by the a priori approach described in [47]. For instance,
if an access-control policy states that no statements about foaf:OnlineAccounts
should be disclosed, then statements about foaf:OnlineEcommerceAccounts would
not be disclosed either, assuming that the latter is a subclass of the former.
Finally, none of the policy languages presented in Chapter 2 has been already
integrated into RDF databases.
6.2 Policy-based query expansion
As argued in Section 6.1, existing work on RDF data protection does not
suit the requirements of dynamic environments. Many available solutions are only
applicable to scenarios where access restrictions depend on the data to be accessed
but not on environmental factors, i.e., to scenarios where access-control policies
include data-dependent conditions but no context-dependent conditions.
To address this limitation, we decided to enforce an access-control layer on
top of RDF stores, which also has the positive side-eﬀect of making our solution
store-independent. Our strategy consists of two steps: ﬁrst, context-dependent
conditions stated by the applicable policies are identiﬁed and pre-evaluated. If
the pre-evaluation succeeds, the query is then modiﬁed in order to embed data-
dependent conditions, so that only allowed RDF statements are accessed by the
underlying RDF store at query-processing time.
By supporting both data- and context-dependent conditions, our solution al-
lows for more expressive policies than the ones supported by the approaches pre-
sented in Section 6.1, while at the same time relying on the highly optimized query
evaluation of the RDF store for the enforcement of data-dependent conditions.
6.2.1 RDF queries
The following deﬁnitions use a similar notation as in [68]: they rely on the
sets 퐼, 퐵, 퐿 and 푉 푎푟, which are supposed to be inﬁnite and mutually disjoint, and
to denote sets of IRIs, blank nodes, literals and variables respectively.
Deﬁnition 49 (RDF graph) An RDF graph is a ﬁnite subset of (퐼 ∪ 퐵) × 퐼 ×
(퐼 ∪퐵 ∪ 퐿).
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Deﬁnition 50 (Triple pattern) A triple pattern is a triple of the form (푠, 푝, 표),
where 푠 ∈ 퐼 ∪퐵 ∪ 푉 푎푟, 푝 ∈ 퐼 ∪ 푉 푎푟 and 표 ∈ 퐼 ∪퐵 ∪ 퐿 ∪ 푉 푎푟.
Deﬁnition 51 (Path Expression) A path expression is a set of triple patterns.
In the following, we will use 푣푎푟푠(푒) to denote the set of all variables occurring in a
triple pattern or path expression 푒.
Intuitively, path expressions are templates formed by triple patterns where
variables are allowed in any position, and are meant to model conjunctive queries
to be matched against RDF graphs.
In the following, we will mean by atomic constraint a property of an 푛-upla
of elements of 퐼 ∪퐵 ∪ 퐿 ∪ 푉 푎푟 (where 푛 ≥ 1). A property of a pair (푒1, 푒2) may be
the fact that 푒1 > 푒2. A property of a triple (푒1, 푒2, 푒3) may be the fact that 푒3 is
the string concatenation of 푒1 and 푒2.
The expressiveness of constraints heavily depends on the query language actu-
ally exploited. In order to keep the discussion as general as possible, we do not stick
to any speciﬁc existing language and hence do not further discuss the expressiveness
constraints may have.
Atomic constraints can be combined by means of boolean operators in order
to form boolean expressions.
Deﬁnition 52 (Query) A query is either a pair (푅퐹, 푃퐸) or a triple (푅퐹, 푃퐸,
퐵퐸) where
∙ 푃퐸 is a path expression (query pattern)
∙ 푅퐹 is
– either a set of variables ⊆ 푣푎푟푠(푃퐸)
– or a path expression such that 푣푎푟푠(푅퐹 ) ⊆ 푣푎푟푠(푃퐸)
(result form)
∙ 퐵퐸 is a set of boolean expressions
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(0) CONSTRUCT * FROM
(1) {Person} foaf:name {Name};
(2) foaf:phone {Phone};
(3) foaf:interest {Document};
(4) foaf:holdsAccount {Account}
Figure 6.1: Example RDF query
In the following, we will use 푣푎푟푠(푒) to denote the set of all variables occurring in a
result form, query pattern or boolean expression 푒.
Intuitively, our deﬁnition of “query” is meant to model RDF queries having the
following structure (cf. Section 6.19 in [4])2, where the WHERE section can possibly
be omitted.
SELECT 푅퐹/CONSTRUCT 푅퐹
FROM 푃퐸
WHERE 퐵퐸
In SELECT queries 푅퐹 is a set of variables, whereas in CONSTRUCT queries it is a path
expression. An example query is provided in Fig. 6.1, where the token * is exploited,
denoting either 푣푎푟푠(푃퐸) (in SELECT queries) or 푃퐸 (in CONSTRUCT queries). The
boolean expressions in 퐵퐸 are supposed to be AND-ed. If no access-control policy
were deﬁned, this query would return an RDF graph containing all RDF triples
matching the graph pattern deﬁned in the FROM block, i.e., the query answer would
include identiﬁer and name of a person, her phone number(s) and the document(s)
she is interested in as well as the account(s) she holds.
The following deﬁnition is taken from [64].
Deﬁnition 53 (Substitution) A substitution is a ﬁnite set of the form {푣1/푡1, . . .
푣푛/푡푛}, where 푛 ≥ 0 and ∀1 ≤ 푖, 푗 ≤ 푛 푣푖 ∈ 푉 푎푟, 푡푖 ∈ 퐼 ∪ 퐵 ∪ 퐿 ∪ 푉 푎푟, 푣푖 ∕= 푡푖 and
푖 ∕= 푗 ⇒ 푣푖 ∕= 푣푗.
2We focus on common read operations which all RDF query languages like SeRQL or SPARQL
support. Data manipulation operations, such as insert or delete, are supported by some exten-
sions such as SPARUL [74] but are not part of any standard yet.
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Deﬁnition 54 (disunify function) Given a triple pattern 푒 = (푠, 푝, 표) and a sub-
stitution 휃, the function 푑푖푠푢푛푖푓푦(푒, 휃) returns the pair (푒′, 퐵퐸), where 푒′ is a triple
pattern (푠′, 푝, 표′) and 퐵퐸 is a set of boolean expressions such that
∙
⎧⎨⎩
푠′ = 푣푠 and 퐵퐸푠 = {푣푠 = 푠} if 푠 /∈ 푉 푎푟
푠′ = 푣푠 and 퐵퐸푠 = {푣푠 = 푋} if 푠 ∈ 푉 푎푟, 푠/푋 ∈ 휃
푠′ = 푠 and 퐵퐸푠 = ∅ otherwise
∙
⎧⎨⎩
표′ = 푣표 and 퐵퐸표 = {푣표 = 표} if 표 /∈ 푉 푎푟
표′ = 푣표 and 퐵퐸표 = {푣표 = 푋} if 표 ∈ 푉 푎푟, 표/푋 ∈ 휃
표′ = 표 and 퐵퐸표 = ∅ otherwise
where
∙ 푣푠, 푣표 /∈ 푣푎푟푠(푒) nor appear they in 휃
∙ 푣푠 ∕= 푣표
∙ 퐵퐸 = 퐵퐸푠 ∪퐵퐸표
Example 31 In this example some applications of function disunify are provided.
∙ 푑푖푠푢푛푖푓푦((푎, 푏, 푐), ∅) = ((푋, 푏, 푌 ), {푋 = 푎, 푌 = 푐})
∙ 푑푖푠푢푛푖푓푦((푋, 푏, 푌 ), ∅) = ((푋, 푏, 푌 ), ∅)
∙ 푑푖푠푢푛푖푓푦((푋1, 푏, 푌1), {푋1/푋2, 푌1/푌2}) = ((푋3, 푏, 푌3), {푋3 = 푋2, 푌3 = 푌2})
Intuitively, subject and object of the triple pattern are replaced by variables, whereas
the boolean expressions keep track of their original values.
6.2.2 Specifying policies over RDF data
In order to restrict access to RDF statements, a policy language must allow
to specify graph patterns (i.e., path expressions and boolean expressions), such as
one can do in an RDF query. This implies that the policy language must allow to
explicitly deﬁne variables and to set constraints on the values they can assume. This
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requirement by itself excludes policy languages based on Description Logic [9] (e.g.,
KAoS—cf. Chapter 2), since Description Logic does not allow to explicitly deﬁne
variables. For this reason, in the following we will focus on the competing track of
policy languages which are based on the Logic Programming [64] formalism.
Policies of Logic Programming-based policy languages rely on the notion of
rule. We consider a policy rule to have the following form
(1) ALLOW/DENY ACCESS TO 푃퐸 IF
(2) 퐶푃1 AND . . . 퐶푃푙 AND
(3) 푃퐸1 AND . . . 푃퐸푚 AND
(4) 퐵퐸1 AND . . . 퐵퐸푛
where 푙,푚, 푛 ≥ 0, 푃퐸 and 푃퐸푖 (1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푚) are triple patterns, 퐶푃푗 (1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푙)
are context-dependent conditions and 퐵퐸푘 (1 ≤ 푘 ≤ 푛) are boolean expressions.
We call head of the rule the action shown in line (1) (i.e., ALLOW/DENY ACCESS
TO 푃퐸) and body of the rule the set of conditions appearing in lines (2-4). In the
following, we will use 퐻(푝표푙) (resp. 퐻푃퐸(푝표푙)) to denote the head (resp. triple
pattern in the head) of a policy rule 푝표푙 and 퐵(푝표푙) to denote the (possibly empty)
body of 푝표푙.
Notice that our policies are expressed in a high-level syntax. This way, we
allow them to the LP-based policy languages described in Chapter 2. On the other
hand, it is true that the policy language actually chosen will impact the expressive-
ness of the policies which can be speciﬁed, in particular: (i) the set of supported
atomic constraints to be exploited in the boolean expressions 퐵퐸푖; and (ii) the set
of supported context-dependent conditions. Finally, notice that, in order for our
solution to be applicable to a given query language and a given policy language,
the set of atomic constraints supported by the former must be a subset of the one
supported by the latter.
Suppose that Alice speciﬁed the policies presented in Tab. 6.1, whose intended
meaning is as follows.
1. Everyone can access Alice’s phone number(s)
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N∘ Policy
(i) ALLOW ACCESS TO
(#alice, foaf:phone, Z)
(ii) DENY ACCESS TO
(X, foaf:phone, Z) IF
(X, foaf:currentProject, #rewerse) AND
the requester is #recSer
(iii) ALLOW ACCESS TO
(X, foaf:phone, Z) IF
the requester is certified by #bbb AND
(#alice, foaf:knows, X)
(iv) ALLOW ACCESS TO
(X, Y, Z) IF
the current time is Time AND
09:00 < Time AND Time < 17:00 AND
Y = foaf:name AND X != #tom
(v) ALLOW ACCESS TO
(#alice, foaf:interest, Z) IF
(Z, rdf:type, foaf:Document) AND
(#alice, foaf:currentProject, P) AND
(Z, foaf:topic, T) AND (P, foaf:theme, T)
(vi) ALLOW ACCESS TO
(#alice, foaf:holdsAccount, X) IF
the requester is Y AND
(#alice, foaf:knows, Y)
(vii) ALLOW ACCESS TO
(X, Y, Z) IF
(X, rdf:type, foaf:Person) AND
the requester sends a credential C AND
the issuer of C is X
Table 6.1: Example of high-level policies controlling access to RDF state-
ments
2. The Recommender Service is not allowed to access the phone number(s) of
members of project REWERSE
3. Recognized trusted services (which have to provide a credential issued by the
Better Business Bureau—BBB) are allowed to access the phone number(s) of
people Alice knows
4. RDF statements containing the name of entities diﬀerent from Alice’s boss
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Tom can be accessed during work time
5. This policy controls the access to Alice’s interests. Only documents related to
her current project(s) can be accessed
6. A service can access Alice’s on-line eCommerce account only if the service was
invoked by a person known to Alice
7. A service can access information about a person if it can provide a credential
issued by this person
Context-dependent conditions are expressed in natural language (e.g., the requester
is ‘RecommenderService’ ), triple patterns according to the triple notation (e.g.,
(#푎푙푖푐푒, 푓표푎푓 : 푘푛표푤푠,푋)) and boolean expressions exploit the usual (in)equality
operators (e.g., 09 : 00 < 푇푖푚푒).
In order to evaluate policies and to handle conﬂicts which arise whenever two
(diﬀerent) policies allow and deny access to the same resource, we use a simple
policy-evaluation strategy, outlined by the following algorithm, which provides a
the deny by default strategy.
if a deny policy is applicable
then access to the triple(s) is denied
else if an allow policy is applicable
then access to the triple(s) is allowed
else access to the triple(s) is denied
More advanced algorithms exploiting priorities or default precedences among policies
(like in [48]) could be used as well.
6.2.3 Policy evaluation and query expansion
Given an RDF query, each RDF statement matching a triple pattern speciﬁed
in the FROM block is accessed and possibly returned. Our approach analyzes the
set of RDF statements to be accessed and restricts it according to the policies in
force. Context-dependent conditions are evaluated by the policy engine, which keeps
track of the results in its internal state Σ (cf. [19] – in other words, Σ determines at
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each instant the extension of the context-dependent predicates). On the other hand,
data-dependent constraints are added to the given query and hence automatically
enforced during query processing.
To illustrate the algorithm step by step, we consider the query deﬁned in
Fig. 6.1.
Deﬁnition 55 (Policy applicability) Given a triple pattern 푒, a set of policies
푃 and a time-dependent state Σ, we say that a policy 푝표푙 ∈ 푃 is applicable to 푒
according to Σ and 푃 iﬀ 퐻푃퐸(푝표푙) and 푒 are uniﬁable and there exists a variable
substitution 휎′′ such that
∙ 휎′ = 푚푔푢(푒,퐻푃퐸(푝표푙)), where 푚푔푢 denotes the most general uniﬁer [64]
∙ 휎 = 휎′휎′′
∙ ∀푐푝 ∈ 퐵(푝표푙) 푃 ∪ Σ ∣= 휎푐푝
∙ ∀푏푒 ∈ 퐵(푝표푙) such that
– 푣푎푟푠(휎푏푒) ∩ 푣푎푟푠(휎푒) = ∅ and
– ∀푝푒 ∈ 퐵(푝표푙) 푣푎푟푠(휎푏푒) ∩ 푣푎푟푠(휎푝푒) = ∅
it holds that 푃 ∪ Σ ∣= 휎푏푒
and the result of its application to 푒 is a pair (푃퐸,퐵퐸) such that
∙ 푃퐸 = {푝푒′∣푝푒 ∈ 퐵(푝표푙), 푑푖푠푢푛푖푓푦(푝푒, 휎) = (푝푒′, ⋅)}
∙ 퐵퐸0 =
∪
푖∈{퐵퐸∣푝푒∈퐵(푝표푙),푑푖푠푢푛푖푓푦(푝푒,휎)=(⋅,퐵퐸)} 푖
∙ 퐵퐸1 = {휎푏푒∣푏푒 ∈ 퐵(푝표푙)∧∃푝푒 ∈ 퐵(푝표푙) : 푣푎푟푠(휎푏푒)∩(푣푎푟푠(휎푝푒)∪푣푎푟푠(휎푒)) ∕=
∅}
∙ 퐵퐸 = 퐵퐸0 ∪퐵퐸1 ∪ {푋 = 푌 ∣푋/푌 ∈ 휎 ∧푋 ∈ 푣푎푟푠(푒) ∧ 푌 ∈ 퐶표푛푠푡}
In the following, we will use 푖푠퐴푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒) to refer to the fact that a policy 푝표푙
belonging to a set of policies 푃 is applicable to a triple pattern 푒 according to a
state Σ and 푎푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒) to refer to the result of such application.
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Intuitively, a policy 푝표푙 is applicable to a triple pattern 푒 if the triple the
policy is protecting uniﬁes with 푒 and; (i) all context-dependent predicates; and
(ii) all boolean expressions which do not share variables with 푒 nor with any of the
triple patterns in the body of 푝표푙; hold according to the available set of policies and
state. The result of the application is a pair whose ﬁrst element is a modiﬁed version
of the set of triple patterns available in the body of 푝표푙 and whose second element
is a set of boolean expressions comprising
∙ the boolean expressions created when disunifying the triple patterns available
in the body of 푝표푙
∙ a modiﬁed version of the boolean expressions available in the body of 푝표푙 which
share variables with 푒 or with some triple pattern in the body of 푝표푙
∙ the ground bindings available in the substitution
Example 32 Tab. 6.2 shows all pairs (푝표푙, 푒) (where 푝표푙 is applicable to 푒) as well
as the result of the application of 푝표푙 to 푒. The ﬁrst column of the table shows the
policy number (푁푝) as it has been introduced in Tab. 6.1, whereas the second column
shows the number of the triple pattern (푁푡) as it has been introduced in Fig. 6.1.
The further columns exploit the terminology introduced in Deﬁnition 55. When
computing the applicability of a policy to a triple pattern we made the following
assumptions concerning the evaluation of context-dependent predicates.
∙ In policies (ii) and (vi) the requester is #recSer
∙ In policy (iii) the requester is certiﬁed by #bbb
∙ In policy (iv) the current time is 15:00
∙ In policy (vii) the requester sent a credential #cred issued by #bbb
Before we describe the query expansion algorithm we specify the conditions under
which a query does not need to be evaluated since the result is empty.
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Deﬁnition 56 (Query failure) Given a query 푞 = (푅퐹, 푃퐸,퐵퐸), a set of poli-
cies 푃 and a state Σ, we say that 푞 fails if either of the following two conditions
hold.
∙ ∃푒 ∈ 푃퐸 ∄푝표푙 ∈ 푃 ∣푝표푙 is an allow policy ∧푖푠퐴푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒)
∙ ∃푒 ∈ 푃퐸, 푝표푙 ∈ 푃 ∣푝표푙 is a deny policy ∧푖푠퐴푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒) ∧ 푎푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒) =
(∅, ∅)
Intuitively, a query fails if there does not exist any triple to be returned according
to both the query and the applicable policies, i.e., if the query contains at least one
triple pattern for which no matching triples are allowed to be accessed (deny by
default) or for which all matching triples are not allowed to be accessed (explicit
deny).
The query expansion algorithm is deﬁned as follows.
Input:
Two sets of triple patterns 푃퐸1 and 푃퐸2
A set of boolean expressions 퐵퐸 ′
Output:
푃퐸 ≡ a set of triple patterns
퐵퐸 ≡ a set of boolean expressions
푟푒푚표푣푒퐷푢푝푙푖푐푎푡푒푠(푃퐸1, 푃퐸2, 퐵퐸
′):
휃 ≡ a substitution
(1) 푃퐸 = 휃 = ∅
(2) ∀푝푒2 ∈ 푃퐸2
(3) if ∃푝푒1 ∈ 푃퐸1∣푝푒2 and 푝푒1 are uniﬁable
(4) 휃 = 휃푚푔푢(푝푒2, 푝푒1)
(5) else 푃퐸∪ = {푝푒2}
(6) 퐵퐸 = {휃푏푒′∣푏푒′ ∈ 퐵퐸 ′}
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Input:
a query 푞 = (푅퐹,푃퐸,퐵퐸)
a set of policies 푃
a state Σ
Output:
푃퐸+푛푒푤 ≡ a set of triple patterns (from allow policies)
푃퐸−푛푒푤 ≡ a set of triple patterns (from deny policies)
퐵퐸+푛푒푤 ≡ a set of boolean expressions (from allow policies)
퐵퐸−푛푒푤 ≡ a set of boolean expressions (from deny policies)
푝표푙푖푐푦퐹 푖푙푡푒푟푖푛푔(푞, 푃,Σ):
퐵퐸+표푟 ≡ a set of boolean expressions (from allow policies)
퐵퐸−표푟 ≡ a set of boolean expressions (from deny policies)
푃푎푝푝 ≡ a set of policies
(1) 푃퐸+푛푒푤 = 푃퐸
−
푛푒푤 = 퐵퐸
+
푛푒푤 = 퐵퐸
−
푛푒푤 = ∅
(2) ∀푒 ∈ 푃퐸
(3) 퐵퐸+표푟 = 퐵퐸
−
표푟 = ∅
// check allow policies
(4) 푃푎푝푝 = {푝표푙 ∈ 푃 ∣푝표푙 is an allow policy ∧푖푠퐴푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒)}
(5) if 푃푎푝푝 = ∅
// no triples matching 푒 can be accessed
return query failure
(6) ∀푝표푙 ∈ 푃푎푝푝
(7) 푎푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒) = (푃퐸
′, 퐵퐸′)
(8) 푟푒푚표푣푒퐷푢푝푙푖푐푎푡푒푠(푃퐸+푛푒푤, 푃퐸
′, 퐵퐸′) = (푃퐸′′, 퐵퐸′′)
(9) 푃퐸+푛푒푤∪ = 푃퐸′′
(10) 퐵퐸+표푟∪ = {∧푏푒∈퐵퐸′′푏푒}
(11) 퐵퐸+푛푒푤∪ = {∨푏푒∈퐵퐸+표푟 푏푒}
// check deny policies
(12) 푃푎푝푝 = {푝표푙 ∈ 푃 ∣푝표푙 is a deny policy ∧푖푠퐴푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒)}
(13) if ∃푝표푙 ∈ 푃푎푝푝 : 푎푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒) = (∅, ∅)
// all triples matching 푒 cannot be accessed
return query failure
(14) ∀푝표푙 ∈ 푃푎푝푝
(15) 푎푝푝푙푃,Σ(푝표푙, 푒) = (푃퐸
′, 퐵퐸′)
(16) 푟푒푚표푣푒퐷푢푝푙푖푐푎푡푒푠(푃퐸−푛푒푤, 푃퐸′, 퐵퐸′) = (푃퐸′′, 퐵퐸′′)
(17) 푃퐸−푛푒푤∪ = 푃퐸′′
(18) 퐵퐸−표푟∪ = {∧푏푒∈퐵퐸′′푏푒}
(19) 퐵퐸−푛푒푤∪ = {∨푏푒∈퐵퐸−표푟 푏푒}
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Intuitively, function 푟푒푚표푣푒퐷푢푝푙푖푐푎푡푒푠: (i) merges two sets of triple patterns so
that triple patterns which are equal beside variable renaming are not taken into
account; and (ii) modiﬁes a set of boolean expressions in order to take into account
the merging performed during the previous step. First, the output parameter 푃퐸 as
well as the local variable 휃 are initialized to the empty set (line 1). Afterwards, for
each triple pattern 푝푒2 belonging to the input parameter 푃퐸2 (line 2) it is checked
whether 푝푒2 already belongs to the input parameter 푃퐸1 beside variable renaming.
To this goal, it is checked whether 푃퐸1 contains a triple pattern 푝푒1 which is uniﬁable
with 푝푒2 (line 3). If this is the case, 휃 is updated by composing it with the most
general uniﬁer between 푝푒2 and 푝푒1 (line 4), otherwise 푝푒2 is added to 푃퐸1 (line 5).
Finally, the output parameter 퐵퐸 is set to be equal to the input parameter 퐵퐸 ′,
beside the fact that the substitution 휃 is applied to all boolean expressions in 퐵퐸 ′
(line 6).
Intuitively, for each triple pattern available in the FROM clause of a query,
function 푝표푙푖푐푦퐹 푖푙푡푒푟푖푛푔 retrieves the policies applicable to it. The triple patterns
resulting from the application (cf. Deﬁnition 55) of the policies to the triples are
collected. The boolean expressions resulting from the application of a policy to
a triple are AND-ed, whereas the AND-expressions resulting from the application of
all (applicable) policies to a triple are OR-ed and such OR-expressions are collected.
During the whole process, allow and deny policies are kept separate.
First, the output parameters 푃퐸+푛푒푤, 푃퐸
−
푛푒푤, 퐵퐸
+
푛푒푤 and 퐵퐸
−
푛푒푤 are initialized
to the empty set (line 1). Afterwards, for each triple pattern 푒 available in the FROM
clause of the input query (line 2) the local variables 퐵퐸+표푟 and 퐵퐸
−
표푟 are initialized
to the empty set (line 3) and allow (line 4) and deny (line 12) policies applicable
to 푒 are subsequently inspected. According to Deﬁnition 56, if no applicable allow
policies are found (line 5) or some deny policy applies without any restriction (line
13) the query fails. Otherwise, for each applicable policy (lines 6, 14) functions 푎푝푝푙
(cf. Deﬁnition 55—lines 7, 15) and 푟푒푚표푣푒퐷푢푝푙푖푐푎푡푒푠 (lines 8, 16) are subsequently
invoked in order to retrieve a set of triple patterns 푃퐸 ′′ and a set of boolean ex-
pressions 퐵퐸 ′′. The triple patterns belonging to 푃퐸 ′′ are added to 푃퐸+푛푒푤 (line 9)
and 푃퐸−푛푒푤 (line 17), whereas the boolean expressions belonging to 퐵퐸
′′ are AND-ed
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and the result expression is added to 퐵퐸+표푟 (line 10) and 퐵퐸
−
표푟 (line 18). After all
applicable policies have been checked, the boolean expressions belonging to 퐵퐸+표푟
(resp. 퐵퐸−표푟) are OR-ed and the result expression is added to 퐵퐸
+
푛푒푤 (line 10) (resp.
퐵퐸−푛푒푤—line 18).
Example 33 Tab. 6.3 exempliﬁes the application of function 푝표푙푖푐푦퐹 푖푙푡푒푟푖푛푔 to the
query shown in Fig. 6.1 and the policies shown in Tab. 6.1. We made the following
assumptions concerning the evaluation of context-dependent predicates.
∙ The requester is #recSer (therefore policies (ii) and (vi) apply to the query)
∙ The requester is certiﬁed by #bbb (therefore policy (iii) applies to the query)
∙ The current time is 18:00 (therefore policy (iv) does not apply to the query)
∙ The requester sent a credential #푐푟푒푑 issued by #푏푏푏 (therefore policy (vii)
applies to the query)
Because of these assumptions, all policies but (iv) are applicable to the query. The
ﬁrst two columns of Tab. 6.3 do not diﬀer from the corresponding ones of Tab. 6.2,
whereas the further columns show the values returned by function 푟푒푚표푣푒퐷푢푝푙푖푐푎푡푒푠
(푃퐸 and 퐵퐸) as well as the last value of its local variable 휃 upon subsequent calls
within function 푝표푙푖푐푦퐹 푖푙푡푒푟푖푛푔, assuming that both the triple patterns in the WHERE
clause of the query and the policies in Tab. 6.1 are processed in a top-down fashion.
Finally, notice that allow (resp. deny) policies are shown in the upper (resp. lower)
part of Tab. 6.3.
Tab. 6.3 allows to retrieve the output parameters of function 푝표푙푖푐푦퐹 푖푙푡푒푟푖푛푔:
푃퐸−푛푒푤 = {(푋1, 푓표푎푓 : 푐푢푟푟푒푛푡푃푟표푗푒푐푡,푋2)} and 퐵퐸−푛푒푤 = {푋1 = 푃푒푟푠표푛 ∧ 푋2 =
#푟푒푤푒푟푠푒}. 푃퐸+푛푒푤 is the union of the sets appearing in column 푃퐸 (beside the last
line), whereas 퐵퐸+푛푒푤 can be computed as follows.
1. All equalities appearing in each cell of column 퐵퐸 must be AND-ed
2. The conjunctions built during the previous step which refer to the same triple
pattern must be OR-ed
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3. 퐵퐸+푛푒푤 is the set of the disjunctions built during the previous step
Deﬁnition 57 (Expanded query) An expanded query is a pair ((푅퐹+, (푃퐸+,
푃퐸+푂), 퐵퐸
+), (푅퐹−, (푃퐸−, 푃퐸−푂), 퐵퐸
−)) where
∙ (푅퐹+, 푃퐸+, 퐵퐸+) and (푅퐹−, 푃퐸−, 퐵퐸−) are (usual) queries
∙ 푃퐸+푂 and 푃퐸−푂 are path expressions
Intuitively, an expanded query is meant to model RDF queries having the following
structure.
CONSTRUCT 푅퐹+
FROM 푃퐸+ [ 푃퐸+푂 ]
WHERE 퐵퐸+
MINUS
CONSTRUCT 푅퐹−
FROM 푃퐸− [ 푃퐸−푂 ]
WHERE 퐵퐸−
where
∙ MINUS denotes the set diﬀerence operator: the result set of the query above
is the set of results which are returned by the ﬁrst subquery but not by the
second one
∙ [ and ] denote the optional path expression modiﬁer: path expressions con-
tained within the brackets do not have to be matched to ﬁnd query results
Input:
a query 푞 = (푅퐹, 푃퐸,퐵퐸)
a set of policies 푃
a state Σ
Output:
an expanded query 푞 = (푅퐹+, (푃퐸+, 푃퐸+푂), 퐵퐸
+), (푅퐹−, (푃퐸−, 푃퐸−푂), 퐵퐸
−))
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푒푥푝푎푛푑푄푢푒푟푦(푞, 푃,Σ)
1) 푝표푙푖푐푦퐹 푖푙푡푒푟푖푛푔(푞, 푃,Σ) = (푃퐸+푛푒푤, 푃퐸
−
푛푒푤, 퐵퐸
+
푛푒푤, 퐵퐸
−
푛푒푤)
2) 푅퐹+ = 푅퐹− = 푅퐹
3) 푃퐸+ = 푃퐸− = 푃퐸
4) 푃퐸+푂 = 푃퐸
+
푛푒푤
5) 푃퐸−푂 = 푃퐸
−
푛푒푤
6) 퐵퐸+ = 퐵퐸 ∪퐵퐸+푛푒푤
7) 퐵퐸− = 퐵퐸 ∪퐵퐸−푛푒푤
Intuitively, function 푒푥푝푎푛푑푄푢푒푟푦 modiﬁes a query having the structure shown
in Section 6.2.1 into a query having the structure shown above. Optional path
expressions as well as further boolean expressions integrating the ones available in
the original query are provided by the 푝표푙푖푐푦퐹 푖푙푡푒푟푖푛푔 function.
Example 34 Fig. 6.2 shows the result of applying function 푒푥푝푎푛푑푄푢푒푟푦 to the
query shown in Fig. 6.1 and the policies shown in Tab. 6.1, with the same assump-
tions as in Example 33.
6.3 Implementation
In this section we present the implementation of the algorithm we described
in Section 6.2.3. We ﬁrst introduce a generic architecture (which we call Access
Control for RDF Stores—AC4RDF) and describe our concrete implementation. Af-
terwards, we demonstrate how we successfully integrated AC4RDF into existing
infrastructures. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our approach.
6.3.1 Architecture
A key goal of our approach is to be applicable to and reusable in diﬀerent
settings in which access to RDF data should be controlled. Our RDF query rewrit-
ing framework is based on three external component, which can be autonomously
conﬁgured and adapted to a speciﬁc setting.
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CONSTRUCT *
FROM {Person} foaf:name {Name};
foaf:phone {Phone};
foaf:interest {Document};
foaf:holdsAccount {Account}
[ {X11} rdf:type {X12},
{X3} foaf:knows {X4},
{X7} foaf:currentProject {P},
{X8} foaf:topic {T},
{P} foaf:theme {T} ]
WHERE ( X11 = #bbb AND X12 = foaf:Person ) AND
( Person = #alice OR
( X3 = #alice AND X4 = Person ) OR
( X11 =#bbb AND X12 = foaf:Person )
) AND (
( X11 = Document AND X12 = foaf:Document AND
X7 = #alice AND X8 = Document AND
Person = #alice
) OR
( X11 = #bbb AND X12 = foaf:Person )
) AND (
( X3 = #alice AND X4 = #recSer AND
Person = #alice
) OR
( X11 = #bbb AND X12 = foaf:Person )
)
MINUS
CONSTRUCT *
FROM {Person} foaf:name {Name};
foaf:phone {Phone};
foaf:interest {Document};
foaf:holdsAccount {Account}
[ {X1} foaf:currentProject {X2} ]
WHERE X1 = Person AND X2 = #rewerse
Figure 6.2: Expanded RDF query
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Figure 6.3: Architecture of AC4RDF
RDF Query Language Nowadays, many RDF query languages exist. Although
SPARQL has recently become a W3C Recommendation, SeRQL and RDQL
[73] are still being used. Therefore, we designed our framework in order to be
able to support diﬀerent RDF query languages
Policy language As mentioned in Section 6.1, diﬀerent policy languages and en-
gines can be exploited in order to specify and enforce RDF access-control
policies. Our framework is able to deal with diﬀerent policy languages and
engines, as long as they provide the required expressiveness as described in
Section 6.2.2
RDF store Finally, our framework is agnostic on the way RDF data are stored
in order to support application scenarios which require diﬀerent stores (like
Sesame3 [25], Kowari4 or Jena5)
The interface to such external components is provided by the Query Extension, Ac-
cess Control and Repository Access modules of AC4RDF, whose generic architecture
is shown in Fig. 6.3.
3http://www.openrdf.org/
4http://kowari.sourceforge.net/
5http://jena.sourceforge.net/
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Query Extension The main task of this module is to rewrite a given query in such
a way that only allowed RDF statements are accessed and returned. To this
goal, it has to query the Access Control module for each FROM clause of the
input query in order to retrieve further path expressions and constraints (cf.
Section 6.2.3) which will be used to expand the query. Currently, an interface
for the SeRQL query language is available
Access Control This module is responsible for evaluating the policies available
in the system against the requests issued by the Query Extension module.
The evaluation may take into account contextual information provided by the
Query Extension module, such as properties of the requester (possibly to be
certiﬁed by credentials) or environmental factors (e.g., time of the request).
Currently, an interface for the Protunepolicy language and framework is
available
Repository Access When the expanded query is sent to the underlying RDF
repository, it must be ensured that the latter is able to interpret it. For
this reason, the main task of this module is to translate the incoming query
in a language the repository is able to understand. Since our implementation
exploits Sesame, which natively supports SeRQL, we could skip the transla-
tion step. Since the returned result set only contains allowed statements, it
can be directly handed over to the requester
6.3.2 Experiments and evaluation
We set up a Sesame database with more than 3,000,000 RDF statements about
persons and mails into a Quad CPU AMD Opteron 2.4GHz with 32GB memory and
issued the queries from a Dual Pentium 3.00GHz with 2GB memory. We tested our
approach in the worst case by issuing a query which would return a very large
number of results (namely 1,280,000) if access control were disabled.
Fig. 6.4 shows the time needed to evaluate the query if access control is en-
abled: the query has been issued many times with diﬀerent policies, which led to
diﬀerent expanded queries. The results are ordered according to the number of fur-
ther FROM and WHERE literals of the expanded query w.r.t. the original one. Graph
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(a) shows experiments performed when only allow policies were deﬁned, whereas
the experiments reported in graph (b) used both allow and deny policies.
Both graphs show that the addition of WHERE literals linearly increases the
evaluation time. The reasons for this increment are: (i) each WHERE literal speciﬁes
new triples that are allowed to be accessed, therefore the number of triples that will
be returned increases; and (ii) the further literals require time for their evaluation.
As the reader can notice, both graphs show a huge increment of the evaluation
time when six FROM literals are added. Upon closer inspection of the behavior of the
repository, we observed that the new literals produced a triplication of the number
of triples to be considered, even though none of the new ones was to be returned
(for this reason we believe that appropriate optimizations in the repository would
help to increment the performance).
We also made other experiments (not reported here) with more selective
queries and we noticed that the addition of FROM literals only produced linear in-
crement of the evaluation time.
These results demonstrate that the approach described in this chapter scales
to a large number of policies since, even if thousands of policies are deﬁned in the
system, not all of them will contribute to expand the original query with new literals.
Only those: (i) protecting the triples appearing in the FROM clause of the original
query; and (ii) whose context-dependent conditions are fulﬁlled; will be taken into
account.
Our approach is especially appealing if the policies available in the system
induce the expanded query to only contain boolean constraints and selective path
expressions. In such a setting, longer evaluation times could be a reasonable price
for the advantages provided by ﬁne-grained access control. In particular, this cost
may be acceptable for Semantic Web applications and services that must deal with
sensitive data and which use highly selective queries.
On the other hand, further optimizations are required in order to reduce the
evaluation time for non-selective queries: such optimizations include improvements
in the query expansion process, reordering of constraints as well as native optimiza-
tions in the RDF repository.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.4: Response time when increasing the number of FROM and WHERE
literals: (a) with allow policies; and (b) with allow and deny
policies
CHAPTER 7
Conclusions and Outlook
We have illustrated the Protune policy framework and described how it can be
used in order to create a security level on top of metadata stores and RDF reposi-
tories. The positive performance evaluation experiments we reported showed Pro-
tune’s feasibility w.r.t. real-world scenarios. According to [38, 31], Protune is
one of the most complete policy frameworks available to date w.r.t the desiderata
laid out in the literature. More information about Protune and the vision be-
hind it can be found on the Web site of REWERSE’s working group on policies:
http://cs.na.infn.it/rewerse/. There, on the software page, the interested
reader can ﬁnd links to Protune’s software and some on-line demos and videos.
The main challenges for Protune are related to usability: Protune tackles
usability issues by (partially or totally) automating the information exchange oper-
ations related to access control and information release control, and by providing a
natural language front-end for policy authoring.
We plan to continue the development of Protune by adding new features
and improving the prototype. In particular, we plan to support reliable forms of ev-
idences not based on standard certiﬁcation authorities by exploiting services such as
OpenId and enabling user-centric credential creation. Support to obligation policies
is another foreseen extension (preliminary work is reported in [5, 54, 53, 18]).
Another important line of research concerns standardization: we are inves-
tigating how Protune’s policies and messages can be encoded by adapting and
combining existing standards such as XACML (for decision rules—cf. Chapter 2),
RuleML1 or RIF2 (for rule-based ontologies), WS-Security3 (for message exchange)
and so on. Concerning W3C’s RIF initiative, our working group has contributed
with a use case about policy and ontology sharing in trust negotiation.
Finally, we plan to complete some preliminary work which has been accounted
1http://ruleml.org/
2http://www.w3.org/2005/rules/wiki/RIF_Working_Group
3http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=wss
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for in the previous chapters, namely: (i) speciﬁcation of the semantics of the Pro-
tune policy language; (ii) more thorough user evaluation of feasibility, eﬃcacy and
eﬃciency of Protune’s natural language front-end; and (iii) experimental evalu-
ation of the special-purpose strategy to create a security level on top of metadata
stores by protecting them by means of Protune policies.
1. Section 3.5 described how Protune policies can be brought to a canoni-
cal form (beside variable renaming), thereby providing the ﬁrst step toward
the deﬁnition of the semantics of the Protune policy language. However,
the semantics of a generic Protune policy in canonical form has not been
described in this work. Two (non mutually exclusive) ways appear to be
feasible: (i) describing how a Protune policy can be mapped to a Logic
Program (whose semantics has been extensively described in the literature—
cf. [64]); and (ii) providing an executable semantics. The latter strategy bases
on the Model-driven architecture [56] approach to software design, originally
pursued by the Object Management Group4. By means of automatic gener-
ators, MDA-based tools (most noticeably, the Eclipse Modeling Framework5)
allow to create reference implementations of a system out of a description of
its model
2. Section 4.3.3 reported on the results of a preliminary unsupervised user study
evaluating the usability of Protune’s natural language front-end. However, it
is desirable conﬁrming the results of such user study through a more thorough
one, conducted in a supervised fashion and involving more participants as well
as a higher number of policies
3. Chapter 5 presented a general-purpose strategy and a special-purpose one to
lower the policy enforcement time by exploiting pre-evaluation. However, only
the general-purpose strategy has been evaluated (cf. Section 5.3), whereas
solely the theoretical properties of the special-purpose one have been investi-
gated
4http://www.omg.org/
5http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/
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